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NEEDED: MORE THAN A PAPER SHIELD
Sandra Davidson* and David Herrera**
[I]t is essential to the democracy of the United States that journalists
may report important information to the public without fear of intimi-
dation or imprisonment.1
INTRODUCTION
“When governments repress their people, press freedom is among the most power-
ful vehicles for exposing misdeeds,” declared United Nations Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon on World Press Freedom Day 2011.2 “Today it is the peoples of North Africa
and the Middle East mobilizing for their democratic rights and freedoms,” Secretary
Ban continued, “[a]nd they are doing so with a heavy reliance on new media.”3
WikiLeaks could not have been far from the Secretary’s mind. The website’s slow
release of 251,287 diplomatic cables from the U.S. State Department, beginning in
November 2010,4 has been cited as a contributing cause of the 2011 “Arab Spring”
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere.5
* Sandra Davidson, Ph.D., J.D., teaches media law at the University of Missouri School
of Journalism and School of Law. She is the attorney for the Columbia Missourian, the
community newspaper produced at the School of Journalism.
** David Herrera graduated with a master’s degree from the Missouri School of Journalism
in 2011.
1 S. Res. 192, 109th Cong. (2005).
2 Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Sec.-Gen., Remarks on World Press Freedom Day (May 4, 2011),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=5242 (last visited May 1, 2012).
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside
U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1.
5 See, e.g., Robert Mackey, Qaddafi sees WikiLeaks Plot in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES: THE
LEDE BLOG, (Jan. 17, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/qaddafi
-sees-wikileaks-plot-in-tunisia/; Peter Walker, Amnesty International Hails WikiLeaks and
Guardian as Arab Spring ‘Catalysts,’ GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 13, 2011, http://www.guardian
.co.uk/world/2011/may/13/amnesty-international-wikileaks-arab-spring. Assange himself said
WikiLeaks was responsible in part for the regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia. See Wikileaks’
Julian Assange Takes Credit for Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 14,
2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1356754/Wikileaks-Julian-Assange-takes
-credit-Tunisian-Egyptian-revolutions.html#ixzz1JniuB74Zntstu. Even Libya’s Muammar 
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For those interested in shield laws for journalists, WikiLeaks exemplifies the new,
complex reality facing the legal community.6 The website maintains a policy of pro-
tecting its sources, even from news outlets with which it collaborates on document
releases.7 But protecting it from whom? WikiLeaks’ servers are located worldwide,8 
Qaddafi joined in. See Matthew Weaver, Muammar Gaddafi Condemns Tunisia Uprising,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammar
-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising.
The Bangkok Post reported: “For those seeking to better understand the events in Egypt,
by far the best source of information is WikiLeaks. The huge release of cables from the US
[sic] embassy in Cairo offer fascinating insights and background into the drama unfolding in
Tahrir square.” Imtiaz Muqbil, WikiLeaks: Clues to a Failed U.S. Policy, BANGKOK POST,
Feb. 6, 2011, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/220085/wikileaks-clues-to-a-failed-us
-policy. Fascinating and disturbing, if one agrees with the position of the Bangkok paper: “[T]he
cables show how Arab and Islamic leaders have allowed themselves to be made complete fools,
why their peoples are rising up to say that enough is enough and why that political tsunami will
strike many shores right across the world.” Id.
The Guardian’s website has maintained a timeline of events from the Arab Spring. Arab
Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, GUARDIAN (U.K.), http://www
.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline (last
visited May 1, 2012). For more on the release of unredacted cables in September 2011 and
Assange’s concern that this could jeopardize the gains of the Arab Spring, see infra notes
138–42 and accompanying text.
6 Yochai Benkler states:
Wikileaks was born a century after President Theodore Roosevelt
delivered the speech that gave muckraking journalism its name, and
both hailed investigative journalism and called upon it to be under-
taken responsibly. In 2010, four years after its first document release,
Wikileaks became the center of an international storm surrounding the
role of the individual in the networked public sphere. It forces us to ask
how comfortable we are with the actual shape of democratization created
by the Internet.
Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 311 (2011). And this was written
before the September 2011 posting of 251,000 unredacted cables by WikiLeaks. See infra notes
138–42 and accompanying text on the unredacted cables. For general coverage of WikiLeaks’
history prior to Fall 2011, see Benkler, supra, passim.
7 See Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks ‘Transparency,’
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A11.
8 See id. Often the servers are located in countries more sympathetic to source protection,
such as Sweden. See Afua Hirsch, Iceland Aims to Become a Legal Safe Haven for Journalists,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 11, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jul /12/iceland-legal
-haven-journalists-immi. WikiLeaks also took advantage of Icelandic laws favorable to jour-
nalists by working in the country to produce the video of a U.S. helicopter attack on civilians
in Baghdad. Id.; see also Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets: Julian Assange’s Mission for
Total Transparency, THE NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 40. The organization also helped draft 
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so it has no real home. One scholar termed it “the world’s first stateless news
organization.”9
And protecting WikiLeaks against what? WikiLeaks’ founder, Julian Assange,10
has not clearly stated how he received11 the diplomatic cables—nor the Brobdingnagian
caches of military reports from the Afghanistan12 and Iraq13 wars released in July and
October 2010—so it is not clear that he or WikiLeaks would qualify as “journalists”
under existing shield laws.14
a pending law in Iceland that would provide even stronger protections for journalists, includ-
ing of confidential sources and information and of free speech. See Jonathan Stray, What Will
Iceland’s New Media Laws Mean for Journalists?, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (June 16, 2010,
11:51 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/06/what-will-icelands-new-media-laws-mean
-for-journalists/.
9 Jay Rosen, The Afghanistan War Logs Released by Wikileaks, the World’s First Stateless
News Organization, PRESSTHINK, July 26, 2010, http://pressthink.org/2010/07/the-afghanistan
-war-logs-released-by-wikileaks-the-worlds-first-stateless-news-organization/.
10 For a profile of Assange and the creation of WikiLeaks, see Khatchadourian, supra
note 8.
11 Not knowing the source is by design, according to Assange. See PBS Frontline:
WikiSecrets, PBS TELEVISION BROADCAST, (May 24, 2011) (transcript available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/wikileaks/etc/transcript.html). He says that WikiLeaks’
software prevents it from identifying the source of documents it receives. Id. “Instead of keep-
ing source identities secret, we simply do not collect them at all. . . . [O]ur technology does not
permit us to understand whether someone is one of our sources or not because the best way to
keep a secret is to never have it.” Id. On WikiLeaks’ claim that its technology prevents tracing
sources that have transmitted secret information to it, see Charlie Savage, After Afghan War
Leaks, Revisions in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010 at A12.
12 The Afghan War Diary is available at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary,
_2004-2010. Prior to releasing these files, WikiLeaks gave the New York Times, London’s
Guardian, and Germany’s Der Spiegel access to them. See Piecing Together the Reports, And
Deciding What to Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A8. These three newspapers released
reports simultaneously with the public release of the files. Id.
13 Iraq War Logs, available at http://wikileaks.org. The New York Times and some other
organizations call the collective set of Iraq and Afghanistan reports “The War Logs.” See,
e.g., The War Logs: The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at
A1. WikiLeaks expanded early access to the Iraq files to other media besides the original three
newspapers, including France’s Le Monde newspaper and the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network.
See, e.g., David Leigh, Iraq War Logs: WikiLeaks v Washington, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 22,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/22/iraq-war-logs-wikileaks-washington
?INTCMP=SRCH.
14 At least one writer has compared Assange’s penchant for publishing leaked materials to
that of legendary political columnist—and, in the writer’s words, “seasoned reporter”—Jack
Anderson. See Mark Feldstein, Spreading Leaks Before WikiLeaks, AM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Sept. 2010, http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4958.
Some statutes define “journalist” in relation to whether one works for a news organization.
See infra notes 218–51 and accompanying text. WikiLeaks published the War Diaries with 
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The situation in the United States, which lacks a federal shield law, is equally
thorny. WikiLeaks’ release of the War Logs arguably affected support for a federal
shield law.15 According to Washington Post reporter Paul Farhi, “news organizations
thought they were cruising toward a long-cherished goal: Congressional passage of
a federal shield law to protect journalists from being forced to reveal confidential
sources. Then came WikiLeaks.”16 WikiLeaks “complicated, and possibly imperiled,”
passage of a shield law, he said.17 But supporters of a shield law say it would not cover
WikiLeaks, anyway, because WikiLeaks is a “virtual” organization, devoid of a phys-
ical address or “country of origin.”18
some, but not extensive, commentary. Assange did, however, submit to several news inter-
views after publishing the Afghanistan and Iraq documents. See, e.g., Bill Keller, The Boy Who
Kicked the Hornet’s Nest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011 (Magazine), at 35, 47; Schmitt, supra
note 7. He has said the files were “significant for journalistic investigation” and that he hoped
they would cause people to reconsider their position on the wars. See Jo Adetunji, Wikileaks
Founder Julian Assange: More Revelations to Come, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 26, 2010, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jul/26/wikileaks-julian-assange.
Yet the law would presumably be less forgiving to an organization classified as a terrorist
organization, as Rep. Peter King (R-N.Y.) has suggested. See Jennifer Epstein, King: Prosecute
WikiLeaks, Assange, POLITICO (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/news
/stories/1110/45667.html. Rep. Peter King would like to see WikiLeaks prosecuted. Id.
Ironically, King has come under attack for his reported connection with the Irish Republican
Army (I.R.A.). See Justin Elliott, At U.K. Terror Inquiry, Rep. King Defends I.R.A. Terror,
SALON (Sept. 13, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/09/13/peter-king-ira-terrorism.
“King built his career in the Irish Catholic community of Nassau County as a pro-I.R.A.
firebrand in the 1980s, and was even involved with a fundraising organization suspected of
providing the militant group with money and weapons.” Id. When he appeared in front of Great
Britain’s Parliament during a hearing on Muslim radicalization on September 13, 2011, Labour
MP David Winnick quoted King’s statement from 1985 that “[i]f civilians are killed in an
attack on a military installation, it is certainly regrettable, but I will not morally blame the
I.R.A. for it.” Id. King said he stood by those words “in the context of when it was said.” Id.;
see also Justin Elliott, IRA Terror Victim Speaks Out Against Peter King, SALON (Jan. 7,
2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/01/07/peter-king-ira-bombing-survivor/ (quoting
Amnesty International official Tom Parker as saying, “What really bothers me is the hypocrisy
of the man . . . .”).
But what about punishment of the disseminator of information? Assange could stand in the
shoes of the New York Times or the Washington Post in the Pentagon Papers case, New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), provided that Assange had ‘clean hands’ and
merely received the information instead of in some way instigating the theft of that information.
15  Paul Farhi, Wikileaks is Barrier to Shield Arguments, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2010, at C1.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.; see also Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s
Privilege in Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667 (2011).
In the wake of WikiLeaks’ releases, some U.S. senators announced that language in any
developing proposals for a shield law should specifically exclude organizations disseminating
classified or confidential material without additional reporting or contextualization. See, e.g.,
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WikiLeaks has collaborated with the New York Times and the Washington Post.19
Those relationships have become rockier over time, starting with a debate among the
newspapers and WikiLeaks over redacting names from the Afghanistan documents.20
Although WikiLeaks ultimately attempted to scrub documents for informants’ names,
Assange at first was reluctant to do any redaction, and the “harm minimization” pro-
cess, as Assange called it, was not totally successful.21 Some vulnerable people were
still exposed, and less than forty-eight hours after publication of the Afghan War
Logs, according to Nick Davies, an investigative reporter at the Guardian, compet-
itors of “The Guardian and The New York Times ran big stories saying, ‘We’ve been
on the WikiLeaks Web site. We found material which could get people killed.’”22
The New York Times said that its search through a sample of the WikiLeaks docu-
ments found “the names of dozens of Afghans credited with providing credible in-
formation to American and NATO troops” and that the Times, Guardian, and Der
Spiegel had only posted a selection of redacted WikiLeaks documents containing no
identifying information that could jeopardize informants’ safety.23 Martin Smith said
Adam L. Penenberg, Yes, He’s a Journalist Too, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2011, at B3. Charlie
Savage of the New York Times said that Democratic senators who had been working on shield
law legislation were “backpedaling from WikiLeaks” and Senators Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.)
and Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) were working on an amendment that would provide shield pro-
tection to traditional news gathering but withhold it from websites that disseminate massive
amounts of secret information. See Savage, supra note 11; see also John Eggerton, Is Shield
Law the Next WikiLeaks Victim?: D.C. Debates Effect of Leaked Docs on Bill Protecting
Journalists, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 6, 2010, available at http://www.broadcasting
cable.com/article/460623-Is_Shield_Law_the_Next_WikiLeaks_Victim_.php.
WikiLeaks did publish some commentary in the War Diary. See Iraq War Logs, supra
note 13. But perhaps shield protection or lack thereof for WikiLeaks is immaterial. If indeed
tracing of its sources is technologically impossible, then WikiLeaks is shielded from subpoenas
regardless of the law. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19 See Keller, supra note 14, at 35, 37.
20 See, e.g., PBS Frontline: WikiSecrets, supra note 11. From the beginning, Assange and
the newspapers were concerned about minimizing the risks that could flow from the leaks. After
the release of the Afghanistan documents, the Guardian crowed: “Well, we always wanted
stories from data: now we’ve got it. In spades. With bells on. The Wikileaks’ Afghanistan
war logs are a fantastic victory for investigative data basedjournalism [sic], not only here at
the Guardian but at the New York Times and Der Spiegel too.” Simon Rodgers, Wikileaks’
Afghanistan War Logs: How our Datajournalism Operation Worked, GUARDIAN (U.K.)
(July 27, 2010, 7:12 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jul/27/wikileaks
-afghanistan-data-datajournalism. But the Guardian also made clear that it was concerned that
the war logs be redacted: “It was central to what we would do quite early on that we would not
publish the full database. Wikileaks was already going to do that and we wanted to make sure
that we didn’t reveal the names of informants or unnecessarily endanger Nato [sic] troops.” Id.
21 See PBS Frontline: WikiSecrets, supra note 11.
22 Id.
23 Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, Pentagon Studies Risks to Afghans From Leaks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A1.
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that the New York Times “lost trust” in Assange’s redaction process and would not
link to WikiLeaks.24
Could the United States government order Assange to identify his source? Leaving
aside jurisdictional considerations, Assange could not be ordered to name a source if
indeed his software design prevented him from gaining that knowledge.25
Is Assange, himself, a “source” for the news media he works with? Bill Keller,
the top editor at the New York Times, wrote in January 2011 that the Times “regarded
Assange throughout as a source, not as a partner or collaborator, but he was a man
who clearly had his own agenda.”26
The Times’ story continued:
The founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, has said that the orga-
nization withheld 15,000 of the approximately 92,000 documents in the
archive . . . to remove the names of informants in what he called a “harm
minimization” process. But the 75,000 documents WikiLeaks put online
provide information about possible informants, like their villages and
in some cases their fathers’ names.
Id.
24 See PBS Frontline: WikiSecrets, supra note 11. A furious Assange threatened to deny
the New York Times access to the diplomatic cables. Id.
Julian Assange, in an editorial, said: “David Leigh secretly passed the entire archive [of
diplomatic cables] to Bill Keller of the New York Times, in September 2011, or before, know-
ingly destroying WikiLeaks plans to publish instead with the Washington Post & McClatchy.”
Editorial, Guardian Journalist Negligently Disclosed Cablegate Passwords, WIKILEAKS,
Sept. 1, 2011, http://wikileaks.org/Guardian-journalist-negligently.html.
Later, WikiLeaks gave the Washington Post secret documents about the United States
prison at Guantanamo Bay, published in April 2011. See Peter Finn, New Revelations on al-
Qaeda’s 9/11 Movements, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1. WikiLeaks did not give the
documents to the New York Times, which obtained a copy of the documents from another news
outlet and nearly scooped WikiLeaks in publishing stories about the documents. See A Note
to Readers: The Background, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A10.
25 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Shortly after WikiLeaks’ release of the
Afghanistan data, the United States government declared Pfc. Bradley Manning a “person of
interest” in the case. See David S. Cloud, Army Officer a ‘Person of Interest,’ L.A. TIMES,
July 28, 2010, at A6. Manning and the government had a prior history. The government had
already arrested Manning on suspicion of giving WikiLeaks hundreds of thousands of secret
diplomatic cables and a classified video of a helicopter attack, in Iraq, in which two journalists
died. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Broadens Inquiry into Disclosure of Reports to WikiLeaks,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2010, at A4. Manning was in custody when WikiLeaks released the
Afghanistan and Iraq materials. For further discussion of Manning see infra Part I.C., and
for the potential for prosecutions under the Espionage Act, see infra note 155.
26 Keller, supra note 14, at 34. The New York Times does not appear to be in the
Administration’s crosshairs, according to the Times:
“Do you think that what you do is consistent with what you understand
Assange and WikiLeaks did?” [Attorney General] Holder asked a re-
porter. “Would I have liked not to see the stuff appear? Yes. But did The
Times act in a responsible way? I would say yes. I am not certain I would
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Is Assange a journalist? Adam L. Penenberg argues that “Assange has wrapped
himself in the cloak of journalism. . . . WikiLeaks has peppered its ‘about’ page with
the words ‘journalism’ and ‘journalist,’ which appear a combined 19 times, and as
a self-described ‘not-for-profit media organization’ lists its primary goal as bringing
‘important news and information to the public.’”27 While Penenberg says that Assange
“fits the definition of a journalist” under many shield law statutes, he acknowledges
that opponents of Assange would not classify Assange as a journalist.28 His evidence
for that includes the State Department calling Assange “an anarchist,” former Alaska
Governor Sarah Palin calling him “an anti-American operative with blood on his
hands,” and Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) calling him an “agitator intent on dam-
aging our government.”29
say that about those people who were responsible for the initial leaks and
the wholesale dumping of materials.”
Charlie Savage, For Attorney General, New Congress, New Headaches, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2010, at A12.
Since 1980, prosecutorial guidelines have existed to help curb the overzealous pursuit
of journalists’ sources. Published in the Code of Federal Regulations, the guidelines explain
the rationale for limiting prosecutors’ power over journalists as preserving the functioning
of the press:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of
reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of the
government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a reporter’s
responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues.
This policy statement is thus intended to provide protection for the news
media from forms of compulsory process, whether civil or criminal,
which might impair the news gathering function.
28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2011).
To balance the Justice Department’s concern for the functioning of “news media” with
its concern for “the fair administration of justice,” the “guidelines shall be adhered to by all
members of the Department in all cases.” Id. The guidelines apply both to issuing subpoenas
to members of the news media or to requesting their telephone toll records. Id. § 50.10(a).
“[T]he approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance between the public’s in-
terest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s interest in effective
law enforcement and the fair administration of justice.” Id.
Before issuing subpoenas or requesting phone records, the Department of Justice must
first make “[a]ll reasonable attempts” to get the wanted information from other sources. Id.
§ 50.10(b). Another general safeguard for news media, with some conditions, is that no sub-
poenas or phone requests may be made without the Attorney General’s “express authorization.”
Id. § 50.10(e).
The guidelines make clear that the Attorney General’s authorization will only be sought in
criminal cases if information from “nonmedia sources” provide “reasonable grounds to believe”
a crime occurred and, further, that the information sought from the news media is “essential”
to the investigation, and not “peripheral, nonessential, or speculative.” Id. § 50.10(f).
27 Penenberg, supra, note 18.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Glenn Greenwald considers Assange to be “engaging in the crux of investigative
journalism” with his push for “transparency and whistleblowing.”30 Assange, sens-
ing the legal risk he might face in America, has followed a strategy to try to provide
WikiLeaks with First Amendment protection.31
The domestic issues have expanded beyond Assange and WikiLeaks, however.
What will happen when the government seeks documents submitted to news orga-
nizations through their own versions of WikiLeaks, such as SafeHouse, a place to
“[s]ecurely share information with The Wall Street Journal?”32
Pierce-proof shield laws are, thus, important not only for journalists but also for
this country. The United States, if it is to be a leader for press freedom in our complex
world,33 must not dissemble by crafting shield-law exceptions that inevitably create
bias against reporters.
30 Glenn Greenwald, WikiLeaks Grand Jury Investigation Widens, SALON, June 9, 2011,
http://www.salon.com/2011/06/09/wikileaks_27.
31 Julian Assange said,
We insisted on bringing in The New York Times. We also insisted on
The New York Times publishing first. So if there was any debate before
a jury about, had it been published first in a foreign publication or a
U.S. publication, it would be very clear it was published first in a U.S.
publication.
PBS Frontline: WikiSecrets, supra note 11. Assange made clear that he wanted First Amend-
ment protection. Id.
32 WALL ST. J. SAFEHOUSE, https://www.wsjsafehouse.com/ (last visited May 1, 2012).
The Journal faced heavy criticism after opening SafeHouse for lax security measures, see
Riva Richmond, Wall Street Journal Leak Site Works on Security Fixes, BITS (May 6, 2011,
6:40 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/wall-street-journal-leak-site-works-on
-security-fixes, and for the Terms of Service acknowledging that the newspaper would not
be able “to ensure the complete confidentiality or anonymity of anything you send to us.”
Terms of Use for SafeHouse, WALL ST. J. SAFEHOUSE, https://www.wsjsafehouse.com/terms
.html (last visited May 1, 2012). The site was reportedly working quickly on improvements.
See Richmond, supra.
33 In 2010, the United States ranked 20th out of 178 countries in press freedom worldwide
in Reporters Without Borders’ rankings, and China ranked 171st. See Press Freedom Index
2010, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html
(last visited May 1, 2012).
The Obama Administration has come under press scrutiny for its alleged mistreatment of
journalists. See, e.g., Dylan Stableford, Jay Carney and Jake Tapper Clash Over ‘Aggressive’
Reporting, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/cutline/wake-reporter
-deaths-syria-white-house-grilled-aggressive-154806577.html (last visited May 1, 2012); see also
Tapper v. The White House, CNN: RELIABLE SOURCES (Feb. 26, 2012), http://reliablesources
.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/26/tapper-vs-the-white-house/ (last visited May 1, 2012) (discussing
how the Obama Administration treats whistleblowers).
For example, when White House Press Secretary Jay Carney began a February 2012
press conference by praising Anthony Shadid and Marie Colvin, two reporters who died in
Syria, he received press opposition. See Stableford, supra. ABC News Senior White House
Correspondent, Jake Tapper, questioned Carney: “The White House keeps praising these 
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This Article presents a brief history of cases relevant to shield laws, critiques
current state statutes and offers suggestions for their improvement, and proposes a
model shield law. The model law would afford protection for persons who promise
sources confidentiality that is equivalent to the protection current law offers to attor-
neys and priests. In short, this Article argues for absolute shield law protection, even
in the age of WikiLeaks.
The United States and its constituent states should send a clear message to the
world: The democratic imperative of freely flowing information from journalists means
no jailing of journalists who are keeping their promises to their sources.34
I. JAILING JOURNALISTS
Do journalists need good shield laws? Unfortunately, this is not a mere academic
question. Judges in the United States are jailing journalists.35 For example, Josh Wolf,
spent 224 days in captivity in California before being released from jail in April 2007.36
His offense was refusing to testify before a federal grand jury and hand over raw
journalists . . . who’ve been killed. . . . How does that square with the fact that this admin-
istration has been so aggressively trying to stop aggressive journalism in the United States by
using the Espionage Act to take whistleblowers to court?” See id. He continued, “I think you’ve
invoked it the sixth time, and before the Obama administration, it had only been used three times
in history.” See id. Carney referred Tapper to the Justice Department, and he added, “I think that
there are issues here that involve highly sensitive classified information, and I think . . . divulging
that kind of information is a serious issue, and it always has been.” See id.
For more on the Obama Administration’s treatment of whistleblowers, see, for example,
NSA Whistleblower Thomas Drake Prevails Against Charges in Unprecedented Obama Admin
Crackdown, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.democracynow.org/2012/3/21
/in_unprecedented_obama_admin_crackdown_nsa (last visited May 1, 2012).
34 Iceland, for example, may soon surpass the United States in the protections afforded
to journalists. In June 2010, the Icelandic parliament directed the government to begin
rewriting its laws on, inter alia, protecting journalists from having to reveal sources, ensuring
public access to government documents, and preventing enforcement of libel judgments from
other countries against journalists. See Hirsch, supra note 8. Activists who formulated the
proposal adopted by parliament drew on press freedom laws from Sweden, Norway, the
United States, and elsewhere. Id. It is not yet clear, however, what the final law will stipulate
or how far it will reach. See id.; Sylvia Hui, Iceland Parliament Votes for Strong Media Laws,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9132550.
35 At a celebration of the 40th year of the Freedom of Information Act, Lucy Dalglish, the
executive director of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, recounted that she
knew of at least 50 recent cases of reporters being subpoenaed. See John E. Mulligan, A Subdued
Birthday for Freedom of Information, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 17, 2006, at A2. According to
Dalglish, “We have not seen numbers like that since the Nixon administration.” Id.
36 See Jesse McKinley, 8-Month Jail Term Ends as Maker of Video Turns Over a Copy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A9; see also Jesse McKinley, Jail Record Near for Videographer
who Resisted Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A15.
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videotape of a G-8 Summit protest that injured a police officer on July 8, 2005, in
San Francisco.37 The judge maintained that the First Amendment did not protect
Josh because he was a blogger.38
Jim Taricani, a 55-year-old heart-transplant recipient, spent four months under
house arrest from 2004 to 2005 after refusing a federal judge’s order to reveal the
source of an FBI videotape showing a Providence, Rhode Island, official accepting
an envelope full of cash from an undercover FBI agent.39 Taricani had won four
Emmys.40 His conviction came in the wake of a federal investigation called “Operation
Plunder Dome,” which netted convictions for at least three city officials, including
Providence Mayor Vincent Cianci, Jr., and his top aide, Frank Corrente.41 Corrente re-
ceived the cash in the videotape that aired on the NBC affiliate employing Taricani.42
Six days after Taricani’s conviction, the confidential source—a defense attorney—
admitted under oath to giving Taricani the videotape.43
Judith Miller, a former New York Times reporter, spent eighty-five days in jail from
2004 to 2005 after refusing to reveal the source of a leak in the Valerie Plame case.44
37 McKinley, Jail Record Near for Videographer Who Resisted Grand Jury, supra note 36.
38 Id. Wolf had a partial change of mind. As a result, Josh’s judge got part of what he
wanted—namely, the raw videotape—which Josh agreed to release as part of a deal Josh cut
with prosecutors. See McKinley, 8-Month Jail Term Ends as Maker of Video Turns Over a Copy,
supra note 36. Prosecutors in turn agreed not to compel Josh to testify before a grand jury. Id.
39 See In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.R.I. 2003), aff’d 373 F.3d 37
(1st Cir. 2004); see also Lynne Tuohy, Reporter Convicted; Shielded Source, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 19, 2004, at A1.
On November 18, 2004, the federal judge convicted Taricani in Providence, Rhode Island.
Id. Earlier, the judge had fined Taricani $85,000—$1,000 per day—for his refusal. See Tracy
Breton, Judge Shortens Taricani’s Time in Confinement, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 7, 2005, at A1.
His TV station paid the fine. Id. Then on December 9, 2004, the judge sentenced Taricani to
house arrest for six months. Id.
On April 6, 2005, four months after Taricani’s sentencing, the judge released him, which
the judge had promised to do if Taricani abided by the terms of his confinement. See Breton,
supra. His terms had included a prohibition on working or using the Internet, but he could
receive visitors daily from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Id. Taricani left his house three times during
his confinement, for two appointments with his transplant doctor and for an emergency trip to
his dentist. Id.
40 See Tuohy, supra note 40.
41 See Breton, supra note 40.
42 Id.
43 See id.; Tuohy, supra note 40; see also Pam Belluck, TV Reporter Facing Jail Says
Source Rejected Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at A18.
44 See Michael Duffy & Viveca Novak, Let’s Make a Deal, TIME, Oct. 10, 2005, at 24.
In Washington, D.C., on October 7, 2004, Judge Thomas F. Hogan ordered Miller to jail. See
Robert Zelnick, Essay on Source Confidentiality: Journalists and Confidential Sources, 19
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 541 (2005). One week later, he ordered Cooper
to jail. Id. But the reporters’ sentences were stayed while their consolidated cases were on
appeal. Id.
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A federal special prosecutor, Patrick Fitzgerald, sought contempt charges against Judith
Miller and Matthew Cooper, of Time magazine—with imprisonment for up to 18
months and fines of up to $1,000 per day.45 Miller and Cooper, along with some other
reporters, apparently got the information on Plame from the same source.46 One curious
fact is that neither Miller nor Cooper revealed Plame’s name, and Miller never even
wrote a story about Plame. Journalist Robert Novak was actually first to reveal Plame’s
name.47 Also curious is why the prosecutor did not pursue Novak. Speculation is that
45 Duffy & Novak, supra note 44.
46 See G. Robert Hillman, Libby Indicted, Quits, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 29, 2005,
at 1A.
47 Duffy & Novak, supra note 44. Cooper’s source released him after Time magazine
released Cooper’s notes to the prosecutor. For commentary on waivers, see Rachel Smolkin,
Waivering, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb.–Mar. 2006, at 32.
The literature on Miller and Cooper is massive. On July 11, 2005, Senator Frank
Lautenberg (D-N.J.) introduced Senate Resolution 192, “Affirming that the First Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States guarantees the freedom of the press and asserting that
no purpose is served by sentencing journalists Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper, nor any
similarly situated journalists, to prison for maintaining the anonymity of confidential sources.”
S. Res. 192, 109th Cong. (2005). The resolution contained the following clause: “Whereas
Robert Novak, the columnist first to publish the identity of a covert Central Intelligence Agency
officer by name, stated that the Government should not imprison journalists for maintaining
the anonymity of confidential sources.” Id.
For a detailed report on the Plame outing and the ensnaring of journalists, including a
timeline of events. See Nancy Gibbs, The Rove Problem, TIME, July 25, 2005, at 22.; see also
Matthew Cooper, “What I Told the Grand Jury,” TIME, July 25, 2005, at 38–40. On Miller’s
jailing, see, for example, Duffy & Novak, supra note 44. On Libby’s indictment, see, for
example, Hillman, supra note 46 and Doyle McManus & Mary Curtius, Indictment in CIA
Leak Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A18.
For scholarly analyses, see, for example, Clay Calvert, Victories for Privacy and Losses
for Journalism? Five Privacy Controversies from 2004 and Their Policy Implications for the
Future of Reportage, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 649, 690–95 (2005); Eunice Eun, Note, Journalists
Caught in the Crossfire: Robert Novak, the First Amendment, and Journalist’s Duty of
Confidentiality, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1073 (2005); Zelnick, supra note 44.
For more about Valerie Plame, see her memoir, VALERIE PLAME WILSON, FAIR GAME:
MY LIFE AS A SPY, MY BETRAYAL BY THE WHITE HOUSE (2007). The book contains black-
ened lines to mark redaction demanded by the CIA, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the CIA over Wilson’s First Amendment challenge. See Wilson v. CIA, 586
F.3d 171, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2009); Plame Wilson supra. The book then became a movie, Fair
Game, that received some critical acclaim. See, e.g., Roger Ebert, Fair Game, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2010, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20101103/REVIEWS
/101109993/1023.
The Judith Miller story also apparently inspired a movie in 2008, titled Nothing but the
Truth, about a reporter who reveals an undercover CIA agent’s name, refuses to disclose her
source’s identity, and then goes to prison. See Nothing but the Truth: Synopsis, MSN MOVIES,
http://www.movies.msn.com/movies/movie-synopsis/nothing-but-the-truth.4/. In the movie,
the Supreme Court hears the reporter’s case, deciding 5–4 against her and against reversing
Branzburg v. Hayes. Id. For coverage of Branzburg, see infra Part I.B. The movie deviates 
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someone in the Bush administration “outed” Plame in retaliation for accusations by
her husband, retired diplomat Joseph Wilson, that the Administration misrepresented
that Saddam Hussein had tried to buy depleted uranium from Niger.48 Ultimately, on
June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari for the claims of Miller or
Cooper.49 On July 6, 2005, Judge Hogan ordered Miller to jail.50 She remained in jail
until grand jury proceedings ended with the indictment of Lewis “Scooter” Libby.51
Vanessa Leggett, incarcerated in 2001, was a freelancer who spent 168 days in
jail for refusing a federal judge’s order to hand over notes and tapes of interviews
she had made while writing a book about the murder of a Houston, Texas, socialite,
Doris Angleton.52 Leggett’s source was the socialite’s husband, who was a suspect in
the murder.53 A federal judge in Texas found Leggett guilty of contempt.54 A federal
grand jury indicted the husband for murder and did not need Leggett’s notes to do so.
Leggett stayed in jail until the expiration of the grand jury.55
far from the Miller story, with brutal prison conditions, the murder of the CIA agent, and a
surprise twist at the end. See Nothing but the Truth: Synopsis, supra.
48 See Gibbs, supra note 47.
49 Cooper v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).
50 See Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2005 at A1.
51 See Hillman, supra note 46.
52 See Guillermo X. Garcia, The Vanessa Leggett Saga, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.
2002, at 20.
Prior to Leggett’s record 168 days in jail, the record had been held by a reporter from Los
Angeles, William Farr, who spent 46 days in jail in 1972. See Garcia, supra. Farr was covering
the Charles Manson murder trial. Id. The judge had ordered attorneys, witnesses, and court
employees not to release any information to the public. See High Court Rejects a Newsman’s
Petition for Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1972 at 23. Farr got hold of a deposition that told,
among other things, about plans the Manson “family” had made for future murders. Id. Appar-
ently two prosecution attorneys had leaked the information to Farr, who wouldn’t tell the judge
which two. Id.
In In re Farber, a case from New Jersey, reporter Farber paid a $1,000 flat fine and stayed
in jail until the end of the trial—40 days. 394 A.2d 330, 332 (N.J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978). In addition, the New York Times paid a $100,000 flat fine and daily $5,000 fines. Id.
After a pardon by New Jersey’s governor, the Times and Farber’s contempt convictions were
cleared and, $101,000 in fines was refunded. See Jonathan Friendly, Times and Reporter
Granted Byrne Pardon in ‘Dr. X’ Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1982, at A1. What landed Farber
in jail was his investigative work for the Times that led to the indictment of a doctor for murder.
The doctor wanted Farber’s notes. In re Farber, 394 A.2d at 332; see also As Courts Clamp
Down Harder on the Press, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 14, 1978, at 27. The doctor was
acquitted without them. See Friendly, supra.
53 Garcia, supra note 53, at 23.
54 Id. at 24.
55 See id. at 27; see also Samara Kalk, Jailed Journalist Tells of Her Ordeal, CAPITAL
TIMES, May 30, 2002, at 3A; Sharyn Wizda Vane, Jailed Writer Shares the Tale, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, July 21, 2002, at B1.
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And there are many other examples.56 These journalists suffered from the absence
of a federal shield law.57 Unfortunately, they would have suffered the same fate in state
courts under many of the forty shield laws states58 now have in place.59
56 Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams co-authored the book Game of Shadows:
Barry Bonds, Balco and the Steroids Scandal that Rocked Professional Sports while working
as reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle. MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS,
GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS, BALCO AND THE STEROIDS SCANDAL THAT ROCKED
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006). Anthony Lewis succinctly summarized the Balco case:
Two reporters for the San Francisco Chronicle obtained documents
from a federal grand jury investigation and wrote stories—important
stories—about baseball players’ use of performance-enhancing drugs.
Grand jury proceedings are secret. The reporters were subpoenaed and
asked the source of the documents. They refused to answer but were
saved from going to jail for contempt when the prosecutors found the
source themselves. He was a lawyer who had represented the defendants
indicted by the grand jury. When the stories based on his leaks appeared,
he moved to dismiss the charges against his clients on the ground of im-
proper disclosures! I hope I am right in believing that many journalists
would not want to protect that kind of trickery.
Anthony Lewis, Panel Discussion, Are Journalists Privileged?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1353,
1358 (2008).
In April 2011, Bonds was convicted of obstruction of justice in a federal court. See Lance
Williams, Barry Bonds Guilty of Obstruction of Justice, SFGATE.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/04/13/MN491J01BR.DTL. A mistrial was
declared on three other counts of perjury after the jury could not reach a verdict. Id. Prosecutors
had alleged that Bonds lied under oath regarding his steroid use. Id.
For more on the extensively covered BALCO case, see, Sean W. Kelly, Note, Black and
White and Read All Over: Press Protection After Branzburg, 57 DUKE L.J. 199 (2007), Josi
Kennon, Note, When Rights Collide: An Examination of the Reporter’s Privilege, Grand Jury
Leaks, and the Sixth Amendment Rights of the Criminal Defendant, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
543 (2008); Peter Meyer, Note, BALCO, the Steroids Scandal, and What the Already Fragile
Secrecy of Federal Grand Juries Means to the Debate over a Potential Federal Media Shield
Law, 83 IND. L.J. 1671 (2008).
57 For the saga of reporters who recently suffered from contempt charges for refusing to
reveal confidential sources, see Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (a Privacy
Act case).
58 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Part II.
The District of Columbia also has a shield statute, and that statute will also be examined in this
paper. Id. New Mexico, however, is an anomaly, with its Supreme Court gutting its shield law.
See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
59 But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(5)(d) (West 2008) (stating that “No fine or imprisonment
shall be imposed against a person claiming the privilege pursuant to this section for refusal to
disclose information privileged pursuant to this section,” although Hawaii does not specify
whether a reporter could be fined or jailed after a court rules in favor of disclosure).
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The only shield that is truly worthy of the name is an absolute shield—a declara-
tion that journalists will not be jailed for refusing to divulge the names of confiden-
tial sources. Period. Many commentators favor absolute shield laws. For example, Eric
M. Freedman, arguing for absolute shield protection, says, “The mainstream press has
suffered multiple blows . . . .”60 Freedman says the current “environment” renders
“remote” the prospects of courts using the First Amendment to expand the journalists’
privilege.61 The function of a statute is to gain that greater protection for journalists.62
He says that the lesson to be learned from the current situation is that “any qualified
reportorial privilege which depends on judicial balancing of the importance of disclo-
sure in individual cases is inherently structurally defective.”63 Freedman argues that
a qualified privilege fails to provide a “predictable standard” for when judges will re-
quire disclosure, thus defeating the purpose of a journalists’ privilege.64 As Freedman
says, “[a] reporter’s promise, ‘I will not reveal your name unless it meets a three-part
legal test that has been subject to varying judicial interpretations’ is hardly calculated
to inspire a source’s confidence.”65
Freedman concludes that “[a]s the birds come home to roost, it’s time to rebuild
the rookery.”66 In short, a federal shield law should discard the case-by-case method of
a qualified privilege and give journalists “an absolute privilege” based on the attorney-
client privilege.67 “When a client confesses a past crime to a lawyer,” Freedman says,
60 Eric M. Freedman, Reconstructing Journalists’ Privilege, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1381,
1386 (2007). Among those blows, he lists:
[T]he unprecedented and much-publicized testimony of a string of
prominent journalists in the Scooter Libby trial following a profoundly
unedifying series of prevarications, compromises, and surrenders which
deeply stained the image of both the privilege and its champions; and
[P]ost–[September] 11[th] pushback from the federal government and
supporters of its security policies against journalists doing precisely the
sort of excellent investigative work that brings them into inevitable
conflict with the authorities.
Id. at 1387.
61 Id. The function of a statute is to gain that greater protection for journalists. He says that
the lesson to be learned from the current situation is that “any qualified reportorial privilege
which depends on judicial balancing of the importance of disclosure in individual cases is
inherently structurally defective.”
62 Id. at 1387–88.
63 Id. at 1388.
64 Id.
65 Id. He also argues that a qualified privilege produces a “biased framework” for the judge
and that the judge is asked to answer the wrong question of “how reasonable it is to make the
reporter provide the requested information in this case.” Id. Freedman says, “[t]hat focus simply
ignores the good the privilege seeks to protect: disclosure to a journalist in the next case, not
this one.” Id. Last, a qualified-privilege test asks a judge “to perform a predictive task that
requires more foresight than can realistically be expected.” Id. at 1389.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1390.
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“it makes no difference to the applicability of the privilege that the client is a slimy
scuzzball, nor that the client is the only available source respecting the facts of the
crime . . . .”68
As Keith Werhan points out, “[t]he government’s interest in prosecuting crimes
does not ordinarily trump other testimonial privileges, and for good reason: They then
would be privileges in name only. Hampering law enforcement is the social cost of
every testimonial privilege, including a journalist’s privilege.”69 Favoring an absolute
privilege for sources, Joel G. Weinberg says, “[o]ver half of the state shield statutes
render absolute a reporter’s privilege not to disclose confidential sources, and in vir-
tually all of the remaining state statutes, the standard for piercing the reporter’s priv-
ilege is high, requiring more than simple relevance to the proceeding.”70
68 Id. Use of the attorney-client model is certainly not Freedman’s invention. As he points
out, immediately after the Branzburg decision, Senator Alan Cranston introduced legislation
that would have established an absolute privilege at the federal and state levels, using the
attorney-client privilege as a model. Id. at 1393–94. Cranston noted that attorneys could not
even violate a confidence in national-security cases. Id. at 1394.
69 Keith Werhan, Essay, Rethinking Freedom of the Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561,
1605 (2008). “In light of the courts’ traditional acceptance of testimonial privileges protecting
the confidentiality of sensitive relationships—husband-wife, physician-patient, attorney-client—
it seems appropriate to . . . ask why the relationship between journalists and their sources should
be denied similar respect under the law.” Id. at 1602; see Kristen Anastos, Note, Protecting the
Public Interest? Why Qualified Legislative Protection Undermines the Need for a Federal
Reporters’ Privilege, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 463, 464 (2006) (discussing the implications
of privilege legislation); Leslie Siegel, Note, Trampling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a
Federal Reporter Shield Law Providing Absolute Protection Against Compelled Disclosure of
News Sources and Information, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (2006) (arguing for an absolute federal
shield law); Nathan Swinton, Note, Privileging a Privilege: Should the Reporter’s Privilege
Enjoy the Same Respect as the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 979,
989–90 (2006) (arguing for an absolute privilege and discussing Watergate).
70 Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First Amendment: A National Reporter’s Shield Law,
31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 174 (2006).
According to Joel M. Gora, in civil cases, there is almost an absolute privilege:
Indeed, starting shortly after Branzburg, in civil cases, courts had consis-
tently rebuffed efforts to probe confidential sources (except perhaps in
libel and similar suits against the press itself for serious derelictions of
responsible reporting or editing) so much that one could almost say that
in civil cases there was a de facto “absolute privilege.”
Joel M. Gora, The Source of the Problem of Sources: The First Amendment Fails the Fourth
Estate, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1399, 1406 (2008).
Scott A. Mertens’s model statute, in his words, “proposes an absolute privilege for confi-
dential information and sources (except when the journalist is the subject of the inquiry), and
a qualified privilege for unpublished information.” Scott A. Mertens, Comment, Michigan’s
Shield Laws—A Free or Fettered Press?, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 511, 531 (1999).
Douglas E. Lee maintains that even an absolute shield law does not always provide pro-
tection, using the example of Svoboda v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 805 N.E.2d 
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That is not to say that the authors of this Article are optimistic about the passage of
an absolute shield law at the federal level; if Congress could repeal the First Amend-
ment, it very well might.71 But absolute shield protection is necessary because the 
559 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), a case involving a newspaper reporter who became a plaintiff after
a radio news director aired a statement from a confidential source who said the reporter was
romantically involved with one of her newspaper’s publishers. Douglas E. Lee, Do Not Pass
Go, Do Not Collect $200: The Reporter’s Privilege Today, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
77, 93–94 (2006).
Sweden has absolute shield protection for journalists. See TRYCKFRIHETSFÖRORDNINGEN
[TF] [CONSTITUTION] (Swed.) [The Freedom of the Press Act], available at http://www
.riksdagen.se/Global/dokument/dokument/laws/the-freedom-of-the-press-act-2012.pdf. In
fact, Swedish journalists would be guilty of violating law if they revealed their sources:
[A] principle contained in the Freedom of the Press Act is the freedom
to communicate information. According to this principle, all persons in
Sweden are entitled to communicate to the press information that they
consider important and necessary to make public. The publisher of the
material is not entitled to reveal the source if the individual in question
wishes to remain anonymous. It is a punishable offence for anyone, for
example the head of a public agency, to try to find out who has leaked
information to the media.
Freedom of the Press Act, RIKSDAGEN, http://www.riksdagen.se/Global/dokument
/dokument/laws/the-freedom-of-the-press-act-2012.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012). Accord-
ing to Reporters Without Borders, Sweden distinguished itself in 2010 by passing its Press
Freedom Act, thus ranking in the top half-dozen countries for press freedom. See Press
Freedom Index 2010, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index
-2010,1034.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
Could the “trade secrets” rubric perhaps be expanded by U.S. courts to protect confiden-
tial sources? See, e.g., Paperloop.com, Inc. v. Gow, No. 322044, 2001 WL 1674804 (S.F. Cnty.
Super. Ct., 2001); Alfredo A. Barrera III, Comment, Trade Secrets and the Fourth Estate: Can
Employers Claim Trade Secret Protection over a Reporter’s Confidential Sources?, 39 HOUS.
L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2002) (exploring the question: “If a reporter cultivates a source while em-
ployed by a publisher, can a quasi-property interest be claimed in this confidential relationship,
and can it be protected as a trade secret by her former employer?”); see also Clay Calvert &
Robert D. Richards, Journalism Sources As Trade Secrets: Whose Source Is It Anyway?, 23
WHITTIER L. REV. 985 (2002).
71 Why do journalists fight so hard to protect sources and confidential information? Some
object that compelling disclosure of sources is equivalent to turning journalists into inves-
tigators for the government or a party in a lawsuit. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
725–32 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). More important, some fear confidential sources would
dry up, obstructing the free flow of information to the public. For more commentary on why
journalists protect their sources, see infra, Conclusion and Suggestions.
Of course, not everyone favors shield-law protection. Arkansas U.S. district judge, Susan
Webber Wright, says:
I do not believe that any statutory reporter’s privilege should be used
to defeat other interests that are important to our constitutional form of
government. It is true that freedom of the press is essential to our form of 
2012] NEEDED: MORE THAN A PAPER SHIELD 1293
government. But, equally essential are the constitutional rights to indict-
ment by a grand jury and a fair trial, in both criminal and civil cases.
Susan Webber Wright, A Trial Judge’s Ruminations on the Reporter’s Privilege, 29 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 103, 117 (2006).
Louis J. Capocasale argues:
To provide the news media with an absolute privilege to withhold con-
fidential sources may increase the temptation for the news media to print
false “scandalous,” or “controversial” stories about individuals in an
effort to sell newspapers, since when confronted about the factual sub-
stance of the story if a federal investigation ensues, the newsgatherer
could raise his or her shield.
Louis J. Capocasale, Comment, Using the Shield as a Sword: An Analysis of how the Current
Congressional Proposals for a Reporter’s Shield Law Wound the Fifth Amendment, 20 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 372 (2006).
He also says that:
Since reporters assume the role of watchdogs for the people, sniffing
out individual and government crime on the trail of truth, it is illogical
to afford them the right to sit idly by while another citizen or public offi-
cial faces possible reputational harm, impeachment, or imprisonment by
being accused of a crime.
Id. at 377.
The sentiment against press arrogance was forcefully stated by Erik Ugland:
A few weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Herbert
v. Lando, in which the Court refused to prohibit libel plaintiffs from
inquiring about journalists’ editorial processes, Justice William Brennan
delivered his renowned address at Rutgers University . . . . [H]e chided
Jack Landau, then head of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, for his overheated claim that Herbert would destroy the press’s
“last constitutional shred of . . . editorial privacy and independence from
the government.” Brennan was an unlikely critic of the press, but he was
just one of a chorus of people who had begun to warn journalists that their
overzealous self-advocacy was eroding the support they had cultivated in
the years following Watergate and that by arrogantly staking out an elite
social position for themselves and demanding a set of “special . . . rights”
not possessed by the public generally, they were courting a backlash.
Three decades later, the charge of media arrogance and exceptionalism
is still at the core of the contemporary American press critique. The news
media remain the targets of reprobation in part because the public per-
ceives them as demanding a unique set of legal protections. This is par-
ticularly true in the context of the reporter’s privilege and the debates over
the proposed federal shield law, in which journalists’ pleas are frequently
dismissed as attempts to position themselves as “a priestly class above
everybody else.”
Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme
Court and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375,
375–77 (2009) (citations omitted).
1294 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1277
ability of judges to weigh interests almost inevitably means that they will deny pro-
tection in cases such as Judith Miller’s. Miller’s judge was emphatic: no protection for
her under a balancing test.72
Journalists should take scant comfort in any shield laws that permit balancing.
Balancing is often inadequate because it is dependent on the proclivities of the balancer.
Some judges like to puncture shield laws.73 These judges are loathe to let legislators tell
them, the judges, how they should run their courts. A further complication at the state
level is the fact that some judges are elected and thus might fear appearing to be “soft”
on journalists and crime if they grant shield protection.74
So long as there is no federal shield law, federal judges can, in effect, trump state
shield laws. Where state legislators have given shield protection, federal judges can
thwart state legislative intent. But the same would be true if a federal qualified shield
law permitted the federal judge to balance interests and deny shield protection in
circumstances in which state law would grant a shield.
Some commentators, of course, prefer a qualified shield law. For example,
Rodney A. Smolla concludes, “The privilege should be qualified, not absolute, and
For other articles expressing anti-shield-law sentiment, see Randall D. Eliason, Leakers,
Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385 (2006) (discussing history and future of shield laws); Randall
D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1341 (2002) (argu-
ing that privilege laws are flawed and unnecessary); Edward Garris, The Problem with a
Federal Reporters’ Shield Law: Speculative and Divergent, 20 CBA REC. 48 (June–July
2006) (discussing possible solutions for shield law problems); Markus E. Apelis, Note, Fit to
Print? Consequences of Implementing a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1369 (2008) (expressing concern that licensing of journalists would be a consequence of
shield protection); Kennon, supra note 56, at 546 (arguing against recognition of a reporter’s
privilege in cases involving grand jury leaks); Kara A. Larsen, Note, The Demise of the First
Amendment–Based Reporter’s Privilege: Why This Current Trend Should Not Surprise the
Media, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1235 (2005) (analyzing the expansion of privilege laws); John T.
White, Comment, Smoke Screen: Are State Shield Laws Really Protecting Speech or Simply
Providing Cover for Criminals Like the Serial Arsonist? 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909 (2001) (analyz-
ing Arizona’s shield law).
72 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 983 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
73 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74 At least some judges in thirty-nine states face elections in some manner. See AM. JUD.
SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS
(2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection
_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012); see also Genelle I. Belmas & Jason
M. Shepard, Speaking from the Bench: Judicial Campaigns, Judges’ Speech, and the First
Amendment, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 709 n.1 (2010) (explaining methodology for counting
election states). A wide literature exists on the merits and demerits of electing judges—
specifically, whether politics influence their work. See, e.g., sources cited supra. In this case,
the risk, at least, is that public sentiment against a journalist might cause an elected judge to
opt towards unjustly jailing or otherwise punishing the journalist.
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should borrow from the rich body of case law and statutory experience with the
statutory and common-law balancing tests that have been employed by many state
and federal courts.”75
75 Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study
in “Reverse Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 1429 (2008). Smolla does, however,
want to see passage of a federal shield law:
To extend a newsgathering privilege to our federal court system is not
a radical proposition. The fact that some 49 states and the District of
Columbia have extended some form of newsgathering privilege to citi-
zens is a “national referendum” attesting to this country’s sense of the
critical role that a vibrant press plays in a free society. Federal legislation
would simply put the federal court system, and most importantly, the
federal government itself, within the rubric of the same balance that has
been struck by most states. The experience of the states and the District
of Columbia have served as a valuable proving ground for the value of
a reporter’s privilege, and the possibility of crafting such a privilege in
a nuanced manner that balances the competing societal interests.
Id.
Nuance is also stressed by Matthew P. Burke:
States with absolute shield laws generally do not force disclosure of
sources under any circumstances. While such protection sounds appeal-
ing, common sense dictates that there must be either various exceptions to
such an absolute privilege or, perhaps better labeled, a qualified privilege
where courts can compel disclosure under certain limited circumstances.
A potential shield law should provide that compelled disclosure is never
appropriate unless disclosure is necessary to prevent a grave injustice and
the party seeking disclosure cannot obtain information critical to their
[sic] case by any other reasonable means.
Matthew P. Burke, Note, Big Dig Confidential: Why Massachusetts Needs a Statutory
Journalist’s Shield Law if it Wants to Keep the Big Stories Coming, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
899, 914 (2009).
For other commentators advocating passage of a qualified federal shield law, see Rex S.
Heinke & Galit Avitan, Reconciling Branzburg and Daily Mail: A Proposal for a Qualified
Reporter’s Privilege, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 503 (2006); James Thomas Tucker & Stephen
Wermiel, Enacting a Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and
Eliason, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1291 (2008); Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News:
A Sequential Interpretation of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 113
(2008); Robert Zelnick, Journalists and Confidential Sources, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 541 (2005) (discussing primarily the Judith Miller case and arguing for a quali-
fied shield law); Jaime M. Porter, Note, Not Just “Every Man”: Revisiting the Journalists’
Privilege Against Compelled Disclosure of Confidential Sources, 82 IND. L.J. 549, 572 (2007)
(arguing, in part, for a qualified federal shield law); Michael D. Saperstein, Jr., Comment,
Federal Shield Law: Protecting Free Speech or Endangering the Nation?, 14 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 543 (2006); Devin M. Smith, Comment, Thin Shields Pierce Easily: A Case for
Fortifying the Journalists’ Privilege in New Zealand, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 217 (2009)
(arguing for a qualified shield law based on Washington State’s law).
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Qualified shield laws give journalists a false sense of security. A shield that can be
punctured is not a shield that can be relied upon. For newsgatherers who are promising
confidentiality to a source, the problem is similar to a truth-in-advertising problem. The
newsgatherer would need to qualify the promise of confidentiality unless, of course,
the newsgatherer were sure that he or she would choose jail over breaking a promise
of confidentiality. But even if the newsgatherer felt confident in his or her resolve to
choose jail over disclosing the source’s identity, the fact that the newsgatherer might
be put to that choice would seem a material fact that the newsgatherer should disclose
to the source. The newsgatherer could say, “I promise confidentiality. A judge might
order me to reveal your identity, but I would rather go to jail.”
Given the current state of shield law, some federal prosecutors are arguably making
an end run around the First Amendment.76 They are not going after publishers directly
but are calling grand juries and subpoenaing journalists. This prosecutorial tactic could
jeopardize potential sources’ willingness to give information to the press, thus result-
ing in information drying up. Indirectly, then, federal prosecutors could restrain pub-
lication of information the government wants to keep secret, even information about
alleged governmental wrongdoing.
A. A Little History
The history of jailing journalists for refusing to identify sources is, unfortunately,
a long one.77 In fact, Justice Clarence Thomas has noted:
[T]he earliest and most famous American experience with free-
dom of the press, the 1735 Zenger trial, centered around anony-
mous political pamphlets. The case involved a printer, John Peter
Zenger, who refused to reveal the anonymous authors of published
attacks on the Crown Governor of New York. When the Governor
and his council could not discover the identity of the authors, they
prosecuted Zenger himself for seditious libel.78
76 See generally Ugland, supra note 75.
77 See, e.g., Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Déjà Vu All Over Again: How a Generation
of Gains in Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 13, 13 (2006) (“The first known American reporter punished for refusing to identify the
source of published information was Benjamin Franklin’s brother, James, in 1722.” (citing
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY 30 (H. Weld ed., N.Y., Harper & Brothers 1848)).
But see Geoffrey R. Stone, The Responsibilities of a Free Press, 40 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS &
SCI. 7 (1987) (discussing the jailing of James Franklin, editor of the New England Courant,
for writing a sarcastic article about the government building a ship to chase coastal pirates)).
78 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER 9–19 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1972)).
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Zenger kept his promise of confidentiality, and his fellow citizens rallied around
him.79 The jury acquitted him.80 This case shows the deeply rooted, historic value placed
on anonymity.81 In Justice Thomas’s words: “Although the case set the Colonies afire
for its example of a jury refusing to convict a defendant of seditious libel against Crown
authorities, it also signified at an early moment the extent to which anonymity and the
freedom of the press were intertwined in the early American mind.”82 The case also
demonstrates the depth of conviction from an early journalist to protect his source.
In 1848, New York Herald reporter John Nugent chose to go to jail rather than tell
Congress who gave him a copy of a secret treaty with Mexico.83 As for protection for
journalists, Maryland passed the first shield law in 1896.84
The claim of First Amendment protection first got attention in a ground-break-
ing case in 1958, Garland v. Torre.85 Actress and singer Judy Garland sued reporter
Marie Torre for libel.86 The reporter argued for a First Amendment shield for reporters.
Although she lost,87 the Second Circuit seriously considered her argument.88
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 See Ex parte Nugent, 1 Hay. & Haz. 287 (D.C. Cir. 1848); see also David Rudenstine,
A Reporter Keeping Confidences: More Important Than Ever, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1431,
1431 (2008).
84 See Jane E. Kirtley, Reporter’s Privilege in the 21st Century: Despite the Ongoing
Controversy Concerning Adoption of a Federal Reporter’s Privilege Statute, the Idea is
Neither New, Nor Novel, 25 DEL. LAW., Winter 2007/2008, at 12, 13.
85 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
86 Id. at 547.
87 Id. at 550.
88 Id. The Second Circuit framed Torre’s argument in this manner:
The first contention is a Constitutional one—to compel newspaper re-
porters to disclose confidential sources of news would, it is asserted, en-
croach upon the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment,
because “it would impose an important practical restraint on the flow
of news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro
tanto the flow of news to the public.”
Id. at 547–48. For commentary, see Stephen Bates, Garland v. Torre and the Birth of Reporter’s
Privilege, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91 (2010).
Anthony Lewis commented on the Garland case, highlighting its importance:
The first time the claim for such a privilege was made in the courts was
in 1958, in the case of Garland v. Torre. Garland was Judy Garland, the
singer. Torre was Marie Torre, a television columnist for The Herald-
Tribune. She wrote that, according to a CBS executive, Ms. Garland was
not scheduling a special on CBS because she thought she was too fat. Ms.
Garland sued, and demanded the name of the alleged CBS executive—
which Marie Torre refused to produce, claiming a constitutional privilege. 
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B. Branzburg v. Hayes
A shield law would not be necessary if the Supreme Court had said that the First
Amendment protects journalists from incarceration.89 But the Court, in a 5–4 decision,
In the Court of Appeals, Judge Potter Stewart—who would later be pro-
moted to the Supreme Court—said that the harm to news-gathering by
compelled disclosure of a source “must give place under the Constitution
to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice.”
Lewis, supra note 56, at 1355 (citations omitted).
89 For a scholarly article arguing that the Supreme Court should have recognized a First
Amendment privilege for reporters to protect their sources, see Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment,
The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s
Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201 (2005).
Some commentators believe that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence offers a
solution to the problem of granting shield-law protection to journalists. See, e.g., Anthony
L. Fargo & Paul McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law? How Rule 501 Could Solve the
Journalist’s Privilege Problem, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1347 (2007).
Rule 501 says:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
See FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added). The rule continues, saying, “However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law.” Id.
Judge David Tatel opined:
Given Branzburg’s instruction that “Congress has freedom to determine
whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to
fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to
deal with the evil discerned,” 408 U.S. at 706, 92 S.Ct. 2646, Rule 501’s
delegation of congressional authority requires that we look anew at the
“necess[ity] and desirab[ility]” of the reporter privilege—though from a
common law perspective.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Erik Ugland argues for recognition of a common-law privilege for journalists. He says,
Debate over the proposed federal shield law . . . has focused almost
entirely on the sanctity of confidential source relationships and the
value of leaks as a tool for preserving government accountability. In
addition, congressional testimony, newspaper editorials, and other public
communications . . . all highlight the need to maintain an expressive
channel for whistleblowers and other anonymous speakers.
Erik Ugland, The New Abridged Reporter’s Privilege: Policies, Principles, and Pathological
Perspectives, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2010). The result? “All of this rhetorical framing encour-
ages a one-dimensional view of the privilege that is oriented around source confidentiality 
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refused to do so in Branzburg v. Hayes.90 The Court did say, however, that the fed-
eral government and the states could fashion statutory privileges for journalists,91
and today a majority of states have done so, with varying degrees of success.
Currently, forty states and the District of Columbia have passed their own
renditions of shield laws, and more are contemplating a shield law, as is the federal
government.92 But current shield laws may aptly be compared to an insurance policy
that protects a journalist from everything but what happens to that journalist.
Piercing-of-the-shield is precisely what happened to poor journalist Branzburg.
Branzburg wrote a Louisville Courier-Journal article that included a detailed report
even though 97% of journalist subpoenas are for nonconfidential information.” Id. at 5. On
the subject of nonconfidential information, see, for example, Anthony L. Fargo, The
Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 241 (2002).
Elizabeth A. Graham urges the Supreme Court to recognize a “common-law reporter’s
privilege” under Rule 501. Elizabeth A. Graham, Comment, Uncertainty Leads to Jail Time:
The Status of the Common-Law Reporter’s Privilege, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 753 (2007).
Speaking of “the policy concerns which must be taken into account when considering the
common-law reporter’s privilege,” she says:
Most important among these concerns is the need for clarity, so reporters
and their sources will be aware of the consequences of their actions. There
is clearly disagreement among the courts about the proper approach to
analyzing the issue; the best way to address that is for the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari and recognize a common-law reporter’s privilege.
Id. at 757.
The New York Bar’s Committee on Communications & Media Law agrees, saying,
“Branzburg plainly poses no obstacle to judicial recognition of a federal common law privi-
lege for journalists under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and such a privilege
should plainly be recognized.” Comm. on Commc’ns & Media Law, The Federal Common
Law of Journalists’ Privilege: A Position Paper, 60 RECORD 214, 214 (2005).
Kristen Anastos argues that if federal shield-law protections pass, then “the media would
gain a much-needed federal protection. The media, however, would also be squandering the
full protection the First Amendment affords by not fighting for the recognition of an absolute
reporters’ privilege under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Anastos, supra note 69, at 486.
Jaynie Randall opines that “Federal courts should use their common law power under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to articulate a flexible newsgathering privilege for reporters
analogous to the work product immunity that exists for attorneys.” Jaynie Randall, Comment,
Freeing Newsgathering from the Reporter’s Privilege, 114 YALE L.J. 1827, 1827 (2005).
But Arkansas U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright argues against a common-law
privilege, saying, “I conclude that any reporter’s privilege is so different from the privileges
recognized at common law that there really should be no reporter’s privilege at common law.”
Wright, supra note 71, at 110.
90 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
91 Id. at 688–89.
92 See infra Part II (discussing the differences in current shield laws); see also supra note
58 (listing states with shield laws).
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of two young people who were making hashish from marijuana, as well as a picture
of hands working above a laboratory table that had hashish on it.93 The article said
Branzburg “had promised not to reveal the identities of the two hashish makers.”94
That statement was somewhat similar to waving a red flag at a bull.
Branzburg then received a subpoena to appear before a grand jury.95 The Kentucky
court said the state’s shield law protected a journalist from “divulg[ing] the identity of
an informant who supplied him with information.”96 But “the statute did not permit a
reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally.”97 Branzburg, of
course, had observed the two people making hashish. The courts pierced the shield.98
Branzburg was a combination of three cases involving journalists who refused to
testify before grand juries and left murky waters in its wake.99 In one case, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the First Amendment gave a reporter a qualified
privilege.100 In another, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said the First
Amendment did not protect journalists from testifying in front of grand juries.101 In the
third case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said Kentucky’s shield law did not protect
Branzburg, nor did the First Amendment.102
In deciding that the First Amendment does not give journalists shield protection,
the Court balanced competing interests and concluded that the obligation to appear in
front of a grand jury and give testimony when subpoenaed to do so outweighs First
Amendment considerations.103 The Court said, with barbed language, “[W]e cannot
seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agree-
ment to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory
that it is better to write about crime than to do something about it.”104 The Court did
93 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
94 Id. at 667–68.
95 Id. at 668.
96 Id. at 669.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 669–70.
99 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–79. See generally Anthony L. Fargo, What They
Meant to Say: The Courts Try to Explain Branzburg v. Hayes, 12 JOURNALISM & COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 65 (2010) (providing an extensive review of federal cases citing, and
attempting to interpret, Branzburg on shield law and other matters). For a first-person
account of Earl Caldwell, a party in the Branzburg case, see Eric B. Easton, A House Divided:
Earl Caldwell, The New York Times, and the Quest for a Testimonial Privilege, 2009 UTAH
L. REV. 1293 (2009). For coverage of the extensive 1972–1975 hearings in Congress on the
“newsmen’s privilege,” headed by Wisconsin Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, see
Jason M. Shepard, After the First Amendment Fails: The Newsmen’s Privilege Hearings of
the 1970s, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 373 (2009). For an argument for U.S. Supreme Court
recognition of shield law, see generally Nestler, supra note 89.
100 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679.
101 Id. at 674.
102 Id. at 670.
103 Id. at 701–02.
104 Id. at 692.
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recognize that some sources may dry up and that there may be some constriction of
news, but found the question of how much too “speculative.”105
Also, the Court mentioned a practical consideration: If it granted a “constitutional
newsman’s privilege,” then sooner or later the Court was going to have to define who
qualifies as a “newsman.”106 This question, who should qualify as a journalist, remains
a complex one, as will be discussed later.107
The only privilege journalists have in front of a grand jury is the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination that every citizen has, according to the Supreme
Court.108 There is an exception where First Amendment considerations would outweigh
the obligation to testify: when a grand jury investigation is not held in good faith.109
“Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but
to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no justification,”110
the Court said, but proving bad faith could indeed be difficult.111 The bottom line on
Branzburg is that there is “no First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer the rele-
vant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation.”112
Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which he said:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
105 Id. at 693–94.
106 Id. at 703–04. The Court also said:
The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would pre-
sent practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later,
it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who quali-
fied for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional
doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.
Id.
107 See infra Part II.A.
108 Id. at 689–90.
109 Id. at 707.
110 Id. at 707–08.
111 The notion of “good faith” or “bad faith” fortunately gets little play in state shield statutes.
Arizona requires a good-faith statement: “That the subpoena is not intended to interfere with
the gathering, writing, editing, publishing, broadcasting and disseminating of news to the
public . . . .” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(A)(6) (2011). Arkansas also mentions “bad
faith,” but from the perspective of the reporter, saying that before a reporter may be forced to
disclose sources, “it must be shown that the article was written, published, or broadcast in bad
faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510
(2011). Thus, despite the inactive “it must be shown” language, clearly the seeker of sources
must prove bad faith and malice on the part of the reporter and that the reporter’s article was
“not in the interest of the public welfare.” Id. Proving bad faith and proving a negative—“not
in the interest of the public welfare”—might well be very difficult tasks.
112 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
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obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect
to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.113
Based on this concurring opinion, some legal scholars have said that the Branzburg
decision is a plurality decision only.114 With Justice Powell in the middle, Branzburg
could be viewed as a 4–1–4 decision. For example, Rodney A. Smolla said:
[T]he opinion of Justice Powell in Branzburg has proven a model
of muddle. Justice Powell’s opinion, on the one hand, seemed to
profess agreement with the Chief Justice. Yet the opinion of Justice
Powell also proceeded, somewhat opaquely, to hint that it may be
appropriate to balance the competing interests at stake on a case-
by-case basis.115
David Rudenstine has commented that “Powell’s opinion in Branzburg left the
law in a muddle.”116 He continued:
Even Justice Stewart could not resist poking fun at the uncer-
tainty and confusion Justice Powell’s enigmatic opinion created.
Justice Stewart wrote: “In the cases involving the newspaper
reporters’ claims that they had a constitutional privilege not to
disclose their confidential news sources to a grand jury, the Court
rejected the claims by a vote of five to four, or, considering Mr.
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, perhaps by a vote of four and
a half to four and a half.”117
113 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
114 William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 637 (2006) (“For more than thirty years, media lawyers have claimed
with a surprising level of success that Justice White’s opinion for the Branzburg Court was
a plurality opinion and the crucial opinion was Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, which
arguably implied that some form of reporter’s privilege should be recognized.”).
115 Smolla, supra note 75, at 1426; see also Michele Bush Kimball, The Intent Behind the
Cryptic Concurrence that Provided a Reporter’s Privilege, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 379 (2008)
(concluding that, based on his papers, among other sources, Justice Powell supported a case-
by-case application of a qualified reporter’s privilege).
116 David Rudenstine, A Reporter Keeping Confidences: More Important than Ever, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1431, 1436 (2008).
117 Id. (citing Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975)); see
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel,
J., concurring) (speaking of “Branzburg’s internal confusion”).
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Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting in Branzburg, commented on the case of
Caldwell v. United States, one of the three cases that the Court heard in the consolidated
Branzburg case.118 Earl Caldwell was reporting for the New York Times about activ-
ities of the Black Panther Party, which had publicly threatened to kill then-President
Richard Nixon.119 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the First
Amendment granted a limited privilege not to appear in front of a grand jury probing
Panther activities.120 Justice Douglas said:
The New York Times, whose reporting functions are at issue here,
takes the amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be
balanced against other needs or conveniences of government. My
belief is that all of the “balancing” was done by those who wrote
the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute
terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated ver-
sions of the First Amendment which both the Government and the
New York Times advance in the case.121
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall,
wrote an impassioned dissent.122 “The Court’s crabbed view of the First Amendment
reflects a disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press in our
society,” Stewart said. He then presented a three-part test that he would have used:
I would hold that the government must (1) show that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the newsman has information which is
clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demon-
strate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative
means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demon-
strate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.123
This test of relevance, lack of alternative sources, and compelling need had been used
by the Ninth Circuit in one of the cases consolidated by Branzburg, and Stewart’s use 
On a positive note, C. Edwin Baker concluded, “Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg
allowed many, probably most, lower courts faced with the issue to conclude that the First
Amendment does justify at least some special attention to the press’s claims not to be re-
quired to reveal confidential sources.” C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the
Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 984 (2007).
118 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 675–77 (majority opinion).
120 Id. at 679. For a further synopsis of Caldwell, see id. at 676–79.
121 Id. at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 743.
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of it helped the test become very influential.124 Even Stewart’s test, however, probably
would not have helped Taricani, Miller, or even Leggett.125
124 See id. at 678, 743; Fargo, supra note 99, at 80. The Supreme Court could have re-
viewed its decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, but on November 15, 2010, the Court chose not to
do so and also chose not to comment on its refusal. See High Court Won’t Hear Free-Speech
Challenge to Grand Jury Subpoenas, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, (Nov. 16, 2010), http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/high-court-wont-hear-free-speech-challenge-to-grand-jury
-subpoenas.
Siobhan Reynolds and her organization, the Pain Relief Network, opposed the federal
government’s attempts to restrict prescriptions for pain killers, believing that the government’s
actions were leaving patients to suffer chronic pain unnecessarily. Roxana Hegeman, Kan.
Advocate’s Supporters: Grand Jury Retaliatory, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 10, 2010,
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/nov/10/kan-advocates-supporters-grand-jury-retaliatory
/?page=/#article. She took up the cause of Dr. Stephen Schneider and his wife, who received
federal sentences of thirty and thirty-three years respectively for conspiracy in an alleged
moneymaking scheme that resulted in sixty-eight deaths from overdose in a Kansas clinic.
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, supra. Reynolds and her group sponsored a highway billboard,
saying, “Dr. Schneider never killed anyone.” Id. Federal prosecutors attempted to gain a gag
order against Reynolds, but after that failed, prosecutors convened a grand jury. Id. Reynolds
refused to turn over documents that included e-mails. Id.
Her attempts to quash the subpoena and to overturn a contempt citation failed. Id. Even
though organizations such as The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the
Institute for Justice and Reason Foundation took up Reynolds’s cause, the Supreme Court
refused to hear her case. Id. The case climbed mostly in secret to its rebuff by the high Court,
with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals sealing the court docket in Reynolds’s contempt case.
See id. The Tenth Circuit had sealed the amicus brief filed by the Reporters Committee, but
the Associated Press got a copy of the brief after it was posted anonymously on Scribd.com in
October. See id.; Hegeman, supra. The brief said of the Reynolds case, “Here the Assistant U.S.
Attorney sought the subpoenas in question after the district court denied the government’s
motion to gag. The sequence of facts strongly suggests that the government has issued these
subpoenas in direct retaliation for (Reynolds’) political advocacy.” Hegeman, supra; FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, supra. Roxana Hegeman, who has written extensively on the Siobhan
Reynolds case, said, “The Associated Press obtained a copy of the sealed amicus brief after
it was anonymously uploaded to the public document-sharing website Scribd last month.
Institute of Justice attorney Paul Sherman denied his organization posted the document but
confirmed its contents.” Hegeman, supra.
Branzburg had said that the only privilege journalists have in front of a grand jury is the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination that every citizen has. Branzburg, 408 
U.S. at 689–90. But there is an exception where First Amendment considerations would out-
weigh the obligation to testify: when a grand jury investigation is not held in good faith. Id.
at 707. “Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but
to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no justification,” the
Court said, but there is “no First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer the relevant and
material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation.” Id. at 707–08. Was the
Reynolds case one of a “bad faith” grand jury? What constitutes a “bad faith” grand jury? The
Supreme Court has so far not offered any clarification.
Jacob Sullum complains, “Perhaps the Court was impressed by the 10th Circuit’s reasoning.
We can’t judge for ourselves, because the appeals court’s decision is sealed, like almost every
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C. The Value of Openness
Heidi Kitrosser questions the “conventional assumption” that volumes of infor-
mation exist that would be dangerous in enemy hands, and she reports that persons
from all political viewpoints have suggested that the United States unnecessarily clas-
sifies a lot of information.126 For example, she questions the Bush Administration’s
rationale for trying to keep the NSA eavesdropping a secret.127
other document related to Reynolds’ case.” Jacob Sullum, Chilling Her Softly, REASON MAG.,
Nov. 17, 2010, http://reason.com/archives/2010/11/17/chilling-her-softly.
In the meantime, Reynolds, on December 29, 2010, sent out a message to the members
of the Pain Network Organization, saying:
The Members of the Board of Directors and I have decided to shut
down PRN as an activist organization because pressure from the US
Department of Justice has made it impossible for us to function. I have
fought back against the attack on me and PRN but have received no
redress in the federal courts; so, the board and I have concluded that we
simply cannot continue.
Siobhan Reynolds, The End of PRN, PAIN RELIEF NETWORK, Dec. 29, 2010 (on file with author).
125 On December 8, 2004, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia heard arguments on whether to grant Miller and Cooper any protection. In
re Grand Jury, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Judge Sentelle repeatedly asked how
this case differed from Branzburg v. Hayes. Id. at 977–79. Judge Tatel, through his concurrence,
perhaps seemed amenable to balancing the equities in this case. See id. at 987–88 (Tatel, J.,
concurring). But balancing leaves the decision up to the decisionmaker, of course, and proving
relevance, lack of other sources, and need, arguably, is not that difficult for prosecutors.
126 Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving
Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1066 (2008).
127 Id. at 1067–68. So does Anthony Lewis:
We have lately had some dramatic illustrations of the fact that journalists
can often do their most important work only by relying on confidential
sources to get at official secrets. One example was the Times report two
years ago that President Bush had ordered the National Security Agency
to tap international telephone calls without obtaining the warrants that are
required by law. It was a vitally important story, bringing to light—and to
a degree of accountability—a lawless executive activity. Another example
was the Washington Post report on the CIA’s use of secret prisons in
Europe to hold and interrogate alleged enemy combatants. Neither of
those stories could have been reported without the use of confidential
sources. And without, I should add, great courage on the part of the jour-
nalists and their newspapers. The response of the Bush Administration
and its political supporters was to threaten the reporters, call them traitors
and so on; that is, to focus on the leaks instead of one of the flagrant
violations of law that officials had committed.
Lewis, supra note 56, at 1354; see also Note, Media Incentives and National Security Secrets,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2228 (2009) (“In recent years, journalists have exposed many stories
that the government claims will imperil efforts in the war on terrorism, including the Bush
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Yet confidentiality exists, and given confidentiality’s close relationship to matters
of national security, it often adds complexity to the reporting process. Mary-Rose
Papandrea says leaks have become the primary method of communicating information,
even classified information, to the public through a compliant press.128 Today in the
era of WikiLeaks, protection for leakers is all the more divisive. The old chess board
between the press and government has been upended by new and wily—and some-
times reckless—players.129
Bradley Manning is the government’s prime, and only, suspect in the release of
hundreds of thousands of secret documents to WikiLeaks.130 The Army charged him
Administration’s secret domestic surveillance of al Qaeda affiliates . . . .”). For an extended
piece on wiretapping done by presidents, and particularly President George W. Bush, see gen-
erally Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II
Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (2010).
Kitrosser also comments about another risk:
[There also is a risk] that secrecy . . . will intentionally be misused by
those set on manipulating public debate toward their own ends. Indeed,
McCarthy’s exploitation of government secrecy calls to mind Vice
President Cheney’s recent attempts to perpetuate the theory of a link be-
tween Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein through vague public allusions
to evidence in the administration’s possession of which others, including
the 9-11 Commission, supposedly were not aware.
Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities, supra at 1067 (quoting
Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 537–40 (2007)).
Ralph Nader also decries overclassification. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
111TH CONG., ESPIONAGE ACT AND WIKILEAKS 87 (Comm. Print 2011) (statement of Ralph
Nader); see also Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 625 (2010).
128 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National
Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 236–37 (2008).
129 Daniel Domscheit-Berg, who worked at WikiLeaks until September 2010, said this of
WikiLeaks:
It has set in motion a cultural change, in some way that it has created this
whole debate that we are having today. What is secrecy? And is there a
need for secrecy? . . . The goal is not to get rid of all secrets in this
world, but the goal is to foster transparency. And that I think is a really
important cause.
PBS Frontline: WikiSecrets, supra note 11.
130 David S. Cloud, WikiLeaks Probe Brings New Charges, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, at
AA6. News media generally mention Manning and WikiLeaks in the same sentence, all but
stating outright that he was WikiLeaks’ likely source. See, e.g., John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya,
WikiLeaks Chief on Run, Trailed by His Notoriety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A1; Leigh,
supra note 13.
In March, the government imprisoned Manning at Quantico, Virginia. On his conditions
of imprisonment there, see, for example, Charlie Savage, Soldier in Leaks Case Will Be Made
to Sleep Naked Nightly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A8. P.J. Crowley, the then–State
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in March 2011 with twenty-two counts, including the capital offense of aiding the
Department spokesman, spoke out at a private gathering about Manning’s conditions, calling
them “ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid.” See Ellen Nakashima, Manning’s Treatment
is ‘Stupid,’ U.S. Official Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2011, at A2. The following day, President
Obama said the Pentagon had given him assurances that “basic standards” were being met for
Manning. Id. Apparently, Crowley’s negative words ended his job. See Crowley Quits over
Manning Comments, AL JAZEERA ENG., Mar. 13, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news
/americas/2011/03/201131317356184984.html/day/2011/03/14. In April 2011, the U.S. military
moved Manning to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where conditions are ostensibly better. Brad
Knickerbocker, Alleged ‘WikiLeaker’ Bradley Manning Sent to Less Restrictive Prison,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011
/0421/Alleged-WikiLeaker-Bradley-Manning-sent-to-less-restrictive-prison.
Manning’s treatment has become a matter of international interest, if not scandal. After his
14-month investigation, the United Nation’s “special rapporteur on torture,” Juan Mendez, has
formally accused the United States government of mistreating Manning. See Ed Pilkington,
Bradley Manning’s Treatment Was Cruel and Inhuman, UN Torture Chief Rules, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/12/bradley-manning-cruel
-inhuman-treatment-un. According to the Guardian, Mendez concluded that “the US military
was at least culpable of cruel and inhumane treatment in keeping Manning locked up alone for
23 hours a day over an 11-month period in conditions that he also found might have consti-
tuted torture.” See id.; see also Eyder Peralta, Treatment of Bradley Manning Was Cruel and
Inhuman, Says U.N. Official, NPR (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012
/03/12/148453334/treatment-of-bradley-manning-was-cruel-and-inhuman-says-u-n-official.
In the meantime, Assange was facing difficulties of his own because of allegations that
he raped two women in Sweden. Burns & Somaiya, supra. While in London, under house
arrest, he fought extradition. On his court loss, see Esther Addley, Julian Assange Plea After
Extradition Defeat: ‘Make this Case Bigger Than Me,’ GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/feb/24/julian-assange-extradition-defeat. On his appeal,
see, for example, Stefano Ambrogi, WikiLeaks’ Assange in UK Court Extradition Appeal,
REUTERS (July 11, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/11/uk-britain-assange-appeal
-idUKTRE76A77Q20110711.
As of mid-March 2012, Assange’s fate on charges of sexual misconduct remained
undetermined, and the facts of the case remained unclear. John Pilger, The Dirty War on
WikiLeaks: Media Smears Suggest Swedish Complicity in a Washington-Driven Push to
Punish Julian Assange, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 9, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment
isfree/2012/mar/09/julian-assange-wikileaks. In part because of the murkiness of this case, some
of the commentary against this legal pursuit of Assange has been scathing. Id. For example,
John Pilger wrote this commentary in the Guardian:
Assange will soon know if the supreme court in London is to allow his
appeal against extradition to Sweden, where he faces allegations of sexual
misconduct, most of which were dismissed by a senior prosecutor in
Stockholm. On bail for 16 months, tagged and effectively under house
arrest, he has been charged with nothing. . . . If he is passed from Sweden
to the US, an orange jumpsuit, shackles and a fabricated indictment await
him. And there go all who dare challenge rogue America.
Id. Pilger ends with this question: “Should his extradition be allowed, and with Damocles
swords of malice and a vengeful Washington hanging over his head, who will protect him
and provide the justice to which we all have a right?” Id.
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enemy.131 On February 23, 2012, Bradley Manning’s court-martial began.132 He
entered no plea to the charges that could lead to life in prison if he is convicted.133
Although WikiLeaks has not named Manning as a collaborator, the website said
that it had offered Manning legal counsel or money to help pay for his defense.134
Manning also received public support from Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon
Papers in 1971, the last dramatic leak case that faced the United States government
prior to the WikiLeaks War Logs.135 “Bradley Manning has been defending and sup-
porting our constitution,” Ellsberg said.136
Did WikiLeaks and its source (or sources) “aid the enemy”? Have they endangered
national security? United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for one, called the
2010 diplomatic cable leak “not just an attack on America—it’s an attack on the inter-
national community.”137 The stakes potentially rose higher, however, after September 2,
2011, when Assange dumped more than 251,000 unredacted diplomatic cables onto
the Internet.138 The release of the entire box of diplomatic cables restarted many of
131 See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 130. Perhaps the severity of the charges was a pressure
tactic to get Manning to plea bargain. Id.
132 See, e.g., Julie Tate, Pvt. Manning Enters No Plea at Arraignment, WASH. POST, Feb. 24,
2012, at A3.
133 Id.
134 See Schmitt, supra note 7.
135 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Burns & Somaiya, supra
note 130. Scott Shane compared the ease of leaking information today, when “[a] bureaucrat
can hide a library’s worth of documents on a key fob,” compared to the Pentagon Papers’ days:
“Four decades ago, using a photocopier, a leaker might have needed a great many reams of
paper and a tractor-trailer.” Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2010, at WK1.
136 Chris McGreal, Michael Moore Campaigns to Free Bradley Manning in War Logs
Case, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15
/bradley-manning-campaign-michael-moore; see also Interview by Amy Goodman with
Daniel Ellsberg, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 10, 2010), at http://www.democracynow.org
/2010/12/10/whistleblower_daniel_ellsberg_julian_assange_is.
137 See Scott Neuman, Clinton: WikiLeaks ‘Tear at Fabric’ of Government, NPR (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/11/29/131668950/white-house-aims-to-limit-wikileaks-damage.
138 See James Ball, WikiLeaks Publishes Full Cache of Unredacted Cables, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/sep/02/wikileaks-publishes-cache
-unredacted-cables; see also ‘The Principle of WikiLeaks Has Been Destroyed,’ DER SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784048,00.html.
Assange, in an editorial he posted on WikiLeaks the day before, September 1, 2011, had
said:
Revolutions and reforms are in danger of being lost as the unpublished
cables spread to intelligence contractors and governments before the
public. The Arab Spring would not have started in the manner it did if the
Tunisian government of Ben Ali had copies of those WikiLeaks releases
which helped to take down his government. Similarly, it is possible that
the torturing Egyptian internal security chief, Suleiman—Washington’s
proposed replacement for Mubarak—would now be the acting ruler of
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the debates about diplomacy and secrecy that began after the initial leaks.139 The State
Department again condemned the release of the files and United States Representative
Candice Miller reportedly released a statement saying that the release of the cables
“once again proves [WikiLeaks is] a terrorist operation.”140 The New York Times also
quoted Dinah PoKempner, the general counsel of Human Rights Watch, regarding
the safety of people named in the cables: “We are not aware of anyone who has been
arrested or injured because they were named in the cables. . . . We remain concerned
about the potential for reprisal.”141
Journalists have only begun to rummage through the files, but the files’ effects
were felt quickly. In one notable instance, the Al Jazeera news director resigned
after cables showed him discussing the network’s coverage of the Iraq War with
American diplomats.142 Some, sensing the beginning of the end for WikiLeaks, also
began thinking about its legacy and its potential future, along with the future of other
Egypt, had he acquired copies of the cables that exposed his methods
prior to their publication.
Indeed, it is one of the indelible stains on Hillary Clinton that she
personally set course to forewarn dozens of corrupt leaders, including
Hosni Mubarak, about some of the most powerful details of WikiLeaks’
revelations to come.
Editorial, Guardian Journalist Negligently Disclosed Cablegate Passwords, WIKILEAKS
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://wikileaks.org/Guardian-journalist-negligently.html.
Assange in his editorial was publicly venting his rage over news broken by Der Spiegel
three days earlier, on August 29, 2011, that unredacted State Department cables had “inadver-
tently been released” and “that the lives of informants could be at risk.” See Accidental Release
of US Cables Endangers Sources, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.spiegel
.de/international/world/0,1518,783084,00.html.
Assange blamed David Leigh of the Guardian for “knowingly” and “recklessly” re-
leasing the cables’ decryption password in a book he co-authored with Luke Harding. See
Editorial, WIKILEAKS, supra; WikiLeaks: Secret U.S. Cables Exposed, POLITICO (Aug. 31,
2011, 9:07 PM), http://politico.com/news/stories/0811/62451.html. Leigh and Harding have
denied that their book, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy divulged the
password. See, e.g., id.
The explanation that Assange gave for releasing the unredacted cables came during his
keynote address to a technology trade fair in Berlin on September 6, 2011. See David Rising,
WikiLeaks’ Assange Accuses UK Paper of Negligence, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 6,
2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/sep/06/wikileaks-assange-accuses-uk-paper-of
-negligence/. Via video link, he said that because of the negligent release of the password,
intelligence agencies had access to the cables while those who were mentioned in the cables
did not. See id. “So you have a race between the bad guys and the good guys,” he said, “and
it was necessary for us to stand on the side of the good guys.” See id.
139 See Scott Shane, WikiLeaks Prompts New Round of Diplomatic Uproar, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2011, at A15.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See David D. Kirkpatrick, After Disclosures by WikiLeaks, Al Jazeera Replaces its Top
News Director, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A12.
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document-soliciting sites, such as OpenLeaks.143 The Economist said, “WikiLeaks
was not the first site to create an electronic dead-letter drop, but it was the first to try
to combine it with a legal structure as impervious as its technical one, by basing its
servers in countries with strong privacy laws.”144
On October 24, 2011, Julian Assange announced that WikiLeaks might be forced
to shut down permanently because of the “financial blockade” against it.145 PayPal,
MasterCard, Visa, and Western Union refused to accept payments to WikiLeaks, start-
ing late in 2010.146 WikiLeaks has not shut down as of April 2012. For example, on
February 27, 2012, WikiLeaks began posting around five million secret emails from
Stratfor, a private intelligence firm.147 Calling the files The Global Intelligence Files,
Wikileaks called Stratfor a “Texas headquartered ‘global intelligence’ company.”148
WikiLeaks’ website proclaimed:
The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011.
They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an
intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence ser-
vices to large corporations, such as Bhopal’s Dow Chemical Co.,
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government
agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security,
the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The
emails show Stratfor’s web of informers, pay-off structure, pay-
ment laundering techniques and psychological methods.149
The hacker group Anonymous supplied the Stratfor emails to Wikileaks.150 Ironi-
cally, those files contained an email suggesting the United States Department of Justice
has a secret indictment against Julian Assange.151 Democracy Now! reported:
“Somehow you have a private intelligence company, Stratfor, a
‘shadow CIA,’ as people have called it, having information about
143 See Swept Up and Away, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 65.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., John F. Burns, Founder Says WikiLeaks, Starved of Cash, May Close, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A15; Mark Memmott, WikiLeaks Suspends Operations, May Have
to Close, NPR (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/10/24/141649293
/wikileaks-suspends-operations-may-have-to-close.
146 See, e.g., Burns, supra note 145; Memmott, supra note 145.
147 The files are available at http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-02-28-15-stratfor
-emails-reveal-us-has-a-sealed.html.
148 Global Intelligence Files, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-02
-28-15-stratfor-emails-reveal-us-has-a-sealed.html.
149 Id.
150 See Interview by Amy Goodman with Michael Ratner, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 29,
2012), http://www.democracynow.org/2012/2/29/leaked_stratfor_email_suggests_secret_us
(last visited May 1, 2012).
151 Id.
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this sealed indictment—secret again—that Julian Assange doesn’t
have, that WikiLeaks doesn’t have, that his lawyers don’t have,”
says Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights, who
is a legal adviser to both Assange and to WikiLeaks. “What you
see here is secrecy, secrecy, secrecy.”152
On February 28, 2012, Assange released a statement attacking United States
Attorney General Eric Holder and the use of a secret grand jury.153 Assange said, in
part: “This neo-McCarthyist witch hunt against WikiLeaks may be Mr. Holder’s de-
fining legacy. Any student of American history knows that secret justice is no justice
at all. . . . Eric Holder has betrayed the legacy of Madison and Jefferson. He should
drop the case or resign.”154
If WikiLeaks and its source really have endangered national security, what should
happen to them?155 As importantly, what should happen to the journalists and news
organizations that have worked with WikiLeaks or drawn on its material?
The executive power to punish the press for publishing leaks should be “extremely
limited,” Mary-Rose Papandrea says: “the government should be required to prove
that the individual acted either with intent to harm the United States ir help a foreign
nation, or with reckless indifference to whether the release of information would have
that result.”156
To create balance between “truly important national security” interests and the
watchdog press, Rodney A. Smolla favors “qualified protection for promises of
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 See id. For more on Stratfor and the leaked emails, see, for example, Paul J. Weber &
Raphael Satter, Leaked Emails Shine Rare Light on Stratfor, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 28, 2012,
9:10 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46555168/ns/us_news-security/t/leaked-emails
-shine-rare-light-stratfor/.
155 In May 2011, a federal grand jury began hearing testimony to determine whether Assange
and WikiLeaks could face prosecution under the 1917 Espionage Act. See Ed Pilkington,
WikiLeaks: US Opens Grand Jury Hearing, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 11, 2011, http://www
.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/11/us-opens-wikileaks-grand-jury-hearing. The Guardian,
citing Glenn Greenwald of Salon, reported that the hearing concerned “‘possible violations
of federal criminal law involving, but not necessarily limited to, conspiracy to communicate or
transmit national defence information in violation of’ the Espionage Act.” Id.; see also Glenn
Greenwald, FBI Serves Grand Jury Subpoena Likely Relating to WikiLeaks, SALON, (Apr. 27,
2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/04/27/wikileaks_26/singleton/.
Whether this grand jury probe has any relationship to the indictment suggested in the
leaked Stratfor email is not clear. On the leaked Stratfor e-mail, see supra notes 147-52.
156 Papandrea, supra note 128, at 237; see also Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the
Press: The Government’s Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or Publication of
National Security Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 447, 447 (2008) (arguing that Congress
should amend federal law “to limit prosecution to instances when there is evidence of intent to
harm the United States”).
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confidentiality” by newsgatherers.157 Yet, he tips the balance toward national security—
with the reservation that “the invocation of the national security interest would be over-
ridden by courts when it is a sham.”158
While Anthony Lewis flatly states that “the press does not always have right and
justice on its side,” he values protecting confidential sources.159 Still, he acknowledges
the “serious obstacle” to passage of a federal shield law posed by the government’s
claim that testimony is necessary for national security.160 Geoffrey Stone has sug-
gested a way around this obstacle—a shield-law provision saying that journalists could
be subpoenaed to testify about an “imminent threat to the national-security.”161 But
Lewis says such a provision “could easily become as wide as a barn door” because the
government cries “national security” whenever the press makes its “most important”
disclosures, such as the Pentagon Papers or the Bush Administration’s wiretapping
sans warrants.162 And then judges are skittish about second-guessing the government
when it says that the fate of the nation is at stake.163
Jane Kirtley agrees with Lewis that national security poses an obstacle to enact-
ment of a federal shield law:
The [shield-law] bills have been vigorously opposed by the Justice
Department, whose representative testified at a hearing in June
2007 that they would protect unauthorized leaks and disclosure of
sensitive information, as well as threaten national security. Justice
has also asserted that the bill’s definition of “covered persons”
who could invoke the law would include “a terrorist operative who
videotaped a message from a terrorist leader threatening attacks
157 Smolla, supra note 75, at 1430.
158 Id.
159 See Lewis, supra note 56, at 1353.
160 Id. at 1357.
161 Id. (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Op-Ed., Half a Shield Is Better Than None, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2007, at A21).
162 Id.
163 Id. Justice Potter Stewart recognized the threat that subpoenas could pose to the news-
gathering process, saying:
The right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential rela-
tionship between a reporter and his source. This proposition follows as
a matter of simple logic once three factual predicates are recognized:
(1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) confidentiality—
the promise or understanding that names or certain aspects of com-
munications will be kept off the record—is essential to the creation and
maintenance of a news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) an
unbridled subpoena power—the absence of a constitutional right protect-
ing, in any way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process—
will either deter sources from divulging information or deter reporters
from gathering and publishing information.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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on Americans, because he would be engaged in recording news or
information that concerns international events for dissemination
to the public.”164
Lewis also has company in thinking that a national security exception to shield
protection could become way too broad.165 Like Lewis, Keith Werhan is concerned
about subpoenas.166 “If journalists are routinely drawn into . . . investigations and are
compelled to identify their sources, government employees will be far less likely to
leak classified information,” Werhan says.167 He fears sources of secret information
about government activities will dry up if prosecutors pursue journalists, and then the
public will never know what the government is doing in its name.168 Making the case
for shield-law protection of confidential sources, Werhan says, may boil down to be-
lieving journalists’ claims that the flow of information will be impeded if journalists
cannot promise confidentiality.169
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme Court showed its own dis-
comfort over the government controlling the flow of information.170 The Court stated:
“A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to
supply it with information.”171
D. You Can Lead Judges to Water—But Making Them Drink?
Part of the success, or lack thereof, of shield laws will depend on the mindset of
judges.172 Some judges may be reluctant to apply shield laws because of the doctrine
164 See Kirtley, supra note 84, at 15 (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
110TH CONG., FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION ACT OF 2007, at 20 (2007) (statement of Rachel
L. Brand, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy)).
165 For example, Kristen Anastos says of proposed federal shield legislation: “The national
security exception, without which this or any future-proposed Act has little chance of passing,
gives the government too wide a loophole with which to bypass the constraints of the Act.”
Anastos, supra note 69, at 465 (citation omitted).
W. Cory Reiss suggests treating national security information differently than other infor-
mation, arguing that this would “mitigate” some concerns over a shield law expressed by intel-
ligence agencies. W. Cory Reiss, Comment, Crime that Plays: Shaping a Reporter’s Shield to
Cover National Security in an Insecure World, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 664–65 (2009).
He proposes a three-part test for gaining a privilege when national security is involved: “a
track record, a process of deliberation and verification, and transparency.” Id. at 668.
166 Werhan, supra note 69, at 1584.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1583–84. He says, “Recent experiences, admittedly anecdotal, suggest that the
prosecutorial restraint which largely had prevailed before 9/11 may be eroding.” Id. at 1598.
Werhan points to the subpoenas in the Scooter Libby case as an example. See id.
169 Id. at 1603.
170 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
171 Id. at 104.
172 Judge Richard Posner has remarked that in reporter’s privilege cases since Branzburg,
some courts have used the ruling to justify a privilege, while some have ignored it entirely,
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of separation of powers; other judges may consider that their inherent powers to run
the business of the courts should overrule shield laws made by legislatures.173 In short,
some judges have antipathy to legislatures telling them how to run their courts. Perhaps
nowhere is this clearer than in the open warfare that occurred in New Mexico. In 1976,
New Mexico’s Supreme Court gutted the state’s shield law.174
In Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc.,175 the New Mexico Supreme Court
said:
[N]o person has a privilege, except as provided by constitution or
rule of this court . . . under our Constitution the Legislature lacks
power to prescribe by statute rules of evidence and procedure, this
constitutional power is vested exclusively in this court, and stat-
utes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts
cannot be binding . . . .176
But the courts in New Mexico did give some shield protection back to journalists
in New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-514:
A person engaged or employed by news media for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or dissemi-
nating news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so
gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated
has a privilege to refuse to disclose: (1) the confidential source
from or through whom any information was procured, obtained,
supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, dis-
seminated, or delivered in the course of pursuing professional
others say it actually creates the privilege, while still others see the majority as really a plurality
opinion. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). In declining to apply a
shield law privilege in McKevitt, Posner and his Seventh Circuit colleagues wrote that speaking
of a journalists’ “privilege” made less sense than asking courts to “make sure that a subpoena
duces tecum directed to the media, like any other subpoena duces tecum, is reasonable in the
circumstances, which is the general criterion for judicial review of subpoenas.” Id. at 533.
As Judge Posner noted, the Branzburg majority specified that grand jury investigations en-
gaged in “harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to dis-
rupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no justification.” Id. (quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972)).
173 See Anthony Fargo, Evidence Mixed on Erosion of Journalists’ Privilege, 24 NEWSPAPER
RES. J. 50, 57–58 (2003) (offering anecdotal evidence of cases in which judges showed increas-
ing hostility towards journalists’ privilege).
174 See infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
175 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
176 Id. at 1359.
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activities; and (2) any confidential information obtained in the
course of pursuing professional activities.177
The episode in New Mexico demonstrates how judges can make a real difference
in the effectiveness of shield protection. But for now, this Article turns to an analysis
of current shield laws.
II. HOW CURRENT SHIELD LAWS VARY IN THEIR PROTECTIONS
Some shield laws give better protection than others, in part, based on how broad
their provisions are in scope.178 Some statutes are long, others are short. Sometimes
less—in the way of a statute—is more—in the way of protection. State statutes vary
in a various ways, but this Article will analyze the following four basic differences
among the statutes:
• How broad is the definition of a journalist?
• Under what circumstances does the privilege apply: grand juries only,
other court proceedings, legislative committees, or libel cases?
• Does the shield law only cover confidential sources, or does it also cover
confidential information?
• Does the statute provide only qualified protection by presenting tests for
adjudicators to apply?
177 N.M. R. EVID. 11-514 (2011). In 1988, the New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed the
holding of Ammerman, saying:
In Ammerman . . . this Court held legislation creating a testimonial priv-
ilege in a judicial proceeding unconstitutional. The statute constituted
an evidentiary rule, traditionally considered to be “adjective law” or
“procedural law,” the promulgation of which is a power vested in this
Court by virtue of its superintending control over all inferior courts under
Article VI, Section 3, of the New Mexico Constitution.
Sw. Cmmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 755 P.2d 40, 42 (N.M. 1988) (citations omitted).
178 Some statutes include a “statement of public policy,” and that statement can be a flag.
For example, the statement of “Public Policy” in Minnesota says:
In order to protect the public interest and the free flow of information,
the news media should have the benefit of a substantial privilege not to
reveal sources of information or to disclose unpublished information.
To this end, the freedom of press requires protection of the confidential
relationship between the news gatherer and the source of information.
The purpose of [Minnesota’s shield law] is to insure and perpetuate, con-
sistent with the public interest, the confidential relationship between the
news media and its sources.
MINN. STAT. § 595.022 (2011).
The modification needed in both the statement of the policy and the law itself is that
instead of a “substantial privilege,” the Minnesota statute needs an “absolute privilege.”
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A. How Broad Is the Definition of a Journalist?
Who should qualify as a journalist is a truly difficult question, one that the Supreme
Court clearly wanted to avoid in Branzburg. Even before the age of the Internet, the
question was difficult, and jurisdictions came up with conflicting answers.179 For
example, one case involved Karen Silkwood, who worked at a Kerr-McGee nuclear
power plant and died under mysterious circumstances while driving to meet a reporter,
apparently to give him information about unsafe working conditions.180 Her family filed
a civil suit against Kerr-McGee, and Kerr-McGee subpoenaed a man who was making
a documentary film about Silkwood.181 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that, for purposes of that film, he was an investigative reporter.182 On the other
hand, a freelance writer in California, who was reporting on John Belushi’s death from
an apparent drug overdose, did not receive California shield-law protection.183
In 2011, both the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit denied shield protection on the ground that the persons
seeking shield protection did not qualify as journalists.184 First, New Jersey’s high court
said that Shellee Hale, who posted negative comments on an Internet message board,
was not a journalist.185 New Jersey Chief Justice Rabner succinctly stated the question
179 See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
180 Karen Silkwood Biography, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/karen-silkwood
-9542402 (last visited May 1, 2012).
181 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 434 (10th Cir. 1977).
182 Id. at 436.
183 See Paul Feldman, Writer in Belushi Case Jailed After He Defies Judge, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1985, at V1.
184 See infra notes 185, 193 and accompanying text.
185 See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011). The Supreme Court of
New Jersey affirmed denial of shield law protection to Shellee Hale, who allegedly defamed
Too Much Media, which produced software for use by the online adult entertainment industry.
Id. at 367–68. Hale contended that she investigated the industry and reported on its corruption.
Id. at 367. Hale posted negative comments about Too Much Media on an Internet message
board called “Oprano.” Id. at 367–68. Oprano’s platform let people post unscreened mes-
sages about the adult entertainment industry. Id. at 368. Oprano called itself the “Wall Street
Journal for the online adult entertainment industry.” Id. at 369.
Hale hailed from Washington state. Id. at 369. Using video technology over the Internet,
she operated her business as a “certified life coach.” Id. But she claims, “cyber flashers” pre-
tended to want her help as a life coach only to expose themselves via Web cameras. Id. When
her complaints to the online service she used proved unproductive, she started investigating
technology’s use in abusing women and the “criminal activity in the online adult enter-
tainment industry.” Id. Her investigation, she claimed, included conversing with the “offices
of the Washington State Attorney General, . . . attend[ing] six adult industry trade shows,
interview[ing] people in the industry, collect[ing] information from porn web blogs, and re-
viewing information in the mainstream press and on message boards involved in the industry.” 
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the case presented: “whether the newsperson’s privilege extends to a self-described
journalist who posted comments on an Internet message board.”186 As the judge noted,
“[m]illions of people with Internet access can disseminate information today in ways
that were previously unimaginable.”187 Clearly, the judge did not want to extend shield
protection to all of those millions. 
In upholding the appellate court’s decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court made
clear that this case involved “the Shield Law, not freedom of speech.”188 Hale had
Id. She also claimed she investigated “reports of a security breach of” Too Much Media that
might “expose[ ] personal information of . . . customers who believed they had signed up
anonymously for pornographic websites.” Id.
Too Much Media’s software enabled adult entertainment websites to track access to “keep
track of access to affiliated websites and to determine what commissions are due the referring
sites.” Id. at 368. Her investigation included talking to “sources on a confidential basis.” Id.
at 369. She posted on Oprano that Too Much Media’s two owners might threaten the life of
anybody who reported the specifics about their conduct. Id. at 369–70. Then she posted that one
of the owners “personally contacted me to let me know he has not threatened anyone[,] but
I was told something different from someone who claims differently and a reliable source.”
Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hale maintained that her postings were intended to inform the public about technology
misuse and to promote debate. Id. Still, the Appellate Division denied her New Jersey shield
law protection because:
there was no “mutual understanding or agreement of confidentiality” be-
tween defendant and her sources; she did not have “credentials or proof
of affiliation with any recognized news entity” or adhere to journalistic
standards “such as editing, fact-checking or disclosure of conflicts of
interest”; . . . she did not identify herself as a reporter “so as to assure
[her sources] their identity would remain anonymous and confidential”;
she “merely assembl[ed] the writings and postings of others” and “created
no independent product”; she never contacted TMM to get its side of the
story; and, citing to the trial court’s finding, because “there is little evi-
dence (other than her own self-serving statement) that [defendant] actually
intended to disseminate anything newsworthy to the general public.”
Id. at 371–72 (citing Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845 (2009)).
186 Id. at 367.
187 Id. In denying Hale protection, Judge Rabner opined:
New Jersey’s Shield Law provides broad protection to the news media
and is not limited to traditional news outlets like newspapers and
magazines. But to ensure that the privilege does not apply to every self-
appointed newsperson, the Legislature requires that other means of dis-
seminating news be “similar” to traditional news sources to qualify for the
law’s coverage. We do not find that online message boards are similar
to the types of news entities listed in the statute, and do not believe that
the Legislature intended to provide an absolute privilege in defamation
cases to people who post comments on message boards.
Id. at 368.
188 Id. at 373.
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freedom to post, and the “actual malice” standard formulated in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan applied in her defamation suit.189 But she was not covered by New Jersey’s
shield law even though it is, in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s words, “among the
broadest in the nation.”190 New Jersey’s law protects “any person engaged in, engaged
on, connected with or employed by news media.”191 Thus, anyone claiming its protec-
tion must have a “nexus” to news media. The court concluded that because she had not
shown a “sufficient relationship or connection to ‘news media,’” Hale’s “intent alone
cannot validate her claim of privilege.”192
The Second Circuit denied shield protection to a filmmaker hired by a party to
a dispute in Ecuador over alleged environmental degradation by an oil company.193
189 Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
190 Id. at 375.
191 Id. at 376 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21a(b) (West 2012)).
So the question becomes “whether defendant satisfies the required nexus to ‘news media.’”
Id. at 377. But this begs the question of what constitutes “news media.” The statute does not
limit “news media” to the traditional news media such as newspapers but does require a simi-
larity to traditional news media: “newspapers, magazines, press associations, news agencies,
wire services, radio, television or other similar printed, photographic, mechanical or elec-
tronic means of disseminating news to the general public.” Id. at 376 (emphasis added) (quoting
§ 2A:84A-21a(a)). And thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court distills the question to “whether
an online message board is similar to” traditional news media. Id. at 378.
Message boards are not similar to traditional news media, the court concluded. Id. at 379.
They are “little more than forums for conversation.” Id. Some online sites can qualify for shield
protection, such as the online news magazine given protection in California in O’Grady v.
Superior Court, or Matt Drudge’s “Drudge Report.” Id. at 379–80 (citing O’Grady v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Ct. App. 2006); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1998)). For coverage of O’Grady, see infra note 207 and accompanying text. But intent is
not enough. As the court said, “If the Legislature had wanted to create an intent test alone, it
could have done so.” Too Much Media, 20 A.3d at 380. Instead, the Legislature created a tri-
partite test, looking to (1) intent, (2) purpose to collect or disseminate news, and (3) materials
obtained while “pursuing professional newsgathering activities.” Id. (citing § 2A:84A-21.3).
And all elements must be met for shield-law coverage. Id. at 380–81.
192 Id. at 381.
The court also said: “The Legislature is free to expand the law’s coverage as a matter of
policy. In an era of ever-changing technology, with new and rapidly evolving ways of commu-
nicating, the Legislature may choose to reconsider who is a newsperson and add new criteria
to the Shield Law.” Id. at 383. For commentary on Too Much Media, see, for example, Aaron
Mackey, N.J. Shield Law Not Limited to Professional Journalists, REP. COMM. FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS (June 7, 2011), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/nj-shield
-law-not-limited-professional-journalists.
193 See Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit
affirmed an order that Joseph Berlinger produce outtakes of a film for use in legal proceedings
in Ecuador. Id. at 311. Berlinger claimed that he should receive a journalist’s privilege. Id.
at 300. He created Crude, a documentary film about litigation over alleged environmental
damage in Ecuador caused by the oil exploration and extraction of a Chevron affiliate. Id.
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The plaintiffs in the environmental litigation had hired Joseph Berlinger to make a
film to tell their side of the story, and Berlinger made changes to the film that the
plaintiffs requested.194 Thus, Berlinger, who claimed to be an investigative reporter,
failed to carry his burden of proof to show that he engaged in independent reporting.195
The court opined: “A person need not be a credentialed reporter working for an es-
tablished press entity to establish entitlement to the privilege . . . . Nonetheless, in
collecting the information in question, the person must have acted in the role . . . of
the independent press.”196
The problem of who is a journalist is only more difficult today. What about free-
lance journalists who primarily do their work over the Internet? What about bloggers?
Bloggers have done some interesting news stories. A blogger led the way on cracking
open the infamous Dan Rather story on President Bush’s Texas Air National Guard
service record.197 Should not a report of that magnitude of newsworthiness force a
court to say that the blogger is a journalist?
Explaining that not all attempts to disseminate information are “on equal footing,” the
court gave this example:
Consider two persons, Smith and Jones, who separately undertake to
investigate and write a book . . . about a public figure in national politics.
Smith undertakes to discover whatever she can through her investi-
gations and to write a book that reflects whatever her investigations may
show. Jones has been hired . . . by the public figure to write a book ex-
tolling his virtues and rebutting his critics. Smith unquestionably presents
a stronger claim of entitlement to the press privilege. . . . Jones . . . either
possesses no privilege at all or, if she possesses the privilege, holds one
that is weaker and more easily overcome.
Id. at 307–08.
On September 19, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
against Chevron in its 18-year-old battle to escape paying $18 billion in damages ordered by a
judge in Ecuador for pollution of the Amazon rain forest. See Basil Katz, U.S. Court Unfreezes
$18 Billion Award vs Chevron, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2011/09/20/us-chevron-ecuador-idUSTRE78I68620110920; Court Ruling Backs Ecuadorian
Effort to Hold Chevron Accountable for Amazon Pollution, DEMOCRACY NOW!, (Sept. 20,
2011), http://www.democracynow.org/2011/9/20/court_ruling_backs_ecuadorian_effort_to.
The Amazon Defense Coalition says that WikiLeaks’ diplomatic cables show Chevron’s
close ties to United States embassy officials in Ecuador as well as Chevron’s extensive lobbying
of the government in Ecuador to try to stop legal proceedings. See Amazon Defense Coalition,
WikiLeaks Cables Expose Chevron’s Lobbying of Ecuador Government to Kill $18 Billion
Environmental Case, CHEVRONTOXICO (Sept. 21, 2011), http://chevrontoxico.com/news
-and-multimedia/2011/0921-wikileaks-cables-expose-chevron-lobbying-of-ecuador-government
-to-kill-environmental-case.html.
194 Chevron 629 F.3d at 304.
195 Id. at 300, 304, 309.
196 Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
197 See, e.g., Marie Cocco, We Can Trust Blogs Only So Far, TIMES UNION, Mar. 20, 2006,
at A7; see generally, SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007).
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Many commentators favor recognizing bloggers as journalists.198 Some focus
on “function.” For example, Rodney Smolla said of shield protection:
The privilege should not be confined to “mainstream,” “profes-
sional” journalists, but should extend more broadly to others (such
as internet bloggers) who gather information from confidential
sources for the purpose of disseminating news or commentary on
issues of public concern to the general public. A federal shield law
should thus include language that would encompass those who
engage in the “functional equivalent” of traditional journalism,
even though we would not consider them part of the mainstream
or traditional press.199
198 See infra notes 199–200.
199 Smolla, supra note 75, at 1429. Additionally, Joseph S. Alonzo supports extending
privilege protection to bloggers, pointing to the value of their contributions to society and
thus their function:
The journalist’s privilege is justified by the journalist’s role of provid-
ing information that the public would otherwise be unable to acquire.
Broad availability of information is an essential element of a strong
democracy—quality collective decision-making and electoral account-
ability both depend upon an informed polity. Hence, the benefit of addi-
tional information outweighs the cost of the lost testimonial evidence
when journalists claim the privilege and refuse to testify. Bloggers and
other private Internet publishers who disseminate news fulfill the same
function as the mainstream press: informing the public. In addition, blog-
gers benefit society by providing increased access to the marketplace of
ideas and thereby combat the effects of media consolidation.
Joseph S. Alonzo, Note, Restoring the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as
Journalists Can Save the Press, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2006); see also
Gora, supra note 70, at 1420.
Susan M. Gilles draws on libel law to explore the definition of “journalist,” again empha-
sizing function:
Both constitutional libel law and privilege use a combination of function
and product approaches; both identify a good journalist as one engaged
in disseminating information that is the product of classic journalistic
practices such as investigating, writing, and editing; and both define a
good journalist as one who produces news or “information on a matter
of public concern.”
Susan M. Gilles, The Image of “Good Journalism” in Privilege, Tort Law, and Constitu-
tional Law, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 500 (2006). She also says, “One objection to the
creation of a journalist/source privilege is that it will allow the courts to regulate journalism.
The lesson is that we are too late.” Id.
Erik Ugland points to function, as well. Ugland, supra note 71, at 391, 409. He did a
survey of media briefs and court responses in Supreme Court cases between the 1971–1972
and 2006–2007 Terms. Id. at 379. Ugland says, “The media litigant briefs largely reflect an
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Others point to the power of bloggers in reporting the news.200 Matthew Bloom supports
autonomy-model of the First Amendment, which is not built around the special status or
identity of the claimants but around the functions they perform.” Id. at 409.
Anne Flanagan also focuses on function, along with process, she says:
The journalistic process test is a valuable and workable test to determine
when one is functioning as a journalist no matter what label is applied
to the person’s employment or publication medium. It can be implemented
practically by requiring a showing of customary adherence to a code of
journalist professionalism. This would establish that a person followed
acceptable and recognized journalistic processes for gathering, evaluating,
validating and publishing information. Professional codes could, therefore,
be used as the journalist process test for granting special protections and
privileges . . . . Compliance with objective professional standards evinces
considerable intent and procedural steps to ensure that the facts commu-
nicated were of greater validity than disinformation and mere rumor.
Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 425–26 (2006). Flanagan also looks to English law as a source of help
in determining if a blogger is a journalist. She maintains that the United Kingdom has already
“effectively put a journalist process test into practice,” with protections that are broad enough
to encompass blogs. Id. at 426. And she says that “Congress should seriously consider this
approach in any future debate for a federal shield law.” Id. at 427; see also Linda L. Berger,
Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege
in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371 (2003); Michael Russo, Are
Bloggers Representatives of the News Media Under the Freedom of Information Act?, 40
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 225 (2006) (proposing “that the current functional test be
supplemented by an inquiry into the content of the requested material”); David Abramowicz,
Note, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting Journalists’ Confidential Sources, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1949 (2008) (arguing that courts should look at the process by which the
information flowed instead of focusing on the question of who is a journalist); Amy Bauer,
Note, Blogging on Broken Glass: Why the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Needs a
Specific Test for Determining When Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 747, 768–70 (2009) (arguing for coverage of bloggers who pass a test of form and func-
tion that looks at the number and types of sources, verification procedures and subject matter);
Anne M. Macrander, Note, Bloggers as Newsmen: Expanding the Testimonial Privilege, 88
B.U. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2008) (proposing “that the criteria for determining who qualifies for
the federal [shield] privilege should be based on the product an individual produces”).
200 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—The Law of Media: II. Protecting the New Media:
Application of the Journalist’s Privilege to Bloggers, 120 HARV. L. REV. 996, 1007 (2007)
(“[I]f the activity of news-oriented blogging is to be afforded the same protection as is given
to the traditional media, then blogging, when assessed as a collective enterprise, must be seen
as contributing to the public interest.”); Laura Durity, Note, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”:
The Need to Protect Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 11 (2006); Nathan Fennessy, Comment, Bringing Bloggers into the Journalistic Privilege
Fold, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1059 (2006); Stephanie J. Frazee, Note, Bloggers as Reporters:
An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment Protections in a New Age of Information
Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 609 (2006).
The FTC also apparently recognizes the power of bloggers, with regulations promulgated
in 2009 that say that bloggers must disclose if they are being paid to endorse products. See
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extending “journalistic privileges” to bloggers.201 Pointing to the power of bloggers,
he says:
“[T]he lonely pamphleteer” is becoming less useful as an analog
for bloggers, many of whom are wielding important influence over
public opinion. For example, Power Line was largely responsible
for debunking the memos in the CBS newsroom that purportedly
forged information about President George W. Bush’s National
Guard service. Another blog, the Talking Points Memo is described
as “a must-read among the Democratic elite.” [In 2006,] Talking
Points Memo boast[ed] over 100,000 readers per day, larger than
the circulation of all but about seventy-five of the newspapers in
the United States.202
He also says that because of their power, bloggers are starting to be treated like
“traditional journalists.”203 As an example of this, he points out that “Garrett Graff, who
writes the fishbowlDC blog about the Washington press,” received White House press
credentials in March 2005, with the support of traditional White House Correspondents
Association journalists.204 And bloggers also now ride on campaign planes.205
Courts, of course, are struggling with whether to classify bloggers as journalists.
For example, a California appellate court granted a blogger protection in 2006 in
O’Grady v. Superior Court.206 The O’Grady court opined that posting news was indeed
“indistinguishable” from publishing a newspaper.207 And in 2011, the United States 
Press Release, FTC, FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials
(Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm.
201 Matthew Bloom, Comment, Subpoenaed Sources and the Internet: A Test for When
Bloggers Should Reveal Who Misappropriated a Trade Secret, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471
(2006).
202 Id. at 474 (citing Randy Dotinga, Are Bloggers Journalists? Do they Deserve Press
Protections?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2005, at USA3).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Ct. App. 2006).
207 Id. at 99. As for the facts, Apple Computer, Inc. sued blogger “John Doe,” claiming
a website had wrongfully published Apple’s secret plans for a device that would allow Apple
computers to create live sound recordings. Id. at 76. Apple then received authorization to
issue subpoenas to the website’s publisher and to one of the publisher’s e-mail service pro-
viders. Id. The publishers then asked the trial court “for a protective order to prevent any such
discovery,” but “the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the publishers” were
involved in misappropriation of Apple’s trade secret. Id. at 76–77. But the appellate court
reversed, holding the trial court erred because of the federal Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, bar to subpoenaing the email service provider; California’s shield-law
protection, CAL. EVID. CODE, § 1070 (West 2012) “the conditional constitutional privilege
against compulsory disclosure of confidential sources” under Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690
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P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984). O’Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 77. In short, the appellate court “issue[d]
a writ of mandate directing the trial court [in the Apple case] to grant the motion for a protec-
tive order.” Id. at 77. For coverage of the Mitchell factors, see infra note 320.
The court said:
We have already noted the pervasive misuse of the verb “post” by Apple
and allied amici. . . . Here they compound the problem by conflating what
occurred here—the open and deliberate publication on a news-oriented
Web site of news gathered for that purpose by the site’s operators—
with the deposit of information, opinion, or fabrication by a casual visitor
to an open forum such as a newsgroup, chatroom, bulletin board system,
or discussion group. Posting of the latter type, where it involves “con-
fidential” or otherwise actionable information, may indeed constitute
something other than the publication of news. But posting of the former
type appears conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a newspaper,
and we see no theoretical basis for treating it differently.
O’Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 99 (citations omitted). This language would arguably seem appli-
cable to the WikiLeaks situation. On WikiLeaks, see supra notes 129–55 and accompanying
text.
The O’Grady court refused to define “legitimate” news:
We decline the implicit invitation to embroil ourselves in questions of
what constitutes “legitimate journalis[m].” The shield law is intended to
protect the gathering and dissemination of news, and that is what peti-
tioners did here. We can think of no workable test or principle that would
distinguish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” news. Any attempt by courts
to draw such a distinction would imperil a fundamental purpose of the
First Amendment, which is to identify the best, most important, and most
valuable ideas not by any sociological or economic formula, rule of law,
or process of government, but through the rough and tumble competition
of the memetic marketplace.
O’Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 97. For commentary, see, for example, Charles B. Vincent, Note,
Cybersmear II: Blogging and the Corporate Rematch Against John Doe Version 2.006, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 987 (2006) and Calif. Appeals Court: Shield Law Protects Online Reporters,
Bloggers, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (May 30, 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter
.org/calif-appeals-court-shield-law-protects-online-reporters-bloggers.
In a more recent incident involving Apple and bloggers, Jason Chen, an editor for Gawker
Media, which owns the technology blog Gizmodo, had a computer seized from his home. Brian
Stelter & Nick Bilton, Computers Seized from Home of Blogger in iPhone Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at B7. The search-warrant said officers had probable cause to believe
Chen’s house “was used as the means of committing a felony.” Id. He had blogged about the
next-generation Apple iPhone after, he said, he bought it for $5,000 from a person who allegedly
found it in a California bar. Id. Gizmodo returned the phone to Apple, but San Mateo, California
officials contemplated criminal charges for sale of stolen property against both the person who
allegedly found the device and against Chen. Id. Gawker sought return of the property, claiming
that Chen was a journalist. Id.
One question raised by the Gawker case is whether Chen is a journalist because California
and federal law give greater protection against search warrant seizures for journalists than is the
general rule. See, e.g., id.; Carlin DeGuerin Miller, Gizmodo Editor Jason Chen’s Home
Raided: Felony Charges to Follow iPhone Scoop?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www
.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20003511-504083.html. The federal law in question is the
Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa–2000aa-12 (2006). Authorities dropped
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District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that a blogger does not receive Oregon’s
shield-law protection based on that state’s definition of “medium of communication.”208
Anthony Lewis, in commenting on bloggers, clearly worried about sliding down
the slippery slope.209 Anthony L. Fargo thinks that the existence of bloggers greatly
complicates passage of a shield law.210 He concludes: “[T]here are dangers there, par-
ticularly in regard to defining who may claim protection. There is, in short, no perfect
way to balance the needs of journalists and triers of facts.”211
Of course, not everybody favors recognizing bloggers as journalists.212 If everyone
who wants to make his or her information public through a blog is a journalist, then
shield-law protection arguably applies too broadly. Virtually anyone with access to
charges against Chen, in a case that got international attention. See Seher Dhillon, Authorities
Drop Charges Against Gizmodo, TOP NEWS (U.K.), (July 17, 2010) http://topnews.co.uk/29181
-authorities-drop-charges-against-gizmodo.
208 Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. Or.
Nov. 30, 2011); see infra note 327.
209 Lewis, supra note 56, at 1357–58. He wrote:
We are in the new age of the blogger—forty million of them or so. Any-
one with a cell phone camera can be a news photographer. Are all to be
treated as journalists if they happen upon some contested event, and to be
excused from testifying about it? That is not a theoretical question. . . .
[Josh Wolf] was not affiliated with any news organization, but advocates
of press freedom called him a journalist and pressed for his release. I think
they were right. But how do you draft a shield law that does not, poten-
tially, excuse millions of people from the citizen’s obligation to testify?
Id.
210 Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journal-
ists and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1063, 1111 (2006).
211 Id. at 1119.
212 Scott A. Mertens proposed a narrow definition of who qualifies as a journalist: “A
‘journalist’ is a regular employee or a freelancer who is or was engaged in the gathering, photo-
graphing, writing, editing, filming, taping, or recording of news intended for dissemination
to the public.” Mertens, supra note 70, at 530. Mertens was writing in 1999, before blogging
became common. But since blogging has become commonplace, some would still propose a
narrow definition of “journalist.” See, e.g., Scott Neinas, Comment, A Skinny Shield is Better:
Why Congress Should Propose a Federal Reporters’ Shield Statute that Narrowly Defines
Journalists, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 225 (2008).
On the general subject of who should qualify for shield privilege, see, for example,
Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting
the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources
and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 130 (2002) (proposing that “news media” in-
cludes “online news services,” “news” is “information of public interest or concern relating to
local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events,” and “[a] ‘journalist,’ is any person who
is engaged in gathering news for public presentation or dissemination by the news media”);
Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a Definition of “Journalist”
in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411 (1999); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and
the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 520 (2007) (“a qualified privilege should apply 
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a computer and enough confidence (or hubris) to make public his or her words would
be cloaked by this now-gigantic shield.213
On the other hand, perhaps this broad definition of journalist is precisely what mod-
ern technology calls for. Anyone with a computer and a little bit of knowledge about
how to use it can disseminate his or her information instantaneously and globally!214
to anyone disseminating information to the public who is called to testify in a judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding”); Sunny Woan, The Blogosphere: Past, Present, and Future: Preserving
the Unfettered Development of Alternative Journalism, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 477 (2008); Justin
Krypel, Note, A New Frontier or Merely a New Medium? An Analysis of the Ethics of Blawgs,
14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 457 (2008); and Carol J. Toland, Comment, Internet
Journalists and the Reporter’s Privilege: Providing Protection for Online Periodicals, 57
U. KAN. L. REV. 461 (2009) (analysis of shield law in Kansas, with Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) as controlling on the federal level).
213 William E. Lee, who favors considering bloggers to be journalists, observed the following:
During the December 8, 2004 oral argument of In Re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, prominent First Amendment attorney Floyd
Abrams conceded that web bloggers should have a constitutional priv-
ilege to refuse to disclose their confidential sources, just like journalists
at major news outlets. Abrams’ concession caused a “collective flinch”
to ripple “through the establishment media in the gallery.” The notion
that bloggers are journalists does not sit well with those journalists who
consider themselves “a priestly class” set apart from the rest of society
by the First Amendment’s Press Clause.
Lee, supra note 114, at 635 (citations omitted).
214 Courts have struggled to devise fair standards to apply when trying to determine whether
to order disclosure of anonymous Internet posters.
In re Anonymous Online Speakers, involved what the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit called an “acrimonious and long-running business dispute between” Amway Cor-
poration’s successor (Quixtar) and Signature Management TEAM, LLC (TEAM). In re
Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 487, at *1–2 (9th Cir.
Jan. 7, 2011). Quixtar sued for libel, claiming TEAM had orchestrated a “smear campaign”
of anonymous, disparaging postings and videos on the Internet. Id. at *2. During discovery,
Quixtar sought the identity of five anonymous online speakers from a TEAM employee, who
refused on First Amendment grounds. Id. “The district court ordered [the employee] to disclose
the identity of three of the five speakers.” Id. Then Quixtar sought a writ of mandamus to order
the trial court to include the other two in its order, while the Anonymous Online Speakers sought
a writ of mandamus directing the court to vacate its order to disclose the identity of the three.
But the Ninth Circuit turned down both requests. Id.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the right to anonymous speech, citing history:
Undoubtedly the most famous pieces of anonymous American polit-
ical advocacy are The Federalist Papers, penned by James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, but published under the pseudonym
“Publius.” . . . It is now settled that “an author’s decision to remain
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to
the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”
Id. at *5–6 (citations omitted).
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The writ of mandamus, the Ninth Circuit said, “is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy limited to
‘extraordinary’ causes.” Id. at *8 (citations omitted). In looking at the standards other courts
have used for ordering revelation of confidential sources, the Ninth Circuit looked from high—
the “prima facie” standard—to low—the “good faith” standard. Id. at *14–16. The Ninth Circuit
said the trial court in the case at bar had used the “most exacting standard, established by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).” Id. at *15. “The Cahill
standard requires plaintiffs to . . . ‘submit sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
for each essential element’ of [a] defamation claim.” Id. at *15–16 (quoting Cahill, 884 A.2d at
463). Cahill, in effect, required plaintiffs to surmount a hypothetical summary judgment motion,
concluding that this high standard was necessary to prevent the chilling of First Amendment
rights of anonymous posters. Id. Instead of a low standard, “the summary judgment standard
more appropriately balances a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation and a
defendant’s right to speak anonymously.” Id. at *16 (quoting Cahill, 884 A.2d at 462).
Like the Ninth Circuit, the California Court of Appeals in Krinsky v. Doe 6, looked high
and low at other courts’ standards. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 241 (Ct. App. 2008). According to
the Krinsky court, the trial court should have quashed a subpoena in a libel case involving
anonymous postings because the plaintiff did not make a prima facie case that the statements
at issue were libelous. Id. at 251. Messages from Doe 6, posted on a Yahoo! financial message
board, were crude and offensive—using insults such as, “mega scum bag” and “cockroach”—
but not libelous statements of fact. Id. at 235, 251. The appellate court ultimately concluded that
“[b]ecause plaintiff stated no viable cause of action that overcame Doe 6’s First Amendment
right to speak anonymously, the subpoena to discover his identity should have been quashed.”
Id. at 251.
The Ninth Circuit and Krinsky court both cited as an example of the lowest, “good faith”
standard of protection the case of In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52
Va. Cir. 26 (2000), which was reversed on other grounds in America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). In re Anonymous, No. 09-71265, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS at *14; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241. The Virginia court required the Internet
service provider to disclose John Doe identities based on the plaintiff’s “good-faith” allegation
of an actionable claim and of the necessity of the disclosure for the advancement of the claim.
See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241 (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online,
Inc., 52 Va. Cir. at 37). The Krinsky court, like the Ninth Circuit, did not adopt that standard,
and the plaintiff in Krinsky did not even ask the court to do so. Id.
The Krinsky court adopted the high standard of Dendrite Int’l. Inc. v. Doe No. 3, which
involved a corporation that claimed that multiple defendants defamed it on a Yahoo! message
board. 775 A.2d 756 (2001). As the Krinsky court pointed out, the New Jersey appellate court
expressed concern that plaintiffs might try to use discovery to intimidate and silence their
Internet critics, and so devised a four-part test to avoid that result:
First, the plaintiff must make an effort to notify the anonymous poster
that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure
order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. [Second,]
[t]he plaintiff must also set forth the specific statements that are alleged
to be actionable. Third, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to
state a prima facie cause of action. If this showing is made, then the final
step should be undertaken: to balance the strength of that prima facie case
against the defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously.
In Dendrite, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
discovery application.
Id. (citations omitted).
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So long as states do not license journalists, the problem of defining who is a jour-
nalist remains.215 Because of the lack of licenses, there is no neat roll to review as there
is with doctors, lawyers, and other licensed professionals. This problem, however,
of defining who is a journalist should not be considered an argument for licensing
journalists. That “cure” would be worse than the problem as it would undoubtedly in-
fringe on the rights of a free press. The very word “license” would doubtless activate
the gag reflex of any freedom-loving journalist.
But the difficulty in defining who qualifies as a journalist should not be the kiss
of death for shield protection. It is hard to say where orange leaves off and yellow
begins, but the difficulty does not preclude differentiation between yellow and orange.
Likewise, the difficulty, in some cases, of determining who is a journalist does not
mean the job cannot be done.
States have made a variety of attempts at solving the problem of who is a journalist.
Some states have merely used a term to denote a journalist without attempting to
define it. For example:
• Delaware says “reporter.”216
• Illinois says “reporter.”217
• Louisiana says “reporter.”218
• Maine says “journalist.”219
Thus, the legislators in these four states are leaving it up to judges to decide
who falls into the journalistic camp—the camp of those they cannot order to jail.
Many judges, one might guess, would be willing to narrow, as much as possible,
this group that they cannot compel, and for that reason, these nondefinitions are
simply unacceptable.
For discussion of whether privilege protection extends to anonymous posters on news
websites, see Jane E. Kirtley, Mask, Shield, and Sword: Should the Journalist’s Privilege
Protect the Identity of Anonymous Posters to News Media Websites?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1478
(2010). See also Ryan M. Martin, Comment, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All
Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1217 (2007); Yang-Ming Tham, Comment, Honest to Blog: Balancing the Interests
of Public Figures and Anonymous Bloggers in Defamation Lawsuits, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 229 (2010); Jeff Swiatek, Former Junior Achievement CEO Broadening Defamation
Lawsuit, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.indystar.com/article/20110301
/BUSINESS/110301006/Former-Junior-Achievement-CEO-broadening-defamation-lawsu
(reporting on a defamation lawsuit that was expanded “to include people who criticized him
anonymously on news media-run websites”).
215 For an interesting argument that shield protection should be extended to the “work
process” and not be based on a definition of who is a journalist, see Berger, supra note 199,
at 1375.
216 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4321 (2011).
217 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901 (West 2012).
218 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1452 (2011).
219 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (2011).
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On the other hand, some states have definitions that are just too narrow to include
freelancers and certainly bloggers. These states’ shields cover what one might loosely
refer to as “card-carrying” journalists. In addition, these states do not clearly rule in or
out purely Internet transmissions:
• Alabama: “No person engaged in, connected with or employed on any
newspaper, radio broadcasting station or television station, while en-
gaged in a news-gathering capacity . . . .”220
• Alaska: A “reporter . . . while acting in the course of duties as a . . .
reporter.”221
• Arizona: “A person engaged in newspaper, radio, television or reporto-
rial work, or connected with or employed by a newspaper, radio or tele-
vision station.”222
• Colorado: “[A]ny member of the mass media and any employee or inde-
pendent contractor of a member of the mass media . . . .”223
• Florida: “[A] person regularly engaged in writing. . . for gain or livelihood,
who obtained the information sought while working as a salaried em-
ployee of . . . a newspaper, news agency . . . .”224
• North Dakota: “No person . . . while the person was engaged in gathering,
writing, photographing, or editing news and was employed by or acting
for any organization engaged in publishing or broadcasting news . . . .”225
• Ohio: This state divides broadcasters from print reporters. “No person
engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any non-
commercial educational or commercial radio broadcasting station, or
any noncommercial educational or commercial television broadcasting
station, or network of such stations, for the purpose of gathering, pro-
curing, compiling, editing, disseminating, publishing, or broadcasting
news . . . .”226 And: “No person engaged in the work of, or connected
with, or employed by any newspaper or any press association for the
purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, disseminating, or
publishing news . . . .”227
• Oklahoma: “[A]ny person . . . preparing news for any newspaper . . . .”228
• Pennsylvania: “No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by
any newspaper of general circulation or any press association or any
220 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2011).
221 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.300 (2011).
222 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2011). This language would appear to mean that
Arizona’s statute covers no bloggers or freelancers.
223 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2011).
224 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 2011).
225 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01.06.2 (2011).
226 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (West 2011).
227 Id. § 2739.12.
228 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 2011).
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radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for
the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing
news . . . .”229
• West Virginia: “A person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects,
photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or infor-
mation that concerns matters of public interest for dissemination to the
public . . . .”230
New Jersey law clearly includes the Internet in its protection:
• “[A] person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by
news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting, com-
piling, editing or disseminating news for the general public or on whose
behalf news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or
disseminated . . . .”231
So does Arkansas:
• “[A]ny editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical, or
radio station, television station, or Internet news source, or publisher of
any newspaper, periodical, or Internet news source, or manager or owner
of any radio station . . . .”232
Georgia seems to rule out the Internet:
• Shield protection covers “[a]ny person, company, or other entity engaged
in the gathering and dissemination of news for the public through a news-
paper, book, magazine, or radio or television broadcast . . . .”233
Some states do appear to cover freelancers. Michigan, however, may not cover the
freelancers working online:
• “A reporter or other person who is involved in the gathering or preparation
of news for broadcast or publication . . . .”234
Other states have statutes that are broad enough to cover freelancers working
online:
• Connecticut: “[T]hat disseminates information to the public, whether
by . . . electronic or any other means or medium[.]”235
229 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000).
230 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2011).
231 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011). Would this statute cover the Internet?
Would it cover bloggers? If the bloggers were transmitting news for the general public, then
they would seem to be covered, as would freelancers.
232 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2011).
233 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2011). The Internet is not covered. Also a journalist is not
covered when that journalist is a party in a lawsuit, and that poses a problem for defamation
defendants.
234 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 2011). “Other person” seems broad enough
to encompass freelancers. Perhaps a court could interpret “publication” to be broad enough to
include the Internet.
235 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146t (West 2011).
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• Nebraska: “No person engaged in procuring, gathering, writing, editing,
or disseminating news or other information to the public shall be required
to disclose . . . .”236
• North Carolina: “Journalist—Any person, company, or entity, or the em-
ployees, independent contractors, or agents of that person, company, or
entity, engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing,
photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination
via any news medium.”237
• Oregon: “No person connected with, employed by or engaged in any me-
dium of communication to the public shall be required to disclose . . . .”238
• Utah: “News reporter” means:
a publisher, editor, reporter or other similar person gathering in-
formation for the primary purpose of disseminating news to the
public and any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publi-
cation, press association or wire service, radio station, television
station, satellite broadcast, cable system or other organization with
whom that person is connected.239
• Washington: “The term ‘news media’ means . . . [a]ny person who is
or has been an employee, agent, or independent contractor [of news
media] . . . who is or has been engaged in bona fide news gathering for
such entity, and who obtained or prepared the news or information that
is sought while serving in that capacity.”240 The coverage extends to
parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates if compulsory orders seek information
from them.241
• Wisconsin: “‘News person’ means . . . [a]ny person who is or has been
engaged in gathering, receiving, preparing, or disseminating news or in-
formation” electronically, but only from a “business or organization,” of
which the law gives examples, including “newspaper . . . wire service . . .
cable or satellite network.”242
The more recently passed shield laws explicitly include the Internet:
• Hawaii protects “A journalist or newscaster . . . employed by or otherwise
professionally associated with any newspaper or magazine or any digital
236 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (LexisNexis 2011).
237 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2011).
238 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.520 (West 2011).
239 UTAH CT. R. 509 (2011).
240 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010 (West 2011).
241 Id.
242 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 885.14 (West 2011).
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version thereof,” thereby including the Internet for some journalists, and
possibly freelancers.243
Hawaii also offers to extend shield protection to anyone who demonstrates, inter
alia, that he or she “has regularly and materially participated in” publicly disseminating
news “of substantial public interest” through any “tangible or electronic media,” has a
position “materially similar or identical to that of a journalist or newscaster,” and that
“[t]he public interest is served by affording the protection[ ]” in the instant case.244
Other states with similar statutes include:
• Kansas: “Journalist” means:
(1) A publisher, editor, reporter or other person employed by a
newspaper, magazine, news wire service, television station or radio
station who gathers, receives or processes information for commu-
nication to the public; or (2) an online journal in the regular busi-
ness of newsgathering and disseminating news or information to
the public.245
• Texas: “‘Journalist’ means” a “person” who “gathers, compiles, prepares,
collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, investigates, pro-
cesses, or publishes news or information” through a news medium, which
includes electronic means. However, the person must earn a “substantial
portion” of their livelihood or “substantial financial gain” by his or her
work to qualify.246
• Washington: “The term ‘news media’ means . . . any entity that is in the
regular business of news gathering and disseminating news or information
to the public by any means, including, but not limited to . . . internet, or
electronic distribution.”247
Thus, three states—Nebraska, North Carolina, and Oregon—have language that
seems broad enough to include freelancers and bloggers on the Internet. Kansas and
Washington may include freelancers and bloggers, if they write frequently. In Texas
243 HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(a) (West 2011). Unusually, Hawaii’s shield law was set to expire
in June 30, 2011, just a few years after it passed. Rachel Costello, Hawaii Senate Committee
Approves Shield Law Extension, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11813. In late April 2011, Hawaii approved a
two-year extension of its shield law. Legislators Extend Shield Law Protecting Journalists’
Sources, STAR ADVERTISER, Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://www.staradvertiser.com/news
/breaking/120944789.html. The House voted unanimously to accept the Senate’s version of
the bill. Id.
244 HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(b) (West 2011).
245 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480 (West 2011).
246 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021(2) (West 2011).
247 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010(5)(a) (West 2011).
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and West Virginia,248 their status depends on their earnings; in Connecticut their
status depends on whether the website counts as an “other periodical.”249 Nebraska and
Oregon also have the admirable quality of brevity.250 In short, Nebraska and Oregon
have excellent provisions.
Some states have what might be called a “has been” problem. These states give
shield protection to persons who have been reporters. Does that mean that the octo-
genarian who worked for newspapers until the age of twenty-five would, forever and
always, receive shield protection? Perhaps the octogenarian has been told a secret that
he or she wants to keep—say, where some stolen loot is being kept—but did not gather
that information with any thought of disseminating it to the public. The statute would
have to clarify the relationship between past work and the current ability to assert a
privilege. Clearly, a person who has quit journalism but is being asked to reveal infor-
mation gathered while a journalist should be covered.
“Has been” states that do not clearly include freelancers or bloggers are:
• California:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publi-
cation, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who
has been so connected or employed . . . (b) . . . a radio or television
news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a
radio or television station, or any person who has been so con-
nected or employed . . . .251
• District of Columbia: “[A]ny person who is or has been employed by the
news media in a news gathering or news disseminating capacity.”252
• Indiana:
This chapter applies to the following persons: (1) any person con-
nected with, or any person who has been connected with or em-
ployed by: (A) a newspaper or other periodical issued at regular
intervals and having a general circulation; or (B) a recognized
248 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2011). Student reporters at an “accredited edu-
cational institution” are exempt from the financial requirement if they otherwise meet the
definition of a “reporter.” Id.
249 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146t(a)(2)(A)–(B) (West 2011).
250 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (LexisNexis 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.520
(West 2011).
251 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2011).
252 D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (2011). The District of Columbia statute also uses the phrase
“person while employed by the news media and acting in an official news gathering capacity.”
Id. § 16-4702(1). This phrase raises the question, what constitutes “an official news gathering
capacity”? Id.
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press association or wire service; as a bona fide owner, editorial
or reportorial employee, who receives or has received income
from legitimate gathering, writing, editing and interpretation of
news; and (2) any person connected with a licensed radio or tele-
vision stations as owner, official, or as an editorial or reportorial
employee who receives or has received income from legitimate
gathering, writing, editing, interpreting, announcing or broadcast-
ing of news.253
• Maryland: “[A]ny person who is, or has been . . . employed by the news
media in any news gathering or news disseminating capacity.”254
• Nevada: “No reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or
television station . . . .”255
• New York:
‘Professional journalist’ shall mean one who, for gain or live-
lihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing,
editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended for
a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or wire
service or other professional medium or agency which has as one
of its regular functions the processing and researching of news
intended for dissemination to the public; such person shall be
someone performing said function either as a regular employee
or as one otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood
with such medium of communication.256
New York also says, “[N]o professional journalist or newscaster presently
or having previously been employed or otherwise associated with any
newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire service, radio
or television transmission station or network or other professional medium
of communicating news to the public . . . .”257
One “has been” state, Tennessee, would clearly cover freelancers, but not bloggers:
• “A person engaged in gathering information for publication or broad-
cast connected with or employed by the news media or press, or who
253 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (West 2011).
254 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-1112(b) (West 2011).
255 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (West 2011).
256 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6) (Consol. 2001).
257 Id. § 79-h(c). New York also includes definitions of newspapers and magazines that
say that they must have been produced and distributed “for at least one year.” Id. § 79-
h(a)(1)–(2). New York also defines “news agency,” “press association,” and “wire service.”
Id. § 79-h(a)(3)–(5).
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is independently engaged in gathering information for publication or
broadcast . . . .”258
Two “has been” states would seem to cover freelancers and bloggers, and for
this reason, these statutes could be rated among the best and most protective:
• Minnesota: “[P]erson who is or has been directly engaged in the gathering,
procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information for the pur-
pose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public . . . .”259
• South Carolina: “A person, company, or entity engaged in or that has been
engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for the public through
a newspaper, book, magazine, radio, television, news or wire service, or
other medium. . .”260
Texas also includes “has been” coverage, which might extend to bloggers and
freelancers depending on their income from journalism.261 Wisconsin’s “has been”
protection likely extends to freelancers, and maybe bloggers as well.262 The solution to
the “has been” problem is to make clear that the source or information was gathered
while the person was engaged in the gathering for the purpose of dissemination.263
Arguably, Nebraska and Oregon have the best definition sections. The language
used by these states is lean and broad:
• Nebraska: “[P]erson engaged in procuring, gathering, writing, editing,
or disseminating news or other information to the public . . . .”264
• Oregon: “[P]erson connected with, employed by or engaged in any
medium of communication to the public.”265
The worst definition is perhaps Rhode Island’s for its inclusion of the word
“accredited”:
[N]o person shall be required . . . to disclose any confidential
information . . . received or obtained by him or her in his or her
capacity as a reporter, editor, commentator, journalist, writer, cor-
respondent, newsphotographer, or other person directly engaged
258 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2011).
259 MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2011). “Transmission” or “dissemination” arguably should be
deemed by courts to be broad enough to include Internet transmission.
260 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (2011). The language “or other medium” clearly would
encompass the Internet.
261 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021(2)(B) (West 2011).
262 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 885.14 (West 2011). Wisconsin websites would need to prove that
they qualify as a “business or organization” under Wisconsin law. See id.
263 Washington state’s shield law includes just such protection. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5.68.010(5)(b) (West 2011); see also supra note 247, and accompanying text.
264 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (LexisNexis 2011).
265 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.520(1) (West 2011).
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in the gathering or presentation of news for any accredited news-
paper, periodical, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire
service, or radio or television station.266
The use of the term accredited raises the question: What might that accrediting
agency be?267
Not even in the running for the definition of “journalist” were statutes containing
sexist language, with two exceptions: California, which used sexist language in a
header, “Newsman’s refusal to disclose news source” but the statutory language uses
“person,”268 and Ohio, which used the term “his” as noted below.
• Alabama: “The sources of any information procured or obtained by him
and published in the newspaper, broadcast by any broadcasting station,
or televised by any television station on which he is engaged, connected
with or employed.”269
• Arizona: “[T]he source of information procured or obtained by him for
publication in a newspaper or for broadcasting over a radio or television
station with which he was associated or by which he is employed.”270
• Delaware: “A reporter is privileged . . . to decline to testify concerning
either the source or content of information that he obtained within the
scope of his professional activities.”271
But then Delaware clears up its sexism problem in the very next section:
“A reporter is privileged in an adjudicative proceeding to decline to tes-
tify concerning the source or content of information that he or she ob-
tained within the scope of his or her professional activities if the reporter
states under oath . . . .”272
• Kentucky: “Newspaper, radio or television broadcasting station per-
sonnel . . . in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station
by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected.”273
• Louisiana: “[N]o reporter shall be compelled to disclose . . . the identity
of any informant or any source of information obtained by him from
another person while acting as a reporter.”274
266 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2011) (emphasis added).
267 See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2011) (exempting student journalists from
the law’s “for a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood” requirement only if the student
comes from an “accredited educational institution”).
268 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
269 ALA. CODE § 12-21-42 (2011) (emphasis added).
270 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2011) (emphasis added).
271 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4321 (2011) (emphasis added).
272 Id. § 4322 (emphasis added).
273 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
274 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45.1452 (2011) (emphasis added).
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• New Jersey: “[A] person,”275 but then “information obtained in the course
of pursuing his professional activities . . . .”276
• Ohio: “shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured
or obtained by such person in the course of his employment . . . .”277
These statements are in contrast to some notably non-sexist provisions:
• Colorado: “Privilege for newsperson . . . .”278
• Illinois: “[O]rdering him or her to disclose his or her source . . . .”279
• Montana: “Without a person’s consent, a person, including any news-
paper, magazine, press association, news agency, news service, radio
station, television, station, or community antenna television service or
any person connected with or employed by any of these for the purpose
of gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating news . . . .”280
• Rhode Island: “[N]o person . . . received or obtained by him or her in
his or her capacity as a reporter, editor, commentator, journalist, writer,
correspondent, newsphotographer, or other person directly engaged in
the gathering or presentation of news for any accredited newspaper, peri-
odical, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire service, or radio or
television station.”281
B. Where (In What Type of Proceeding)?
May state statutes determine whether federal courts may compel testimony? Alaska
says that its law on privilege shall “also apply to proceedings held under the laws of
the United States or any other state where the law of this state is being applied.”282
Nebraska says “in any federal or state proceeding.”283 But could a state court presume
to tell a federal judge what testimony the judge can compel in his or her courtroom?
Well, yes and no. In a civil diversity case, where parties from different states are
in federal court, the federal court would apply the privilege laws of the state whose
substantive law applies in that particular case.284 According to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Rule 501: “[I]n a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim
275 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:84A-21 (West 2011).
276 Id. § 24:84A-21(b) (emphasis added).
277 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
278 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2011) (emphasis added).
279 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-903 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
280 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1) (2011). Montana’s laws were gender neutralized in
2009. 2009 Mont. Laws Ch., 56. Community antenna television service is something covered
explicitly only by Montana law. Also, “disseminating news” might be broad enough to cover the
Internet, and the “no person” language might be broad enough to cover bloggers and freelancers.
281 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2011) (emphasis added).
282 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.350 (2011).
283 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (LexisNexis 2011).
284 FED. R. EVID. 501.
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or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”285 But if a federal court is
hearing a case “under the laws of the United States,” it would be applying federal law
concerning privileges, and there is currently no federal shield statute. In short, state
legislatures are reaching when they try to say that their shield laws will apply in “any”
federal proceeding or in “proceedings held under the laws of the United States,” but
state shield laws would apply in federal courts in diversity cases applying state laws.
On the other hand, Oklahoma is perhaps shortchanging journalists when it uses
the terse phrase “in a state proceeding.”286 The shield law should also apply in federal
diversity cases where Oklahoma law applies.
The more general question of “where” has to do with the type of proceedings to
which the shield law applies.287
• Illinois’s statute is too narrow because it only applies to courts and not to
other proceedings such as legislative hearings. Illinois says “[n]o court.”288
• Michigan’s statute would not apply to life-imprisonment cases. Michigan
does not list places but says “in any inquiry . . . except an inquiry for a
crime punishable by imprisonment for life . . . .”289
• Georgia has a provision that excludes cases where the journalist is a
defendant: “in any proceeding where the one asserting the privilege is
not a party.”290
Many states have broad coverage but lengthy statutes, often including a lengthy
laundry list plus the catch-all phrase of “or elsewhere.” Seventeen states arguably fall
into this category:
• Alabama: “[I]n any legal proceeding or trial, before any court or before
a grand jury of any court, before the presiding officer of any tribunal or
his agent or agents or before any committee of the Legislature or else-
where.”291
• Arizona: “[I]n a legal proceeding or trial or any proceeding whatever, or
before any jury, inquisitorial body or commission, or before a committee
of the legislature, or elsewhere . . . .”292
285 Id.
286 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(B) (West 2011).
287 For an analysis of shield-law protection in criminal cases, see generally Karl H. Schmid,
Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States Courts of
Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1441 (2002).
288 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-90 (West 2011). Utah’s shield protection comes in the
form of state court rules, so the protection applies only in courts. See UTAH R. EVID. 509; see
also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2011) (“any civil, criminal, administrative or grand
jury proceeding in any court in this state”).
289 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2011).
290 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2011). So, in Georgia, the location does not matter. The
only thing that counts is that the journalist is not a defendant—which means no protection
for libel cases.
291 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2011).
292 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2011).
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• California speaks in terms of “judicial, legislative, administrative body,
or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas . . . .”293
• Delaware: “[N]onadjudicative proceeding[s]” are covered in one section,
and “adjudicative proceeding[s]” are covered in another.294
• District of Columbia: “[J]udicial, legislative, administrative, or other body
with the power to issue a subpoena . . . .”295
• Kentucky:
[I]n any legal proceeding or trial before any court, or before any
grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal,
or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any
committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body,
or any committee thereof, or elsewhere . . . .296
• Kansas: “[A] judicial, legislative, administrative body or any other body
having the power to issue subpoenas . . . .”297
• Maryland: “[A]ny judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or anybody
that has the power to issue subpoenas . . . .”298
• Minnesota: “[A]ny court, grand jury, agency, department or branch of the
state, or any of its political subdivisions or other public body, or by either
house of the legislature or any committee, officer, member, or employee
thereof . . . .”299
• Nevada: “[I]n any legal proceedings, trial or investigation: 1. Before
any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury or any officer thereof. 2. Be-
fore the legislature or any committee thereof. 3. Before any department,
agency, or commission of the state. 4. Before any local governing body
or committee thereof, or any officer of a local government.”300
• New Jersey: “[I]n any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any in-
vestigative body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit
jury, administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or
elsewhere.”301
• New York: “[B]y any court in connection with any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding, or by the legislature or other body having contempt powers, now
293 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (West 2011).
294 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4321, 4322 (2011).
295 D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (2011).
296 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 2011).
297 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-481 (West 2011).
298 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(c) (West 2011).
299 MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2011).
300 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (West 2011).
301 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011).
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shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt
by any court, legislature or other body having contempt powers.”302
• North Carolina: “Legal proceeding—Any grand jury proceeding or grand
jury investigation; any criminal prosecution, civil suit, or related proceed-
ing in any court; and any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding before any
administrative, legislative, or regulatory board, agency or tribunal.”303
• Ohio: “[I]n any legal proceeding, trial, or investigation before any court,
grand jury, petit jury, or any officer thereof, before the presiding officer of
any tribunal, or his agent, or before any commission, department, division,
or bureau of this state, or before any county or municipal body, officer or
committee thereof.”304
• Oregon: “[A] legislative, executive or judicial officer or body, or any
other authority having power to compel testimony or the production of
evidence.”305
• Tennessee: “[A] court, a grand jury, the general assembly, or any admin-
istrative body, to disclose before the general assembly or any Tennessee
court, grand jury, agency, department, or commission . . . .”306
• Washington: “[N]o judicial, legislative, administrative, or other body with
the power to issue a subpoena or other compulsory process . . . .”307
Nine statutes have fewer words but still have broad coverage:
• Arkansas: “[A]ny grand jury or to any other authority.”308
• Florida: “[I]n the proceeding for which the information is sought.”309
• Indiana: “[I]n any legal proceedings or elsewhere . . . .”310
• Louisiana: “[I]n any administrative, judicial or legislative proceedings or
anywhere else . . . .”311
• Montana: “[I]n any legal proceeding” and “by a judicial, legislative, admin-
istrative, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas . . . .”312
• North Dakota: “[I]n any proceeding or hearing . . . .”313
• Pennsylvania: “[I]n any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before
any government unit . . . .”314
302 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(8)(b) (Consol. 2001).
303 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-53.11 (2011).
304 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West 2011).
305 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.520(1) (West 2011).
306 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2011).
307 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010(1) (West 2011).
308 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2011).
309 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-5015(2)(a) (West 2011).
310 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-2 (West 2011).
311 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1452 (2011).
312 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902(1), (2) (2011).
313 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2011).
314 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2011).
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• Rhode Island: “[A]ny court, grand jury, agency, department, or com-
mission of the state . . . .”315
• South Carolina: “[I]n any judicial, legislative, or administrative pro-
ceeding . . . .”316
Colorado uses few words, but its coverage is too narrow because legislative and
administrative proceedings need to be covered, too, and Colorado’s statute talks only
in terms of “judicial proceedings.”317
The best language is arguably from North Dakota, which includes “any proceed-
ing or hearing . . . .”318 Wisconsin avoids defining any type of proceeding and simply
bars anyone “having the power to issue a subpoena” from “compelling a news person
to testify about or produce or disclose . . . .”319
1. Defamation
When might a journalist need shield-law protection most? In a libel case. Without
protection, journalists who are sued for libel have a real problem if they have relied
on confidential sources whom they do not want to disclose. The judge may, if no law
prevents it, turn to the jury and say something320 to this effect: “Ladies and gentlemen 
315 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2011).
316 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (2011).
317 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2) (2011).
318 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2.
319 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 885.14(2) (West 2011).
320 See, e.g., Robert G. Berger, The “No-Source” Presumption: The Harshest Remedy, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 603, 614 n.83 (1987) (citing Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Penthouse Int’l, 6 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1540, 1540–41 (Cal. Super. 1980) (ruling that as consequence of magazine-
defendant’s failure to comply with disclosure order, jury would be instructed that no undisclosed
sources(s) existed), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 902 (1981)).
Still, famed journalist Anthony Lewis argues against giving protection to journalists in
libel cases. See Lewis supra note 56, at 1356. He wrote, among other works, MAKE NO LAW:
THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991). He appeared in a panel discussion
exploring the topic of “Are Journalists Privileged,” and he shared these observations:
Consider the interest of reputation. One of the great press victories in the
Supreme Court, New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964, made it very hard
for public officials who are subjected to criticism to recover damages for
libel. They can do so, the Court said, only if they prove that someone
published a false charge about them with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of its truth or untruth. . . .
Now suppose a federal shield law were in place. A newspaper publishes
a story that a cabinet member has taken a bribe—according to an un-
named confidential source. To recover his good name, the official sues
for libel. To win, he must find out the name of the source—to show that
the source was unreliable, say, or non-existent. But the shield allows the
journalist or publisher to avoid disclosing the name, so the official has no
way to redeem his reputation. That is not a far-fetched possibility. Think
about the case of Wen Ho Lee, the nuclear scientist who was described in
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press reports as a spy for China. He was arrested, charged with 59 felony
counts and held in solitary confinement for nine months. Then the gov-
ernment dropped all but one count, and Mr. Lee agreed to plead guilty of
mishandling information. The judge apologized to Mr. Lee and said the
case had “embarrassed our entire nation.” Wen Ho Lee sued the govern-
ment for violation of his privacy in the leaks to the press. He subpoenaed
reporters and asked them to name the source or sources of the leaks. They
refused to answer. Would we want a shield law that would support that
refusal and effectively deprive Mr. Lee of any chance to repair a ruined
life? I would not.
Id. (citations omitted).
Patrick M. Garry also criticized use of anonymous sources, saying that “use of anonymous
sources can degrade the quality of political discourse by obscuring the identity and biases of
those injecting alleged facts into that discourse.” Patrick M. Garry, Anonymous Sources,
Libel Law, and the First Amendment, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 579, 603–04 (2005). He also said that
“defamatory statements made by such sources . . . can harm the entire political process by
discouraging good candidates from seeking office.” Id. at 604.
Garry does not think that journalists should receive both a “qualified privilege of con-
fidentiality” and “actual malice” protection. Id. He argues, that this “double protection” both
unduly encourages use of confidential sources and “overly muffles society’s interest in the
protection of reputation.” Id. at 600. He opines that promising confidentiality has a “speculative
effect on the media’s newsgathering abilities,” and he questions whether there is a need for
promises of confidentiality in “the contemporary world where it seems as if no one hesitates
to seek out publicity.” Id. at 605.
To “curb” what Garry calls “the abuses caused by the media’s reliance on anonymous
sources,” he suggests giving journalists a choice: “if the press chooses to use anonymous sources,
then the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard will not protect any defamatory
statements made by those sources.” Id. Garry does not mince words in stating his opinion:
With the use of anonymous sources escalating by the day, and with the
number of Internet entities willing to use such sources similarly escalating,
the courts can no longer continue to tip the balance so strongly in favor of
anonymity and against reputational and accountability interests. In a media
age when pervasive anonymity threatens to turn the Internet into a gossip
pen at best and a libelous cesspool at worst, the last thing the law should
do is provide extra incentive for the use of anonymous sources.
Id.
Granted, the notion of protection of confidential sources in libel cases comes under harsh
criticism, but the balance even in actual malice cases is perhaps not so tipped against media
plaintiffs as Garry wishes to argue. Juries can always assess the credibility of a journalist if he
or she does not name a confidential source. Juries, in short, can decide on whether they think the
journalist has credibility or whether the journalist has created a confidential-source smokescreen.
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984), stemmed from a libel suit over an
article in Reader’s Digest that told about the Mitchells’ winning a Pulitzer Prize for a series of
articles that criticized a church, and the article included some of those criticisms. Id. at 626–27.
The church sued. Id. The Mitchells wanted to avoid disclosing their confidential sources in a
libel case and asserted a privilege based not on statutory law, but on the press freedoms guar-
anteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution and article I, section 2 of the California
Constitution. Id. at 627. The court concluded that a qualified privilege not to disclose confi-
dential source did exist in civil cases, but that the scope of such a privilege was dependent on
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of the jury, the defendant has refused to disclose the names of sources used by the
defendant in preparation of the article (or broadcast) at issue. Therefore, you will pre-
sume that there is no such source.” If that source were critical to establishing the truth
of the article or broadcast, then the judge has just handed a victory to the plaintiff.
The judge has told the jury to presume no such source exists, and thus the defendant
journalist is left hanging in the wind.
Three states specifically say that their law does not apply if the journalist is “a
party.”321 But of course, a journalist is a party when being sued for defamation, and,
ergo, the statutes would deny shield coverage in libel cases.
• Georgia says specifically that its shield law applies “in any proceeding
where the one asserting the privilege is not a party . . . .”322
the weighing of five factors. Id. at 632. These factors are: (1) “the nature of the litigation and
whether the reporter is a party”; (2) “the relevance of the information sought to plaintiff’s cause
of action”; (3) “whether the party seeking a confidential source’s disclosure has exhausted all
alternative sources of obtaining the needed information”; (4) “the importance of protecting
confidentiality in the case at hand”; and (5) in a libel case, whether the plaintiff had made a
prima facie case that the statements at issue were false. Id. at 632–34.
The court in O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Ct. App. 2006), commented
on the fifth Mitchell factor:
As extrapolated to actions not sounding in defamation, this factor trans-
lates into consideration of the demonstrated strength of the plaintiff’s case
on the merits. . . . Obviously the journalist’s interest in withholding
information should merit less protection if it appears likely that the jour-
nalist has indeed committed a tort against the plaintiff. . . . [A] weak
showing of ultimate success tends to militate against disclosure because
it increases the likelihood that any disclosure, and the accompanying
violence to expressional interests, will prove to have been needless.
Id. at 115.
The Mitchell court granted the Mitchells a protective order, concluding that “the California
courts should recognize a qualified reporter’s privilege, depending upon a balancing of the
relevant considerations in each case” and that here, “the generality of plaintiffs’ requests, the
absence of a showing that alternative sources had been exhausted, and the absence of a prima
facie showing of falsity” tipped the balance toward the Mitchells. Mitchell, 690 P.2d at 635.
In short, the Mitchells could not be compelled to disclose their confidential sources or infor-
mation supplied by those confidential sources. Id.
In Germany, journalists receive an absolute privilege in libel cases. See Alexander Bruns,
Access to Media Sources in Defamation Litigation in the United States and Germany, 10
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 283, 303 (2000). Bruns says that “in order to maintain the free flow
of information, informants’ identities are absolutely privileged. This characteristic feature of
German law reflects that, unlike American evidence law, German civil procedure is not gov-
erned by the hearsay rule.” Id. at 303–04. The result is that “the journalist may testify about the
contents of confidential conversations without revealing an informant’s identity.” Id. at 304.
For some coverage of the related topic of protecting the identity of anonymous posters in
libel suits, see supra note 214.
321 See infra notes 322–24.
322 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2011).
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• Hawaii says its privilege does not apply if “[p]robable cause exists to
believe that the person claiming the privilege has committed, is commit-
ting, or is about to commit a crime.”323
• South Carolina says “in any judicial, legislative, or administrative pro-
ceeding in which the compelled disclosure is sought and where the one
asserting the privilege is not a party in interest to the proceeding.”324
Four states have language that would specifically deny shield protection to jour-
nalists in libel cases:
• Illinois: “In libel or slander cases where a person claims the privilege . . .
[not to disclose a source], the plaintiff may apply in writing to the court for
an order divesting the person named therein of such privilege and order-
ing him or her to disclose his or her source of information.”325
• Oklahoma: “This subsection does not apply with respect to the content or
source of allegedly defamatory information, in a civil action for defama-
tion wherein the defendant asserts a defense based on the content or source
of such information.”326
• Oregon: “The provisions of [Oregon’s shield law] do not apply with re-
spect to the content or source of allegedly defamatory information, in [a]
civil action for defamation wherein the defendant asserts a defense based
on the content or source of such information.”327
323 HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(c)(1) (West 2011).
324 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (2011).
325 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-903 (West 2011).
326 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506.B(2) (West 2011).
327 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.530(3) (West 2011). In November 2011, a district judge in
Oregon applied the language that denies shield protection to journalists in libel proceedings
to Crystal Cox, a blogger accused of defaming a lawyer involved in a bankruptcy case. See
Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 30,
2011).
The judge first denied Cox any protection from Oregon’s shield law because her work did
not fall into the statute’s definition of “medium of communication”: “any newspaper, magazine
or other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broad-
cast station or network, or cable television system.” Id. But the judge added that because the case
was a civil action for defamation, Cox would not have been allowed to protect the source of
her blog post “even if she were otherwise entitled to those protections.” Id.
The ruling initially alarmed many in the news media, who worried that the judge had un-
reasonably narrowed the definition of “journalist.” See, e.g., David Carr, When Truth Survives
Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, at B1; C.J. Cornell, After Crystal Cox Verdict, It’s
Time to Define Who Is a Journalist, MEDIASHIFT IDEA LAB (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.pbs
.org/idealab/2012/01/after-crystal-cox-verdict-its-time-to-define-who-is-a-journalist026.html;
Kashmir Hill, Why an Investment Firm was Awarded $2.5 Million After Being Defamed by
Blogger, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/12
/07/investment-firm-awarded-2-5-million-after-being-defamed-by-blogger/. Some of those
who had worried, however, later began to rethink their stance after looking more closely at
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• Tennessee: “[The shield law] shall not apply with respect to the source of
any allegedly defamatory information in any case where the defendant
in a civil action for defamation asserts a defense based on the source of
such information.”328
Two states give reporters explicit protection from contempt in civil suits, which
include libel suits, but do not say anything about a presumption that there is no source.
• Montana says that reporters “may not be adjudged in contempt . . . for
refusing to disclose or produce the source of any information,” but the
law does not give the protection needed in defamation cases, namely, pro-
tection from the presumption that not naming a source means there is
no source.329
• New York says “no professional journalist or newscaster . . . shall be ad-
judged in contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal
proceeding . . . .”330
Colorado gives journalists adequate protection against both contempt and the pre-
sumption that there is no source. Colorado’s statute says that a newsperson shall not “be
compelled to disclose, be examined concerning refusal to disclose, [or] be subjected to
any legal presumption of any kind.”331
The New Jersey Supreme Court has determined that New Jersey’s shield law gives
an absolute privilege in libel cases.332 In 2011, the court said: “In evaluating the scope
of the Shield Law, it is important to recall that in civil defamation and libel cases, the
privilege is absolute.”333 New Jersey’s law says:
A person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by
news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general public or
on whose behalf news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, com-
piled, edited or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative
body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury,
Cox’s work and background. See Carr, supra; Hill, supra (calling Cox’s blog posts “unhinged”
and reporting that Cox later emailed the firm where the lawyer worked to offer it “PR Services
and Search Engine Management Services starting at $2,500 a month to . . . protect online
reputations and promote businesses”).
The jury decided on a $2.5 million award for the plaintiff, an investment firm. See, e.g.,
Hill, supra.
328 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(b) (2011).
329 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(2) (2011).
330 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (Consol. 2001).
331 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119.2 (2011).
332 Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 383 (N.J. 2011).
333 Id. (citing Maressa v. N.J. Monthly, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1982)).
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administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative committee,
or elsewhere.334
C. Sources of Information—Or, Information, Too?
States have many permutations on what information is covered by their shield
statutes. Arguably, the most limited coverage is that of sources for only published or
broadcast material, which means that confidential information is not covered, nor are
confidential sources if their information is not published or broadcast. States falling
in this camp include:
• Alabama: “[T]he sources of any information procured or obtained by him
and published in the newspaper, broadcast by any broadcasting station,
or televised by any television station on which he is engaged, connected
with or employed.”335
• Arkansas shield law only covers “the source of information used as the
basis for any article.”336
• Kentucky: “[T]he source of any information procured or obtained by
him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broad-
casting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he
is connected.”337
Some statutes say “source only,” which could be published or unpublished
information.
• Alaska says “source of information.”338
• Illinois says “source” only.339
• Louisiana says “the identity of any informant or any source of infor-
mation.”340
• Ohio says “the source of any information.”341
• Pennsylvania says “the source of any information.”342
Some courts have found source to mean only “source.”343 Some statutes say source
and any unpublished information.344
334 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011) (emphasis added). New Jersey revamped its
shield-law statute in the wake of In re Farber, discussed, supra note 52.
335 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2011).
336 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2011). Would a broadcast piece qualify? Judges might
strictly construe the statute.
337 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 2011).
338 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.320 (2011).
339 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901,-903 (West 2011).
340 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45.1452 (2011).
341 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West 2011).
342 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2000).
343 See State v. Geis, 441 N.E.2d 803, 808 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Commonwealth v.
Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 749 (Pa. 2003).
344 Perhaps it is easier in some cases, such as those involving broadcasts, for the defendant
to produce the information than for the plaintiff to have to try to get it through other means.
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• California: “The source of any information” and “any unpublished in-
formation obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication to the public.”345
California also offers a definition:
As used in this section, “unpublished information” includes infor-
mation not disseminated to the public by the person from whom
disclosure is sought, whether or not related information has been
disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes,
photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself dissem-
inated to the public through a medium of communication, whether
or not published information based upon or related to such material
has been disseminated.346
• Colorado: “The privilege of nondisclosure shall not apply to the following:
(a) [n]ews information received at a press conference; (b) [n]ews infor-
mation which has actually been published or broadcast through a medium
of mass communication.”347
• District of Columbia: Prohibits compelled disclosure of “[t]he source of
any news or information procured by the person while employed by the
news media and acting in an official news gathering capacity, whether or
not the source has been promised confidentiality”348 and “[a]ny news or
information procured by the person while employed by the news media
in the course of pursuing professional activities that is not itself com-
municated in the news media, including any: (A) Notes; (B) Outtakes;
(C) Photographs or photographic negatives; (D) Video or sound tapes;
(E) Film; or (F) Other data, irrespective of its nature, not itself commu-
nicated in the news media.”349
• Hawaii protects sources and information that could lead to the source, and
“[a]ny unpublished information obtained or prepared by the [journalist
or newscaster] while so employed or professionally associated.”350
Likewise, it might be easier for a newspaper to produce back issues. Clearly, there is no con-
fidentiality concern if the information has already been made public.
345 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(b) (West 2011).
346 Id. § 1070(c).
347 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2011).
348 D.C. CODE § 16-4702(1) (2011). The “whether or not the source has been promised
confidentiality” gives very broad protection. On the other hand, what does an “official news
gathering capacity” mean? Does this imply that there could be a “non-official” news gather-
ing capacity? The term “official” should be scrapped as a potential source of unnecessary
obfuscation.
349 Id. § 16-4702(2). The D.C. statute should have stopped there, but it continues, requir-
ing application of the three-part Stewart test. See id. § 16-4703(a); see supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
350 HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(a)(2) (West 2011).
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• Maryland says:
“(1) The source” and (2) Any news or information procured by the
person while employed by the news media, in the course of pur-
suing a professional activity, . . . for communication to the public
but which is not so communicated, in whole or in part, including:
(i) Notes; (ii) Outtakes; (iii) Photographs or photographic nega-
tives; (iv) Video and sound tapes; (v) Film; and (vi) Other data,
irrespective of its nature, not itself disseminated in any manner
to the public.351
• Michigan: “The identity of an informant, any unpublished information
obtained from an informant, or any unpublished matter or documenta-
tion, in whatever manner recorded, relating to a communication with an
informant.”352
• Minnesota: The source is “the person or means from or through which
information was obtained” and “any unpublished information procured
by the person in the course of work or any of the person’s notes, memo-
randa, recording tapes, film or other reportorial data whether or not it
would tend to identify the person or means through which the informa-
tion was obtained.”353
• Oklahoma: “1. The source of any published or unpublished information
obtained in the gathering, receiving or processing of information for any
medium of communication to the public” and “2. [A]ny unpublished
information.”354
• Oregon:
(a) The source of any published or unpublished information
obtained by the person in the course of gathering, receiving or
processing information for any medium of communication to the
public; or (b) Any unpublished information obtained or prepared
by the person in the course of gathering, receiving or processing
information for any medium of communication to the public.355
• Rhode Island: “[C]onfidential association, . . . any confidential infor-
mation, or . . . the source of any confidential information received or
obtained by him or her.”356
351 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2011).
352 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2011).
353 MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2011).
354 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(B) (West 2011).
355 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.520 (West 2011).
356 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2011).
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Other state statutes cover both sources and information, whether published or
unpublished.
• Connecticut covers “any information obtained or received, whether or not
in confidence, . . . or the identity of the source of any such information,
or any information that would tend to identify the source.”357
• Delaware’s law covers both the “source or content of information that he
obtained within the scope of his professional activities.”358
• Georgia covers “disclosure of any information, document, or item ob-
tained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news.”359
• Indiana covers the source as well as information that is “published or not
published” or “broadcast or not broadcast.”360
• Kansas covers sources and information from a specific source or procured
independently. “Information” is defined as published or unpublished in-
formation, including “notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes and other record-
ings or other data of whatever sort.”361 Kansas also covers the information
“whether or not related information has been disseminated.”362
• Montana covers “the source of any information” or “any information ob-
tained or prepared in gathering, receiving, or processing information in
the course of the person’s business.”363
• Nebraska: “(1) The source of any published or unpublished, broadcast or
nonbroadcast information obtained in the gathering, receiving, or process-
ing of information for any medium of communication to the public,” or
“(2) Any unpublished or nonbroadcast information obtained or prepared
in gathering, receiving, or processing of information for any medium of
communication to the public.”364
• Nevada includes “any published or unpublished information obtained
or prepared by such person in such person’s professional capacity in
gathering, receiving or processing information for communication to
the public or the source of any information. . . in any legal proceedings,
trial, or investigation.”365
357 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146t(b) (West 2011). Connecticut defines “information”
by “its ordinary meaning,” but also notes several protected kinds of information, including
“notes, outtakes,” or “other data of whatever sort in any medium.” Id. § 52-146t(a)(1).
358 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4321 (2011).
359 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2011). The law does not use the term “source.” Arguably,
however, a source is simply one form of “information” covered by the law.
360 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-2 (West 2011).
361 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480 (West 2011).
362 Id.
363 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(2) (2011).
364 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (LexisNexis 2011).
365 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (West 2011).
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• New Jersey covers both “a. The source, author, means, agency or person
from or through whom any information was procured, obtained, supplied,
furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or deliv-
ered; and b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing
his professional activities whether or not it is disseminated.”366
• North Carolina recognizes that “[a] journalist has a qualified privilege
against disclosure in any legal proceeding of any confidential or non-
confidential information, document, or item obtained or prepared while
acting as a journalist.”367
• North Dakota covers “[a]ny information or the source of any infor-
mation.”368
• South Carolina recognizes “a qualified privilege against disclosure of
any information, document, or item obtained or prepared in the gather-
ing or dissemination of news.”369
• Tennessee covers “any information or the source of any information
procured for publication or broadcast.”370
• Texas broadly includes “any confidential or nonconfidential information,
document, or item,” or their source.371
• Utah protects information “likely to lead directly to the disclosure” of
a “person who gives information to a news reporter with a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality”—this protection extends to confidential
sources—“information,” including notes and outtakes, gathered “on
condition of confidentiality”; and “information, other than confidential
unpublished news information, that is gathered by a news reporter.”372
• Wisconsin covers confidential source identities and information likely to
uncover them, as well as “news or information obtained or prepared in
confidence.” A final section covers all other “news, information, or iden-
tity of any source of any news or information” obtained or prepared by
a news person while preparing information for dissemination.373
• Washington provides coverage for sources or “information that would
tend to identify the source,” but limits the protection to those sources who
366 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011).
367 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2011). Like the Georgia statute, this law does not use the
term “source.” However, “information” should be broad enough to include source, as well.
368 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2011).
369 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (2011). Like the Georgia and North Carolina statutes, this
law does not use the term “source.” However, “information” should be broad enough to include
source, too.
370 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2011).
371 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.023(a)(1) (West 2011).
372 UTAH EVID. R. 509(a).
373 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 885.14(2)(a) (West 2011).
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have a “reasonable expectation of confidentiality.”374 Conceivably, then,
a court could rule that a source did not have that reasonable expectation,
whatever a journalist’s intentions. Washington also covers information
obtained for “potential” public dissemination, including “any notes, out-
takes, photographs, video or sound tapes, film, or other data” in future
media.375 However, the state qualifies information protection by exclud-
ing “physical evidence of a crime.”376
• West Virginia covers “the confidential source of any published or un-
published information” unless the source consents.377
Maine falls somewhere in the middle. Confidential sources and information are
protected while nonconfidential sources and information are not,378 and publication
or a journalist’s “consent[ing] to disclosure” of the source or information waives the
privilege.379
In some states, the word “observation” poses a problem. This is the problem that
tripped up Branzburg, in Kentucky, when he photographed the hands working at the
lab table, turning marijuana into hashish.380 Conceivably, any of the states that only
protect confidential sources could have the Branzburg problem.
• In Colorado, the nondisclosure law does not apply to “[n]ews informa-
tion based on a newsperson’s personal observation of the commission
of a crime if substantially similar news information cannot reasonably
be obtained by any other means”—Colorado requires a lack of alternate
sources for this segment of the law—or to “[n]ews information based
on a newsperson’s personal observation of the commission of a class 1,
2, or 3 felony.”381
• Florida: “This privilege [not to be a witness or reveal information or
sources] applies only to information or eyewitness observations ob-
tained within the normal scope of employment and does not apply to
physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio recording
of crimes.”382
• Hawaii revokes its privilege if the person claiming it “observed the alleged
commission of a crime.” However, it reinstates the privilege if the interest
374 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010 (West 2011).
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2011).
378 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61(1) (2011).
379 Id. § 61(4).
380 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667, 708–09 (1972).
381 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2) (2011). Colorado does not require a lack of alternate
sources for this segment of the law.
382 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015(2) (West 2011).
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in maintaining it outweighs the “public interest in disclosure,” or if pub-
lishing the information or documents in question was the crime itself.383
In New York, the protection journalists receive for both confidential news and its
sources is absolute:
Absolute protection for confidential news . . . no professional
journalist or newscaster . . . shall be adjudged in contempt . . .
for refusing or failing to disclose any news obtained or received
in confidence or the identity of the source of any such news com-
ing into such person’s possession in the course of gathering or ob-
taining news for publication or to be published in a newspaper,
magazine, or for broadcast by a radio or television transmission
station or network or for public dissemination by any other profes-
sional medium or agency which has as one of its main functions
the dissemination of news to the public, by which such person is
professionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gath-
ering capacity notwithstanding that the material or identity of a
source of such material or related material gathered by a person
described above performing a function described above is or is not
highly relevant to a particular inquiry of government and notwith-
standing that the information was not solicited by the journalist or
newscaster prior to disclosure to such person.384
New York’s language of “absolute protection for confidential news” is highly
protective of journalists, of course. Note, however, that this absolute protection would
only apply to “professional journalists” working for professional publications or broad-
casters.385 Honorable mention should also go to the District of Columbia for saying that
courts may not compel the disclosure of sources.386
Nebraska uses the very broad language of “for any medium of communication,”
which would include the Internet, of course:
(1) The source of any published or unpublished, broadcast or non-
broadcast information obtained in the gathering, receiving, or pro-
cessing of information for any medium of communication to the
public; [and] (2) Any unpublished or nonbroadcast information
383 HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(c) (West 2011).
384 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (Consol. 2001) (emphasis added).
385 Id. While New York exempts “professional journalists and newscasters” from contempt,
by granting an “absolute protection for confidential news,” it grants a “qualified protection for
nonconfidential news.” Id. § 79-h(c).
386 D.C. CODE § 16-4702(1) (2011).
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obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving, or processing of in-
formation for any medium of communication to the public.387
But the statutory provision is rather long and somewhat convoluted.
North Dakota ultimately wins for breadth combined with brevity, covering “any
information or the source of any information.”388
D. Qualified Privilege and Stewart’s Three-Part Test or a Variant of It
Even if Judith Miller had the benefit of the Stewart test, she would still have
spent eighty-five days in jail. The information she had was highly relevant, the alter-
nate sources were also journalists, and the need was arguably compelling because the
federal prosecutor was investigating misdeeds that, perhaps, reached to the highest
levels of the federal government. Judge Henderson said in Miller’s case: “[M]y col-
leagues and I agree that any federal common-law reporter’s privilege that may exist
is not absolute and that the Special Counsel’s evidence defeats whatever privilege we
may fashion . . . .”389
In its Memorandum in Opposition to a Joint Motion for a Scheduling Conference,
the government noted that “the Court of Appeals did not provide any guidance con-
cerning the common law but only echoed th[e] [district] Court’s conclusion that the
Special Counsel’s ex parte evidentiary submission would be able to meet even the
most of [sic] stringent of balancing tests.”390
If any prosecutor tells a judge, in all sincerity, that the information being sought
is relevant and truly needed, the only remaining question is one of alternatives. Say the
prosecutor declares, “Your Honor, I don’t know anybody else with this information.
If I did, I wouldn’t be going after this reporter.”
As it does in other areas of the law, balancing must occur when it comes to shield
law. But the balancing has, arguably, been done incorrectly. Take, for instance, consti-
tutional protection for senators and representatives, who receive absolute protection
for statements they make on the floor of the House or Senate.391 The reason for this
unqualified privilege is the importance of free debate. Similarly, the importance of the
387 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20.146 (LexisNexis 2011).
388 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2011).
389 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Henderson,
J., concurring), superseded by In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
390 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 374 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations
omitted). Stuart Taylor, Jr. quotes Judge Hogan’s words that the special prosecutor could meet
the most stringent balancing test, and he argues that the balancing test does not give enough
protection. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Should Reporters Go to Jail for Doing Their Jobs?, NAT’L
J. MAG., (Oct. 16, 2004), available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/opening
-argument-should-reporters-go-to-jail-for-doing-their-jobs--20041016.
391 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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free flow of information in this country should take precedence. So long as a test such
as the Stewart test is applied, however, journalists face a “clear and present danger”
that judges will order them to reveal their sources or else face jail time.
Some states rely on a version of the Stewart test. In Alaska, for example, a reporter
must appear in court, and a full-blown evidentiary hearing might be held on the ques-
tion of whether to grant or deny the privilege.
When a public official or reporter claims the privilege in a case
being heard before the supreme court or a superior court of this
state, a person who has the right to question the public official or
reporter in that proceeding, or the courts on its own motion, may
challenge the claim of privilege. The court shall make or cause to
be made whatever inquiry the court thinks necessary to a determi-
nation of the issue. The inquiry may be made instanter by way of
questions put to the witness claiming the privilege and a decision
then rendered, or the court may require the presence of other wit-
nesses or documentary showing or may order a special hearing for
the determination of the issue of privilege.392
This statute emphasizes the compelling-need aspect of the Stewart test:
The court may deny the privilege and may order the public official
or the reporter to testify, imposing whatever limits upon the testi-
mony and upon the right of cross-examination of the witness as
may be in the public interest or in the interest of a fair trial, if it
finds the withholding of the testimony would (1) result in a mis-
carriage of justice or the denial of a fair trial to those who challenge
the privilege; or (2) be contrary to the public interest.393
If a reporter refuses to divulge the source, the issue may come before the state
supreme court or a superior court. The seeker of the information must make an
application:
setting out the reasons why the disclosure is essential to the ad-
ministration of justice, a fair trial in the instant proceeding, or the
protection of the public interest. . . . The court shall make or cause
to be made whatever inquiry the court thinks necessary, and make
a determination of the issue . . . .394
392 ALASKA STAT. § 9.25.310(a) (2011).
393 Id. § 9.25.310(b).
394 Id. § 9.25.320(c).
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In short, the privilege is not a sure thing, and the reporter may well face intensive
scrutiny as the court makes “whatever inquiry the court thinks necessary.”395
Other states employ slightly different variations of the Stewart test.
• Arizona: In civil or criminal cases, to subpoena “a person engaged in
gathering, reporting, writing, editing, publishing or broadcasting news
to the public,” one must show that the information is relevant and that the
information could not be gained from alternate sources. In addition, those
alternate sources must be identified. But there is no requirement to show
a compelling public need.396
• Connecticut: Courts may compel disclosure if parties show by “clear and
convincing evidence” that the information sought is “critical or neces-
sary” to a claim, not available elsewhere, and that disclosure fulfills
“overriding” public interest.397 However, those seeking information must
engage in “prior negotiations” with news media before beginning com-
pulsory proceedings.398
• District of Columbia: A court may compel disclosure of information not
made public if the seeker proves by “clear and convincing evidence” the
relevancy, lack of alternate sources, and an “overriding public interest.”399
However, the District of Columbia says that courts may not compel dis-
closure of sources.400
• Florida uses a version of the Stewart three-part test—“information is
relevant and material,” it “cannot be obtained from alternative sources,”
and a “compelling interest exists.”401
Freelancers and bloggers appear to be unprotected by Florida law. “A professional
journalist has a qualified privilege not to be a witness concerning, and not to disclose
the information, including the identity of any source, that the professional journalist
has obtained while actively gathering news.”402
Also, “[t]his privilege applies only to information or eyewitness observations
obtained within the normal scope of employment and does not apply to physical
evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio recording of crimes.”403
395 Id.
396 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214 (2011).
397 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146t(d) (West 2011). Connecticut also forces parties who
try to subpoena information not covered by its statute to pay to the media party the cost that
would have gone into copying the desired information. Id. § 52-146t(i).
398 Id. § 52-146t(c).
399 D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (2011). The use of “clear and convincing” evidence creates a
higher standard than the normal standard in civil cases of “preponderance of the evidence.”
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that this higher standard applies
in actual malice cases).
400 D.C. CODE § 16-4702.
401 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.515(2) (West 2011).
402 Id.
403 Id.
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• Georgia’s test for disclosure is whether the information sought—which
would appear to include sources—“[i]s material and relevant,” “[c]annot
be reasonably obtained by alternative means,” and “[i]s necessary to the
proper preparation or presentation of the case of a party seeking the infor-
mation, document, or item.”404
• Hawaii states five reasons its privilege may disappear: When the reporter
witnesses or has committed a crime;405 when “substantial evidence” sug-
gests the source or information is material to a prosecution or claim,
unavailable elsewhere, noncumulative, and “necessary” to a charge or
claim; when the information sought is “critical to prevent serious harm
to life or public safety”; or when the source consents to disclosing docu-
ments or “other tangible materials provided by the source.”406
• Illinois’s statute uses the relevancy and availability of sources as factors,
plus looks at the type of proceeding, the merits on both sides, and the
availability of remedies:
In granting or denying divestiture of the privilege [not to name
a source,] . . . the court shall have due regard to the nature of the
proceedings, the merits of the claim or defense, the adequacy of
the remedy otherwise available, if any, the relevancy of the source,
and the possibility of establishing by other means that which it is
alleged the source requested will tend to prove.407
• Kansas: Parties are granted a trial to determine whether the informa-
tion sought is “material and relevant,” unobtainable elsewhere, and is
of “compelling interest,” defined as evidence likely to be admissible and
of “probative value that is likely to outweigh any harm done to the free
dissemination of information to the public through the activities of jour-
nalists.”408 The law states that information that would prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm, or prevent a miscarriage of justice, would meet
the probative value test.409
404 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2011).
405 HAW. REV. STAT. § 621(c) (West 2011).
406 Id. This, obviously, takes the decision out of the journalist’s hands. See McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533–34 (7th. Cir. 2003) (dismissing a journalists’ privilege claim in
part because the source was known and had already consented to releasing tape-recorded
interviews with him). But cf. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“Nor does the fact that the government has obtained waivers from its witnesses waive the
privilege. The privilege belongs to CBS, not the potential witnesses, and it may be waived
only by its holder.”).
407 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-906 (West 2011).
408 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-482 (West 2011).
409 Id.
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• Michigan: Protection does not apply in felony cases punishable by life
in prison, but in other cases, Michigan applies a higher standard than the
Stewart test’s “relevance,” namely, “essential to the purpose of the pro-
ceedings.” “In any inquiry . . . except an inquiry for a crime punishable by
imprisonment for life when it has been established that the information
which is sought is essential to the purpose of the proceeding and that
other available sources of the information have been exhausted.”410
• New York offers absolute protection for confidential information and
sources.411 For unpublished information and for sources, regardless of
whether they were promised confidentiality, New York applies an en-
hanced Stewart test, requiring that the information be “highly” relevant
and “critical or necessary” to the case:412
Qualified protection for nonconfidential news . . . no professional
journalist or newscaster . . . shall be adjudged in contempt . . . for
refusing or failing to disclose any unpublished news obtained or
prepared by a journalist or newscaster in the course of gathering or
obtaining news . . . or the source of any such news, whe[ther] such
news was not obtained or received in confidence, unless the party
seeking such news has made a clear and specific showing that the
news: (i) is highly material and relevant; (ii) is critical or necessary
to the maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or proof of an issue
material thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any alternative
source. A court shall order disclosure only of such portion, or por-
tions, of the news sought as to which the above-described showing
has been made and shall support such order with clear and specific
findings made after a hearing.413
• North Carolina: The qualified privilege applies to both confidential and
nonconfidential information, and the compelling need part of the Stew-
art test is modified to “essential to the . . . claim or defense”:
A journalist has a qualified privilege against disclosure in any
legal proceeding of any confidential or nonconfidential informa-
tion, document, or item obtained or prepared while acting as a
journalist. In order to overcome the qualified privilege . . . , any
410 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2011).
411 See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
412 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79h-(c) (Consol. 2001).
413 Id. Confidential information and sources receive absolute protection. See supra note 151
and accompanying text.
2012] NEEDED: MORE THAN A PAPER SHIELD 1357
person seeking to compel a journalist to testify or produce infor-
mation must establish by the greater weight of the evidence that the
testimony or production sought: (1) Is relevant and material to the
proper administration of the legal proceeding for which the testi-
mony or production is sought; (2) Cannot be obtained from alter-
nate sources; and (3) Is essential to the maintenance of a claim or
defense of the person on whose behalf the testimony or production
is sought.414
• North Dakota: The statute calls for no disclosure “unless directed by an
order of a district court of this state which, after hearing, finds that the fail-
ure of disclosure of such evidence will cause a miscarriage of justice.”415
This “miscarriage of justice” language would seem to present a huge loop-
hole for journalists needing protection.
• South Carolina: The qualified privilege applies to “any information,” and
the compelling need part of the Stewart test is modified to require only
that information be “necessary” to the case:
The person, company, or other entity may not be compelled to dis-
close any information or document or produce any item obtained
or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news unless the
party seeking to compel the production or testimony establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that this privilege has been know-
ingly waived or that the testimony or production sought: (1) is
material and relevant to the controversy for which the testimony or
production is sought; (2) cannot be reasonably obtained by alter-
native means; and (3) is necessary to the proper preparation or pre-
sentation of the case of a party seeking the information, document,
or item.416
• Tennessee: The language appears to poke a huge hole in the shield: “Any
person seeking information or the source thereof protected under this
414 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(b)–(c) (2011). “Greater weight of the evidence” is the
typical “preponderance” standard used in civil cases and is a lower standard than used, for
example, in the District of Columbia, which uses “clear and convincing evidence.” D.C. CODE
§ 16-4703 (2011).
415 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2011).
416 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(B) (2011). The statute adds: “Publication of any informa-
tion, document, or item obtained in the gathering and dissemination of news does not consti-
tute a waiver of the qualified privilege against compelled disclosure . . . .” Id. § 19-11-100(C).
Washington’s shield law includes a similar provision. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010(4)
(West 2011) (stating that publication does not waive a journalist’s qualified privilege against
compelled disclosure).
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section may apply for an order divesting such protection. Such applica-
tion shall be made to the judge of the court having jurisdiction over the
hearing, action or other proceeding in which the information sought is
pending.”417 So “any person seeking information” protected under the
shield may apply to pierce the shield. But the statute gives no guidelines
to the judge, no test to apply, in determining whether to grant an “order
divesting” shield protection. Arguably, this amorphous provision devas-
tates the shield law.
• Texas employs a six-part test, adding to Stewart’s test that the (1) dis-
closure sought must not be overbroad and limit itself to published infor-
mation when possible; (2) that the news organization have had adequate
notice of the demand; and (3) that the material sought is not “peripheral,
nonessential, or speculative.”418
• Washington: A judge may force disclosure if the information sought
is “highly material or relevant,” “critical” to a party’s claim or defense,
and unobtainable elsewhere.419 The judge must also find a “compelling
public interest” in disclosure, and may consider whether the information
came from a confidential source in determining that interest.420 However,
Washington state’s protection also covers orders issued to: “A nonnews
media party where such subpoena or process seeks records, information,
or other communications relating to business transactions between such
nonnews media party and the news media for the purpose of discovering
the identity of a source or obtaining news or information . . . .”421 So, al-
though this clause appears to protect journalists against back-door sub-
poenas for information, it might also justify a judge’s waiving protection
altogether because information was not obtainable elsewhere—when the
shield law itself rendered the information unobtainable.
• Wisconsin circuit court judges may compel disclosure of information or
sources.422 The law uses the three-part Stewart test, with a fourth part stip-
ulating that the information be “critical or necessary” to a party’s claim
or to proof of a material issue.423
417 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(c)(1) (2011).
418 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.024 (West 2011).
419 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §5.68.010(2) (West 2011).
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 885.14(2) (West 2011).
423 Id. Wisconsin also uses a three-part test for whether non-media parties must disclose
information. Id. § 885.14(3). Unlike some tests for news media subpoenas, such as in Kansas,
courts need not take into account non-media subpoenas’ probable impact on journalists or the
free flow of information. Id.; see supra notes 408–09.
Maine uses a similar four-part test. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61(2) (2011).
2012] NEEDED: MORE THAN A PAPER SHIELD 1359
Another qualification appearing in two states’ statutes requires broadcasters to
keep information for a year or lose shield protection:
• New Jersey provides that:
The provisions of this rule insofar as it relates to radio or television
stations shall not apply unless the radio or television station main-
tains and keeps open for inspection, for a period of at least 1 year
from the date of an actual broadcast or telecast, an exact record-
ing, transcription, kinescopic film or certified written transcript of
the actual broadcast or telecast.424
• Pennsylvania provides that:
The provisions [of the shield law]. . . as they relate to radio or
television stations shall not apply unless the radio or television
station maintains and keeps open for inspection, for a period of
at least one year from the date of the actual broadcast or telecast, an
exact recording, transcription, kinescopic film or certified written
transcript of the actual broadcast or telecast.425
Kansas includes a variation on the Stewart test, but it also attempts to curb the
test’s use. In Kansas, judges may force parties seeking disclosure to pay “costs and
attorney fees” to their targets if the judge finds the attacking party “had no reasonable
basis to request such disclosure.”426 However, judges also may force those seeking pro-
tection under the law to pay costs and fees if that party is found to lack a “reasonable
basis to claim such privilege.”427
Utah provides different tests based on the kind of information sought.428 Confiden-
tial sources can be disclosed only if the person seeking the source “demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that disclosure is necessary to prevent substantial injury
or death.”429 Confidential unpublished information can be disclosed on a showing that
the “need for [the] information . . . substantially outweighs the interest of a continued
free flow of information to news reporters.”430 The test for other unpublished infor-
mation is reversed: It is the journalist who must show that an interest in the continued
free flow of information outweighs the need for disclosure. In all cases, a court must
424 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011).
425 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000).
426 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-484 (West 2011).
427 Id.
428 See generally UTAH R. EVID. 509(b)–(d) (providing a variety of tests for compelling
disclosure).
429 Id.
430 Id.
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conduct an in camera review of the information before making a final determination
about disclosure.431
West Virginia simply says its protection is lost when a reporter’s testimony or
information would be necessary “to prevent imminent death, serious bodily injury or
unjust incarceration” without specifying who decides how or when that test is met.432
E. Summary
This section reviews the best statutes from previous sections as good starting places
for any legislator attempting to construct (or reconstruct) a shield law for journalists.
Who receives protection from the law? Nebraska and Oregon have perhaps the
best language. They are unencumbered by concerns about the use of a particular
medium (or not-yet-invented media), freelancing, or the content of the journalism.
They also do not give judges a completely blank slate with which to twist the defi-
nition of “journalist.”
In what type of proceedings are journalists protected? Here, North Dakota’s
brief but broad language might be best: “in any proceeding or hearing.”433 But legis-
lators must also address the risk that journalists protecting a source will get toasted in
a libel case. For that, Colorado’s protection against journalists being “subjected to
any legal presumption of any kind”434 for protecting a source deserves attention. So
does New Jersey’s language of “privilege to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-
legal proceeding.”435
Does the law only protect sources or also information? Confidential or not con-
fidential? Many states address these questions with a laundry list of qualifications
or clarifications about what information is protected. North Dakota skips all that by
simply saying “any information or the source of any information.”436
What about Justice Stewart’s three-part test or other tests? There is no good lan-
guage to use. Any variation of the Stewart test, ultimately and unjustifiably, endangers
journalists.
III. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTES
On March 31, 2009, the House approved the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009
by a voice vote.437 The 2009 Act was the latest effort at the federal level to pass a 
431 Id.
432 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2011).
433 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2011).
434 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2011).
435 N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011).
436 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2.
437 H.R. 985, 111th Cong. (2009); see Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010),
THOMAS, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=111/
(search “H.R. 985”) (last visited May 1, 2012) (providing data on vote allocation).
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Here is an abbreviated history of federal shield law, leading up to the 2009 proposal:
The “Free Speech Protection Act of 2004,” proposed by Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-
Conn.), would have provided an absolute privilege for confidential information and a quali-
fied privilege for nonconfidential information. S. 3020, 108th Cong. (2004). When he intro-
duced this Act, Senator Dodd said, “This legislation is fundamentally about good government
and the free and unfettered flow of information to the public.” See Federal Reporter’s Shield
Law Proposed, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Nov. 22, 2004), http://
www.rcfp.org//browse-media-law-resources/news/federal-reporters-shield-law-proposed.
Earlier attempts, in the 1970s and 1980s, failed to pass because of an inability to agree about
what a shield law should contain. Id. In 2005, S. 340, and its revision S. 1419, and H.R. 581,
and its revision H.R. 3232, likewise would have granted absolute privilege for confidential
information but qualified privilege for nonconfidential information.
Shield legislation, the “Free Flow of Information Act,” passed the House in 2007. On
October 16, the House bill, H.R. 2102, passed overwhelmingly, with a 398-to-21 margin. See
Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress (2007–2008), THOMAS, available at http://thomas.loc
.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=110 (search “H.R. 2102”) (last visited May 1,
2012). As the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press noted, this was “the first time
ever” the House had passed shield legislation. See Matthew Pollack, House Passes Federal
Shield Law, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.rcfp
.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/house-passes-federal-shield-law.
The Senate Judiciary Committee had passed its version, S. 2035, on October 4. See Bill
Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008), supra. Then-Senator Barack Obama and
then-Senator Hillary Clinton cosponsored the legislation. Senator John McCain also sup-
ported the proposed shield law. SPJ Leaders Pleased with Democratic Hopefuls’ Support
of a Federal Shield Law, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.spj.org
/news.asp?ref=789.
That version of the law would only have provided protection if a source were promised
confidentiality or if documents were gained through a promise of confidentiality. See S. 2035,
110th Cong. (2007). On July 30, 2008, the Senate bill failed a cloture motion on a vote of
“51 Ayes” and “43 Nays.” See S. 2035: Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2035 (last visited May 1, 2012).
The House version would not have provided broad coverage. Narrowed by an eleventh-
hour amendment by Representative Fredrick “Rick” Boucher (D-Va.), the law would not
have covered bloggers or many freelance journalists. See Amy Gahran, House Passes Shield
Law, “Covered” Language Tightens Further, POYNTER (Oct. 18, 2007, 2:47 PM), http://
www.poynter.org/how-tos/digital-strategies/e-media-tidbits/85055/house-passes-shie (last
updated Mar. 3, 2011) (citing David Ardia, Citizen Media Law Project). A “covered person”
had this restrictive definition:
a person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records,
writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or information that concerns
local, national, or international events or other matters of public interest
for dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of the person’s
livelihood or for substantial financial gain and includes a supervisor,
employer, parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such covered person.
Id. (quoting H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007)).
David Ardia of the Citizen Media Law Project asked, “Do we really want judges to be
deciding whether a journalist is earning enough money to qualify for protection?” Gahran,
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shield law for journalists.438
The Act, if it had become law, would have covered people who “regularly” gather
information concerning events or “other matters of public interest” and who do so for
“a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial gain.”439
supra. But the law also contained exceptions. The proposed law permitted “disclosure of the
identity of . . . a source” if:
(A) . . . necessary to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act of
terrorism against the United States or its allies or other significant and
specified harm to national security with the objective to prevent such
harm, (B) . . . necessary to prevent imminent death or significant bodily
harm . . . ; (C) . . . necessary to identify a person who has disclosed—
(i) a trade secret . . . ; (ii) individually identifiable health information . . . ;
or (iii) nonpublic personal information . . . ; or (D)(i) disclosure of the
identity of such a source is essential to identify in a criminal investi-
gation or prosecution a person who without authorization disclosed
properly classified information and who at the time of such disclosure
had authorized access to such information; and (ii) such unauthorized
disclosure has caused or will cause significant and articulable harm to
the national security . . . .
H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2007); see also, Pollack, supra.
Despite these exceptions, President Bush’s advisors in a press release announced that
they would counsel the President to veto the legislation. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2102—PROVIDING
CONDITIONS FOR THE FEDERALLY COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY CERTAIN
PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THE NEWS MEDIA (2007). The press release said,
The Administration believes that H.R. 2102 would create a dramatic shift
in the law that would produce immediate harm to national security and
law enforcement. The legislation would make it extremely difficult to
prosecute cases involving leaks of classified information and would
hamper efforts to investigate and prosecute other serious crimes.
Id.
On various versions of federal shield law from 2004 through 2009, see, for example, Jill
Laptosky, Protecting the Cloak and Dagger with an Illusory Shield: How the Proposed Free
Flow of Information Act Falls Short, 62 FED. COMM. L. J. 403, 421–27 (2010).
438 During his confirmation hearings, Attorney General Eric Holder said of a federal shield
law that a “carefully crafted . . . law is appropriate.” Walter Pincus, Senate Weighs New Shield
Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, at A5.
Lobbying expenditures for the 2009 House bill included $10,000 by the Washington Post
and $50,000 by the National Newspaper Association. Id. Although lobbying expenditures by
News Corporation, General Electric and Time Warner numbered in the millions, the exact
amount spent specifically on shield-law lobbying cannot be precisely calculated. Id.
439 H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (2007). Specifically, the proposed Act would have
covered anyone who “regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits,
reports, or publishes news or information that concerns local, national, or international events
or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of
the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial gain.” Id. It also evades the security concerns
of those such as Patrick Fitzgerald, the United States Attorney, by specifying that it does not
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The Act presumably applied to journalists’ works published in any media, as it does
not explicitly list any to which it applies. However, the financial requirements for cov-
ered persons would likely have excluded most bloggers, who rarely earn enough money
to qualify.440
The proposed House law offered a qualified privilege against any “Federal entity”
compelling covered persons to provide testimony or “documents”441 related to infor-
mation the person obtained while engaging in “journalism.”442
The proposed House law used a variation on the Stewart test for its qualification.
A court would have been allowed to rescind the privilege if, by a preponderance of the
evidence, it could be shown that the information sought was “critical” to the investiga-
tion of or defense against a criminal case, or “completion of the matter” in noncriminal
cases; would have prevented a terrorist attack or identified suspected terrorists, or
prevented “imminent death or significant bodily harm”; or was necessary to identify
a person who leaked trade secrets, other protected consumer information, or classified
information.443 The party seeking information must have also exhausted other means
of obtaining it,444 and demonstrated that the interest in disclosure outweighs that of
“gathering or disseminating news or information.”445
Representative Mike Pence (R-Ind.) invoked Judith Miller’s name in urging the
passage of the qualified shield law.446 Use of the Miller incident by Pence was mislead-
ing, at best. Federal Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald was investigating a misdeed
that perhaps reached to the highest levels of the federal government—the misdeed of
outing undercover CIA agent Valerie Plame.447 If Judith Miller had the benefit of the
apply to foreign agents or terrorists. H.R. 985 111th Cong. § 4(2) (2009); H.R. 2102 § 4(2).
On Fitzgerald’s concerns surrounding potential terrorists posing as journalists, see Patrick
J. Fitzgerald, Shield Law Perils . . . , WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A25.
440 See Matt Sussman, Day 4: Blogging Revenues, Brands and Blogs: SOTB 2009,
TECHNORATI (Oct. 22, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://technorati.com/blogging/article/day-4-blogging
-revenues-brands-and/ (reporting survey results suggesting that 83% of respondents did not
use their blog as their primary source of income).
441 H.R. 985, 111th Cong. § 4(3) (2009). Defined as “writings, recordings, and photographs,
as those terms are defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 (28 U.S.C. App.).” Id.
442 Id. § 4(5). Journalism is defined as “the gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing,
recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information that concerns local,
national, or international events or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the
public.” Id.
443 Id. § 2(a).
444 Id. § 2(a)(1).
445 Id. § 2(a)(4). The law also includes sections dictating the procedure for obtaining a
reporter’s information regarding his or her own alleged criminal conduct, id. § 2(e), and in-
formation held by various communication service providers, id. § 3.
446 See Mike Pence, Congressman, Marking ‘Sunshine Week,’ Calls for Passing a Federal
Shield Law in 2009, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://www.editorand
publisher.com/Columns/Article/Congressman-Marking-Sunshine-Week-Calls-For-Passing
-a-Federal-Shield-Law-in-2009.
447 See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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limited protection of the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, she almost certainly
would still have gone to jail.448
In his concurring opinion in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, Judge
David S. Tatel commented that Miller’s case “involves a clash between two truth-
seeking institutions: the grand jury and the press” and that he agreed with tipping the
balance toward the grand jury in her case:
Because I agree that the balance in this case, which involves the al-
leged exposure of a covert agent, favors compelling the reporters’
testimony, I join the judgment of the court. . . . I believe that the
consensus of forty-nine states plus the District of Columbia—
and even the Department of Justice—would require us to protect
reporters’ sources as a matter of federal common law were the
leak at issue either less harmful or more newsworthy.449
448 Representative Pence said in his editorial:
The Free Flow of Information Act simply provides qualified protection
for members of the news media against compelled disclosure of confi-
dential sources. In doing so, this legislation strikes a balance between the
public interest in the free flow of information against the public interest in
compelling testimony in limited circumstances such as situations involv-
ing grave risk to national security or imminent threat of bodily harm.
Pence, supra note 447. Then Pence recounted briefly the history of his legislation and his hope
that it will pass:
In October 2007, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed
the Free Flow of Information Act. Unfortunately, the Senate did not pass
the legislation before the end of the last Congress. On February 11, 2009,
I was pleased to join Congressman Boucher, House Judiciary Committee
Chairman John Conyers, Vice Ranking Member Bob Goodlatte and 35
of our colleagues in reintroducing the same legislation that previously
garnered 398 votes.
I believe that sufficient bipartisan majorities exist in both the House
and the Senate to enact this critical legislation this year. President Obama
pledged his support for a federal media shield when he was serving as a
U.S. Senator. The time for ensuring the free flow of information is now.
Id. Later in his editorial, Pence emphasized the importance of his legislation—and he specifically
named Miller:
The protections provided by the Free Flow of Information Act are nec-
essary so that members of the media can bring forward information to
the American public without fear of retribution or prosecution. Without
the free flow of information from sources to reporters, stories will not be
written that could better inform the public and strengthen our democracy.
In recent years, we have famously seen reporters such as Judith Miller
jailed . . . .
Id.
449 397 F.3d 964, 986–87 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring).
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Judge Hogan said in Miller’s case of In re Special Counsel Investigation, “the
Court of Appeals . . . echoed this Court’s conclusion that the Special Counsel’s ex
parte evidentiary submission would be able to meet even the most of [sic] stringent
of balancing tests.”450 In short, Special Counsel Fitzgerald would have met any bal-
ancing test, thus forcing Miller to reveal the source or go to jail.
The House version of the Free Flow of Information Act specifically would have
covered compelled revelation of a source where:
(i) disclosure of the identity of such a source is essential to iden-
tify in a criminal investigation or prosecution a person who with-
out authorization disclosed properly classified information and
who at the time of such disclosure had authorized access to such
information; and
(ii) such unauthorized disclosure has caused or will cause signif-
icant and articulable harm to the national security . . . .451
Miller would have been compelled to disclose her source under both of these
provisions. Scooter Libby was convicted of disclosing classified information.452 And
outing a CIA agent arguably could have a significant effect on national security.453
450 374 F. Supp. 2d 238, 240 (2005).
451 H.R. 985, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(D) (2009).
This Act specifically did not cover libel cases in either federal or state courts: “d) Rule of
Construction—Nothing in this Act shall be construed as applying to civil defamation, slander,
or libel claims or defenses under State law, regardless of whether or not such claims or defenses,
respectively, are raised in a State or Federal court.” Id. § 2(d).
452 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Libby, Ex-Cheney Aide, Guilty of Lying in C.I.A. Leak Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1.
“The perjury prosecution of Scooter Libby indicates that the game of leaks can be sloppy
and imperfect, but the reality is that this is the system of information control and dissemination
in the United States.” Papandrea, supra note 128, at 237.
Former CIA Director Porter J. Goss’s explicit call for prosecutors to un-
cover government leakers by subpoenaing journalists, coupled with the
successful reliance on journalist witnesses in the prosecution of Scooter
Libby, make vivid the potential use of Branzburg to routinely enlist
journalists in the prosecution of government leakers, and thereby to dry
up journalists’ sources of classified information.
Werhan, supra note 69, at 1598.
453 Noah Goldstein opined, “Some believe that a qualified privilege or a privilege that
involves a balancing of interests will be successful in the United States. Nevertheless, in light
of the [Scooter] Libby trial and its outcome, the privilege recognized should be absolute.” Noah
Goldstein, An International Assessment of Journalist Privileges and Source Confidentiality,
14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 103, 134 (2007).
Kristen Anastos had also denigrated the proposed qualified shield:
[T]he fight for the enactment of a federal reporters’ privilege—the Free
Flow of Information Act of 2006 has been proposed as our new Civil
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Rights Act. If passed, it would be a farce; a qualified legislative protec-
tion that will facially resolve the inconsistency of circuit court rulings
in federal media subpoena cases, send a positive message to the inter-
national community that we care about democratic freedoms at home,
and temporarily placate reporters willing to face fines and jail time to
protect confidential communications essential in sustaining the public’s
right to know.
Anastos, supra note 69, at 464–65.
Likewise, Eric M. Freedman did not like a proposed federal shield law that, in his opinion,
would leave journalists vulnerable. He said:
Just before leaving for its August 2007 recess, the House Judiciary
Committee cleared legislation that would allow compulsory disclosure
of a source in a range of cases . . . This bill is worse than useless. It is
harmful. Not only would it not have helped the press in most of the high
profile battles of recent years, but its passage could leave sources with
even less protection than at present. In most federal circuits there is a
judicially-created privilege that might provide more protection than this
statute does.
Freedman, supra note 60, at 1396 (citations omitted).
Although not giving a clear answer, Leila Wombacher Knox also addressed the issue of
whether there should be an absolute federal shield law, saying:
Clearly, there is a need for reporters to offer their sources confidentiality
if the press is going to operate in the vigorous manner that the Framers
envisioned. The primary issue is how far any federal shield law should
stretch: should it be an absolute protection against being compelled to
reveal anonymous sources, or a qualified privilege with a balancing test
similar to what many courts read from Branzburg? An examination of
state shield laws can prove helpful in clarifying this issue.
Leila Wombacher Knox, Note, The Reporter’s Privilege: The Necessity of a Federal Shield
Law Thirty Years After Branzburg, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 125, 139 (2005) (citation
omitted) (comparing state shield laws and Senator Dodd and Senator Lugar’s proposed federal
legislation and apparently concluding that the more common qualified privilege is preferable
to an absolute privilege).
A problem that Joel M. Gora emphasizes in relation to Miller is that the absence of a
federal shield law undercuts states’ rights to protect journalists such as Miller.
Indeed, in the Miller/Cooper case, the journalists’ request for Supreme
Court review was supported by a coalition of thirty-four state attorneys
general. These state law enforcement officials took the position that the
absence of federal constitutional or other uniform protection for journalist
sources undermines the States’ policy choices to protect journalists’
sources and ignores the fact that law enforcement in those states are able
to function effectively without having to impose upon journalists. The
states’ point was that often the journalist or the source will not know
if the subject matter of the story will lead to possible federal judicial
proceedings—where confidentiality may not be available—or state judi-
cial proceedings—where there is probably a protective shield law. This
uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the source will cooperate
with the journalist and thereby undercuts the states’ policy of protecting
journalists’ sources.
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The Senate Judiciary Committee passed its own version of a shield law454 in
December 2009 after completing negotiations with the Obama Administration re-
garding national security provisions.455 The full Senate did not pass the bill.456
For more articles on the federal shield-law debate, see, for example, Anthony L. Fargo,
Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can Learn From the States, 11 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 35 (2006) (comparing the proposed federal shield laws of Senator Christopher
Dodd and Senator Richard Lugar); Michelle C. Gabriel, Plugging Leaks: The Necessity of
Distinguishing Whistleblowers and Wrongdoers in the Free Flow of Information Act, 40 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 531 (2009); Cathy Packer, The Politics of Power: A Social Architecture Analysis
of the 2005–2008 Federal Shield Law Debate in Congress, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
395 (2009); and Mark Gomsak, Note, The Free Flow of Information Act of 2006: Settling the
Journalist’s Privilege Debate, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2007).
For an article that favors passing a federal shield law and also compares shield laws in other
countries, see, Goldstein, supra note 454, at 112–26 (comparing protection or lack thereof
internationally). Lee Levine forcefully argues for a shield law in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., REPORTERS’ PRIVILEGE LEGISLATION: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
99 (Comm. Print 2005).
Incidents that happen in states can likewise shed light on the debate for appropriate federal
shield laws. For example, the importance of a broad definition of the covered media came to
the fore in the 2005 decision of Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that Alabama’s shield law, enacted in 1935, “bestows
an absolute privilege,” but, unfortunately for the Sports Illustrated reporter involved in a libel
suit, the statute did not mention “magazine” under the covered media. Id. at 1335, 1340–41.
It covered persons “engaged in, connected with or employed on any newspaper, radio broad-
casting station or television station.” Id. at 1335. The court said, “It seems to us plain and
apparent that in common usage ‘newspaper’ does not mean ‘newspaper and magazine.’” Id.
at 1336. For commentary, see, for example, Dean C. Smith, Price v. Time Revisited: The
Need for Medium-Neutral Shield Laws in an Age of Strict Construction, 14 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 235 (2009).
On the importance of adequate language in state shield laws, see generally, Edward L.
Carter, Note, Reporter’s Privilege in Utah, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (2003) (Utah); L. Michael
Higgins, Jr., Comment, Rusty Shields for Those Who Wield the Pen: The State of Alabama’s
Reporter Shield Law in the Aftermath of Price v. Time, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 263 (2006–2007)
(Alabama); Caroline Lynch Pieroni, Note, Staying Out of Jail . . . Sometimes: Maintaining
a Free Press Through Journalist Shield Laws Requires Changes Not Only at the Federal
Level, but Also Among the States, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 803 (2009); Richard Rosen,
Comment, A Call for Legislative Response to New York’s Narrow Interpretation of the
Newspersons’ Privilege: Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Inc. v. Greenberg, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 285 (1988) (New York); Toland, supra note 212 (Kansas); Leita Walker, Comment,
Saving the Shield with Silkwood: A Compromise to Protect Journalists, Their Sources, and
the Public, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215 (2005) (Kansas); and John T. White, Comment, Smoke
Screen: Are State Shield Laws Really Protecting Speech or Simply Providing Cover for
Criminals Like the Serial Arsonist?, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909 (2001) (Arizona).
454 S. 448, 111th Cong. (2009).
455 Senate Committee Passes Shield Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at A28.
456 J.C. Derrick, Federal Shield Law Introduced in House Once More, REPS. COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.rcfp.org/node/98369.
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The Senate bill contained some notable differences compared to the House bill.
One difference is that, in criminal cases, the burden of proof fell on the covered person
to establish “by clear and convincing evidence” that disclosure of information would
be contrary to the public interest,457 though the burden fell on the party seeking infor-
mation in noncriminal cases.458 The Senate bill also outlined several exceptions to the
privilege absent from the House bill, when the information sought regarded cases of
kidnapping, sex offenses against minors, or damage to critical infrastructure.459
The Senate bill also appeared to protect bloggers. It defined “covered person”
by whether the person’s “primary intent” at the inception of collecting information
was to disseminate it publicly and the information involved events or issues of public
interest.460 Unlike the House bill, it did not list any requirements regarding “substantial
livelihood.”461 It did, however, list media through which the information must be dis-
seminated, including print, broadcasting, “electronic” or “other means.”462
Notably missing from the House and Senate proposals was absolute protection
for journalists concerning their confidential sources. An earlier bill introduced in the
Senate, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, provided absolute protection:
in any proceeding or in connection with any issue arising under
Federal law, no Federal entity may compel a covered person to
disclose—(1) the identity of a source of information—(A) from
whom the covered person obtained information; and (B) who the
457 The reporter is to “tak[e] into account” the public interest in the flow of information, as
well as any potential harm to national security. S. 448 § 2(a)(2)(A)(iv).
458 Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(ii).
459 Id. § 4.
As the Washington Post reported on the 2009 legislation: “The House and Senate mea-
sures would not cover people who work as agents of foreign powers or are affiliated with
government-named terrorist organizations.” Pincus, supra note 439; see also S. 448 § 11
(1)(c)(ii); H.R. 985, 111th Cong. § 4 (2) (2009).
Thus, if WikiLeaks were classified as a terrorist organization, as Rep. Peter King wants,
WikiLeaks would not receive shield protection. On Rep. King, see supra note 14.
On the other hand, under the proposed 2009 legislation,
When classified information is involved, the protection of the source
or the information would require the government to show the materials
were properly classified. Then a judge would have to find after an evi-
dentiary hearing that their disclosure could cause significant harm to
national security that would outweigh benefits to the public interest with
its publication.
Pincus, supra note 439, at A5; see H.R. 985 § 2(c). The Post quoted Sen. Schumer as saying,
“This compromise accommodates both the need for Americans to be safe and the right of
Americans to be free in a country with an unencumbered press.” Pincus, supra note 439, at A5.
460 S. 448 § 11(2)(A).
461 Compare id. § 11(2), with H.R. 985 § 4(2).
462 S. 448 § 11(2)(A)(iii).
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covered person believes to be a confidential source; or (2) any
information that could reasonably be expected to lead to the dis-
covery of the identity of such a source.463
The proposed 2005 law would have protected reporters, such as Jim Taricani and
Judith Miller, who refused to reveal their sources. Under the 2009 proposals, neither
Taricani, Miller, nor Vanessa Leggett might be so fortunate.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
In too many jurisdictions, lawyers fighting on behalf of journalists are going into
battle with a paper shield or no shield at all. Journalists, using that term in the broadest
sense, need a bulletproof shield.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg was unfortunate in its denial of shield
protection under the First Amendment, but at least the Court invited states and the
federal government to create shield laws. “It goes without saying, of course, that we
are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing
their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s privilege, either qualified or
absolute,” the Court said.464 Now it is up to legislators to craft shield laws that really
do give protection instead of maybe just giving a false sense of security.465
463 S. 340, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005). Section 6 of the proposed law said: “The publication
or dissemination of any testimony or document (or portion of such testimony or document),
identity, or information described in section 4 shall not waive the prohibition described in such
section.” Id. § 6. This means that no journalist may lose the privilege against revealing sources
because of any prior revelation about the source, whether in a publication or when testifying.
464 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
465 Arguments to the effect that journalists should have no special privileges perhaps fail to
consider this: Congress in the past has come to journalists’ defense in other situations, creating
special laws for journalists. See, e.g., Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1804
(2006) (exempting newspapers from certain provisions of antitrust laws).
Consider this example from antitrust law: Congress acted after the decision in 1969 in
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States (known as the “Tucson Case”), when the Supreme
Court declared that “joint operating agreements” were illegal. 394 U.S. 131 (1969). The agree-
ments, according to the Court amounted to “price fixing,” “profit pooling,” and “market control,”
all of which are illegal under the Sherman Act. Id. at 134–35. At that time, two dozen other
cities besides Tucson had papers with joint operating agreements. The following year, 1970,
Congress passed the Newspaper Preservation Act. Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1804 (2006)). This Act permits joint operating agreements for
newspapers if at least one of the two newspapers is “failing” or “in probable danger of
financial failure.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1802(5), 1803(6). Also, new joint operating agreements,
agreements not in existence in 1970 when the act was passed, have to have written consent
of the Attorney General of the United States.
Congress also passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 in the wake of the United States
Supreme Court’s 5–3 decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 463 U.S. 547 (1978), which
permitted knock-and-enter searches of newsrooms. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa (2006).
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Having some protection in only some areas is tantamount to having no protection.
Being protected from the heat of reentry everywhere on one’s spaceship, but not in the
few little places where falling foam has stripped the protective tiles away, is tantamount
to having no protection. The heat can do its deadly job through a small portal.
Likewise, with shield laws, prosecutors can get the job done in the heat of the
courtroom when shield laws provide less than absolute protection. Being jailed after
the prosecutor convinces the judge that some multipart test is met is just as bitter as
going to jail without the oratory. It may be more bitter because the shield law implied
that it would do what it could not, namely, shield a reporter.
Inadequate shield laws leave journalists as too-easy targets for judges who do not
like to hear journalists, or anyone else, tell them “No.” Imprisonment should not be an
option for these journalists because some judges will use that option. Freedom of the
press, under those circumstances, becomes a sham. No matter how one tries to parse
the phrase, freedom of the press cannot truly exist so long as journalists face the real
possibility of going to jail for just doing their jobs.
Perhaps journalists, in part, have not done a good enough job lobbying for them-
selves. Legislators and their constituents may sometimes wonder, why should journal-
ists be so adamant about protecting sources, and why should this country care?
The Zurcher case started when a student newspaper, the Stanford Daily, published a staff
member’s photographs of a student demonstration that got out of hand. Zurcher, 463 U.S. at
550–51. Demonstrators occupied the administrative offices of Stanford University Hospital,
barricading the adjacent hall at both ends. Id. at 550. When police tried to forcibly enter from
the west, students armed with clubs attacked nine policeman stationed at the east end. Id. All
nine officers were hurt. Id. Most reporters had been at the west end; the one Stanford Daily
photographer had been at the east. Id.
After the paper published the pictures, four policemen, armed with a search warrant,
looked for photographs, negatives, and film in the paper’s filing cabinets, desks, photography
laboratory, and wastebaskets. Id. at 551. Zurcher was the chief of police. Id. at 552. The news-
paper and its staff members sued, claiming violation of their rights under the First and Fourth
Amendments. Id. Although the Supreme Court upheld the search of the Stanford Daily’s
newsroom, outraged journalists ultimately prevailed in convincing Congress to pass a federal
law aimed at limiting such occurrences in the future.
The law defines a covered person as “a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to
disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public commu-
nication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). The Privacy
Protection Act applies to federal, state, and local authorities. Id. §§ 2000aa(a), 2000aa-7(c). Quite
simply, the law generally forbids officers to perform a knock-and-enter search of a newsroom
with a search warrant. Id. § 2000aa(a)–(b).
But the protection is qualified, not absolute. Under the law, an officer can only search a
news office with a search warrant if probable cause exists to believe the reporter was involved
in the crime, there is danger of bodily harm or loss of life, or there is danger the material will
be destroyed. Id. Otherwise, the police have to ask the reporter to hand over the material
voluntarily, or the police have to get a subpoena duces tecum, which provides an opportunity
for a legal challenge to the propriety of surrendering information before the reporter turns it
over. Id. § 2000aa(c). If the reporter fails to respond to the subpoena, then the police do have
a fourth ground upon which to obtain a search warrant. Id. § 2000aa(b)(4).
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Journalists should be willing to explain that their goal in promising confidentiality
to a source is to gain information that the journalist could not gain otherwise. The
source is either the only individual who knows that information or is part of a small
group that knows the information. The source is divulging information to the jour-
nalist despite the fact that it would be adverse to the source’s self-interest if he or she
were known to be the source of that information. The adversity that the source could
experience, if his or her identity became known, includes criminal prosecution, loss
of a job, loss of esteem in the community due to the source’s participation in wrong-
doing, the source’s being viewed as disloyal, or, in the most egregious circumstances,
even loss of life.466
Journalists should also explain that refusing to reveal the identity of a source is
considered by responsible journalists to be a fiduciary duty. This fiduciary duty to the
source is an obligation of the highest order because of the enormous personal risks the
source may be taking in furnishing information to the journalist.
The source is placing his or her trust in the journalist based on the journalist’s
promise of confidentiality. The source’s confidence that the reporter will keep that
promise is key to the source’s divulging sensitive information. The reporter’s living
up to the fiduciary obligation of keeping the promise of confidentiality may literally
make the difference in the source’s living, or, at least, living well.
The enormity of the consequences to the source creates the enormity of the fidu-
ciary obligation; a source may be risking his or her life on the promise by the jour-
nalist to keep the source’s identity secret, forever.467 What trust could be greater? What
fiduciary duty could be greater? None.
The source places his or her security in the hands of the reporter, trusting in the
good faith, integrity, and fidelity of the reporter who made the promise. Vigilance
466 After deciding that he or she should promise confidentiality, the reporter must then turn
his or her attention to gaining support for this decision from his or her editors. The reporter
might have to divulge the identity of the source to the editors. Sometimes editors want to know
the source of the story because they want to assure themselves that the source is credible. These
editors consider it part of their duty, as responsible editors, to weigh the credibility of the source
because the whole news organization could be on the line for suit if the source’s information
turns out to be wrong and libelous. Also, editors fear a loss of credibility with the public if
the information disseminated by their news organizations turns out to be misinformation.
Sometimes editors do not want to know the source of the information because they trust the
judgment of the reporter and because they want to limit the number of persons who know the
source’s identity. An editor’s not wanting to know might also be a matter of self-interest because
the editor does not want to be subject to jail time or fines if ordered by a judge to reveal the
source’s identity. For the dangers of editors voluntarily burning sources after the reporter has
promised confidentiality, see generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
467 “The legislation should contain an explicit provision that extends the privilege after the
death of a journalist,” according to Rodney A. Smolla. Smolla, supra note 75, at 1430. He
suggests using the case of Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), as a model
to follow. Smolla, supra note 75, at 1430. The Supreme Court in that case held that the
attorney-client privilege indeed survives death. Swindler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402.
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and faithfulness in the execution of this fiduciary duty are imperative; the promise of
confidentiality must be held inviolable.
Perhaps protection of sources and confidential information, as well, boils down
primarily to a matter of credibility. After all, credibility is a journalist’s stock in trade.
Of course, credibility is essential with a public that relies on the accuracy of the infor-
mation disseminated by journalists.
However, credibility is also essential among potential confidential sources of
unique information. Otherwise, the sources will not trust the journalists and will not
reveal the information. As a result, the question about the public’s view of the credi-
bility of that information will be moot because the public will never receive that infor-
mation and the sources will not reveal information because they do not consider the
journalists’ promises of confidentiality credible.
Thus, if the credibility circle is broken between the source and the journalist, the
credibility circle cannot even be formed between the journalist and the public. A gap
in information will occur, and the effect on society of that gap will depend on the
importance of that lost information to society.
In short, confidence in confidentiality is imperative because a breakdown in con-
fidence ultimately leads to a loss of information for society—a loss of knowledge.
Perhaps James Madison expressed most tersely the importance of knowledge to our
society: “a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives.”468
Journalists, in short, deserve shield protection—real shield protection—because
their free and unfettered performance is critical to the functioning of this country.
468 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
